The troops arrived in Buner with the aim of protecting government buildings and bridges, but soon after they arrived, militants attacked their convoy, killing a policeman.

The Taliban’s growing influence is causing increasing concern about the Pakistani government’s ability to control the militants. 

Michael Krepon, the co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and a specialist in South Asian security matters, joins Martin Savidge to discuss the threat posed by the Taliban, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and if the Pakistani military has the ability to stem this tide of extremism.

Schools have been destroyed by violence in Pakistan’s Swat Valley, but some are reopening under the new peace deal with militants. Photo: IRIN

In Pakistan on Tuesday, Taliban militants agreed to extend a cease-fire in Swat Valley, which is largely under control of the militants. Violence in the area has killed hundreds, and up to a third of the population has left.

The Taliban said the cease-fire announced with the government last week would be extended for an indefinite period. As part of the truce, the government agreed to allow the Taliban to impose stricter Islamic law.

The truce has brought relative peace to the area, with schools re-opening. But some argue that the price for this respite is too high, and that the government has conceded to insurgents.

A blogger at “Deadpan Thoughts” in Karachi, Pakistan, criticizes the government for the deal:

So what have we gained from this ceasefire? Stoppage of the bloodshed I guess and the return of Swat to perhaps a peaceful state.  However we have also left the implementation of this shariah law in the hands of people who may chose to do with it as they want. [...]

Thus in short the government of Pakistan has abandoned Swat to the wolves, and our esteemed politicians are more than happy crowing about the saving of lives and what not, going on about their bandwagon long march with no goal in sight.

Blogger Ahmed Humayun at World Politics Review agrees, arguing that the deal will have severe and damaging effects on the power of the state:

What has prompted the government to surrender its electoral mandate? Fear. In recent months, 12,000 Pakistani troops stationed in Swat and its surrounding environs have been unable to dislodge 3,000 determined militants. Extremists have killed tribal elders, law enforcement officers, and elected representatives of the ANP, and then displayed their bodies in public squares. After repeated assassination attempts on his life, even the ANP’s leader was forced to temporarily flee the province three months ago.

[...]If Pakistan eventually sets up the courts demanded by the militants, it will have ratified a new political dispensation where non-state actors are free to dictate state policy. Islamists will be convinced that what they cannot achieve electorally, they can win through armed force. As it currently stands, rather than isolating and marginalizing extremists, the compact has conferred legitimacy on radical ideology and vindicated jihadist tactics.

Blogger “Zaheerul Hassan” in Lahore disagrees, writing that Pakistan should look for more opportunities to work with Islamists:

Islamists whom we brand as extremists and terrorists, if handled wisely, can become the real strategic assets of Pakistan. [...] I reckon, whether we like it or not, we will have to admit that the Islamists are the best fighting force available in Pakistan. By virtue of rough terrain and inclement weather conditions they live in, frugal way of living, valorous stories of their rich past, their ability to fight and use the gun and to brave extreme hardships, closeness to religion and believing in life hereafter, fearless and preferring to die than to surrender, not leaving their dead or wounded in battle behind under any circumstances, dedicated to the given cause and fighting their foes to the last irrespective of superiority of the enemy in terms of manpower, material and technology.

[...]Accord in Swat is a good beginning which must be followed up. Unwarranted concerns expressed by USA, western countries and India must be ignored. President Zardari should give peace a chance and shouldnʼt dither signing the accord. If this chance is frittered away under pressure from our detractors, the bloodletting would intensify with harrowing consequences.

The agreement could have implications on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Ahmad Kamal, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations, speaks with Martin Savidge about the impact of the deal on America’s war on terror and on the Taliban presence in Pakistan.

Read what a Worldfocus contributing blogger had to say about the Swat Valley deal: Pakistan adopts Islamic law in Swat Valley.

Pakistan’s Swat Valley is now under sharia law.

Pakistan this week agreed to a peace deal with the Taliban in the area known as the Swat Valley, suspending its military offensive and imposing tough Islamic law in that area. Religious experts will now sit in courts with judges to make sure rulings comply with Islam.

U.S. officials have expressed great concern about the deal struck between the Pakistani government and Taliban leaders.

See the Worldfocus interview about Swat Valley: Pakistan strikes peace deal with Taliban.

Jauhar Ismail blogs at “All Things Pakistan” and discusses the implications of the agreement for the U.S. and for locals in Swat Valley.

Deal in Swat: Good Move or Bad Move?

In my opinion, the devil is really in the details and the implementation of this agreement. I have mixed feeling on this: It is hard to see how the situation in Swat can be controlled only through the military means; there has to be a political dimension. This is what the U.S. is also learning the hard way in Afghanistan where there is already a talk of having some sort of adjustment with “moderate Afghan Taliban”.

In an ideal world, you would have hoped that Pakistan army would have gained the upper hand in Swat and then they could have negotiated from the position of strength. Unfortunately this is not the case. Despite several attempts, the army could not make any significant gains in Swat. Part of this is due to bad strategy and partly due the nature of guerrilla-warfare. Pakistan army was never trained to fight a counter-insurgency; fighting against India is what the focus has been so it does’t come as a surprise that it didn’t perform very well.

As far as their strategy goes, it was based primarily on using gunships and (artillery) shelling against suspected militant hide-outs. This approach is not very conducive to counter-insurgency because it leads to a lot of collateral damage. As the U.S. experience in Iraq shows, your mission in such a situation must really be to “secure the population”. This was the fundamental change in strategy that U.S. Gen. David Petraeus made but such a change requires putting a lot of boots on the ground, taking a lot more causalities and better intelligence. Unfortunately the Pak army was unwilling and incapable to take this approach which resulted in the bloody Swat stalemate.

Against this backdrop, the agreement can offer a way out if government can play its cards correctly. It should also be noted that this is not the first time that Swat will be under the so-called Shari’s law. This was the case for decades when Swat/Dir region was part of the princely state and life was governed by “Customary law”. The elected representatives of the Swat region have also been in favor of incorporating some populist militant demands such as Qazi courts and quick and simply justice with a 6 months deadline to process all cases.

One can hope that by incorporating the populist demands and a willingness to understand and work with local sensitivities, the authorities can gain credibility with the local population and take some of the wind out of the insurgency’s sails.

To read more, see the original post.

The views expressed by contributing bloggers do not reflect the views of Worldfocus or its partners.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Scott Christian under a Creative Commons license.