Martin Savidge hosts a panel of guests and address viewer questions about the region. In addition to the audio interview, here are some written answers to user-generated questions regarding the history, politics and the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

Lynn Fredriksson is a researcher on the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, for Amnesty International. She co-leads missions to the Horn. Most recently she has traveled to Nairobi, Kenya and Hargeisa, Somaliland to interview refugees from the armed conflict in southern and central Somalia.

Abdi Samatar is a professor and chair of the department of geography and global studies at the University of Minnesota. He was Fulbright Scholar to Ethiopia and Botswana. His research focuses on the relationship between democracy and development in the Third World in general and Africa in particular, and he has written extensively about Ethiopia and Somalia.

David H. Shinn is a former Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. He is currently an adjunct professor at George Washington University.  Amb. Shinn’s research interests include Africa, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and U.S. foreign policy in Africa. He also blogs regularly here.

HISTORY OF LAWLESSNESS IN SOMALIA

Photo: Abukar Albadri

Q: Why hasn’t Somalia had a stable central government in 17 years?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: Two factors contributed to the demise of a national government: Internal and external factors. Unlike what many conventional analysts claim, it has not been the genealogical structure (clans) of Somalis that has been the problem.

Instead, the key problem has been sectarian politicians who undermined the integrity of the public order by using state resources and power for personal gain and to oppress those who challenge them. The internal problem has been political rather than cultural in the sense of genealogy.

Second, the internal factor dovetailed with cold war agendas that supported whichever local groups that served their interests. These two forces jointly destroyed the legitimacy of the state and alienated the population. Once warlords divided the country into fiefdoms it has been difficult to create the space for civic minded citizens to mount a counter-attack and the international community continues to support the sectarian politicians and warlords.

Q: Has piracy always been a problem?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: Piracy is a new phenomenon and can easily be eliminated by a legitimate Somali government.

Q: How much of this is a religious struggle between Somali Muslims and Ethiopian Christians? Is radical Islam and the war on terror the root causes here?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: There is little that is religious in the conflict between Ethiopian and Somalis. The struggle is centered on the marginalization of the Somali population in Ethiopia as well as Ethiopia¹s long-standing attempt to undermine Somali unity. The war on terror is the problem. Most of Somalis who subscribe to political Islam are nationalist.

Q: What does the resignation of the Somali president in December mean for internal Somali politics and leadership going forward? How has the power sharing between Somali leaders and Islamists worked out so far? Which party/group will likely emerge from the power vacuum?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: It will not change things significantly as far as the legitimacy and capacity of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is concerned. It is hard to predict which political grouping will come out on top.

ETHIOPIA’S WITHDRAWAL FROM SOMALIA

Q:  What were Ethiopia’s goals in occupying Somalia in 2006? Did Ethiopia accomplish them? What were Ethiopia’s interests/fears concerning Somalia?

Amb. David H. Shinn: Ethiopia actually had small numbers of troops inside Somalia before 2006. The growing strength of the militias of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and, especially, their march towards Baidoa in south central Somalia in late 2006 persuaded the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopia to take strong action. Baidoa was the TFG headquarters. A few UIC leaders had even expressed an interest in waging a jihad against Ethiopia. At least one of the leaders revived the idea of Somali irredentism, or taking back land under the control of Ethiopia.

At the time of independence in 1960, it was the goal of the Somali government to incorporate into Somalia that part of Ethiopia inhabited by Somalis. This region constitutes about one-quarter of Ethiopia’s land area. Ethiopia decided it was time to defeat the UIC militia.

After defeating the UIC, Ethiopia wanted the more compliant TFG to take control of Somalia. This would remove the threat of jihad against Ethiopia and neutralize any thought of reviving Somali irredentism. Ethiopia initially succeeded militarily by soundly defeating the UIC, whose militias evacuated the capital of Mogadishu as the Ethiopians and TFG approached. Within months, however, the situation began to deteriorate in the capital. The Islamists have slowly rebuilt their strength ever since.

The Ethiopian military force and their TFG and African Union force allies became bogged down in urban guerrilla warfare. As financial costs and casualties mounted, the Ethiopians concluded it was necessary to pull out. Ethiopia says that it achieved its objectives. Over the short term, it is true that they need not fear an attack from Somalia nor is irredentism a serious threat. On the other hand, they did not install the compliant TFG in Mogadishu and forces in Somalia opposed to Ethiopia have reasserted themselves and eventually might decide to revive the idea of Somali irredentism.

My own view is that the Ethiopians decided to cut their losses and leave Somalia. In the best case scenario, this decision may permit moderate Islamists and the TFG to take control of the country and reestablish a degree of stability.

Photo: Abukar Albadri

Q: Did Ethiopia invaded Somalia with the backing of the U.S.? How did the U.S. support Ethiopia, and why?

Amb. David H. Shinn: The U.S. denied that it supported Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia. It is important to remember that the TFG invited Ethiopian troops to join them in opposing the UIC. It is still not clear to me, and I believe the public generally, to what extent the U.S. supported Ethiopia in this endeavor. We know a few facts.

The U.S. never publicly called on Ethiopia to end its military action inside Somalia nor did it publicly criticize the effort. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi publicly acknowledged that the U.S. shared intelligence with Ethiopia as the Ethiopians moved deeper into Somalia. I do not know if the U.S. provided any military equipment that could be used in the action or paid any of the costs for the invasion.  Many Somalis and Ethiopians in the region believe that the U.S. provided more tangible support. They either have information that is not available to me or they are just guessing. At a minimum, however, the U.S. gave a green light to Ethiopia.

The U.S. was sympathetic to the Ethiopian position for several reasons. The U.S. supported the TFG and Ethiopia was trying to put the TFG in power in Mogadishu. A defeat of the UIC, which at the time had both moderate and extremist members, would in the view of the U.S. reduce the likelihood that terrorism would increase in Somalia. In fact, a TFG/Ethiopian victory might even create a situation that would allow the U.S. to root out a small number of foreign terrorists that it believed had taken refuge in the country.

Q: How does the crisis in Somalia affect the greater region (Horn of Africa)?

Amb. David H. Shinn: It has had huge, negative implications for the wider region. The crisis drove Somali refugees into neighboring countries, especially Kenya and Yemen. It attracted Ethiopian troops into Somalia, further exacerbating relations between Somalis and Ethiopians.

The crisis destroyed the economy of Somalia so that it became a net importer of virtually everything rather than a producer. Somalia is traditionally a nomadic country with herds crossing between Somalia and Ethiopia. The crisis disrupted these movements and forced many nomads to move to the capital where international agencies provided emergency food aid.

Outside powers joined in the fray, seeking advantage for their own purposes. As Ethiopia supported the TFG, Eritrea supported the UIC in an effort to put additional pressure on Ethiopia.  You will recall that relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea were poor because of a dispute over demarcation of their border. A small number of outside extremists began funding radical elements in Somalia, thus increasing the specter of terrorism.  As the Somali economy broke down, more and more Somalis took to the profitable business of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. This has had a major impact on international shipping in the region.

The biggest losers in all of this, however, have been the Somalis themselves, especially innocent men, women and children who have nothing to do with the conflict.  They face regular danger, minimal food and health care, and often find themselves internally displaced.

Q: What does the resignation of the Somali president in December mean for internal Somali politics and leadership going forward? How has the power sharing between Somali leaders and Islamists worked out so far? Which party/group will likely emerge from the power vacuum?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: It will not change things significantly as far as the legitimacy and capacity of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is concerned. It is hard to predict which political grouping will come out on top.

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

Q: On Friday, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution expressing its intention to establish the U.N. force in Somalia, but postponed the final decision for several months to assess the situation and strengthen the African Union force currently deployed in the capital. Why the delay? Is the situation in Somalia on the scale of Darfur? Has the situation changed since Ethiopia pulled out?

Lynn Fredricksson: The delay appears to be based in large part on the inability of the UNSG to find lead and other country willing to make troop and other necessary commitments to constitute a full U.N. peacekeeping operation. It is also perhaps bad timing in that the Ethiopian forces are only now pulling out and the immediate imposition of a significant international force might be less than welcome, especially before the Somali people know what is happening in relation to the presidency, the impact of Ethiopian troop withdrawal and the impact of recently strengthened anti-piracy operations.

Amnesty International’s greatest concern about the new resolution is that it does not include preparations for human rights provisions to be included in any upcoming operations nor does it address the lack of capacity and  mandate for civilian protection by the current AU peacekeeping operation. While I don’t think it’s worthwhile to compare African crisis situations, I would say that the interlinked humanitarian and human rights crises in Somalia are among the worst for civilians in the world.

Photo: Abukar Albadri

Q: When were you in Somalia last, what did you see on the ground?

Lynn Fredricksson: While direct access to Somalia has been challenging due to ongoing security concerns, Amnesty International has been regularizing its missions to the region since late 2007 — including field work in the self-declared independent Somaliland and in Nairobi, Kenya, where we have interviewed refugees from southern and central Somalia, including journalists and human rights defenders who have been forced to flee, and in Djibouti where we have been monitoring the progress of the peace process there.

Our findings throughout 2008 have indicated a disturbing and ongoing targeting of human rights defenders, humanitarian aid workers and journalists, the very people who we depend on to have revealed consistently dire human rights conditions in which humanitarian organizations are obstructed from providing desperately needed assistance to some 3.2 million vulnerable Somali civilians.

Q: Has the safety of humanitarian workers and journalists improved?

Lynn Fredricksson: Conditions for Somali human rights defenders, aid workers and journalists has not yet improved. It often takes time for developments like the Ethiopian withdrawal, the resignation of the president or United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to result in clear changes in conditions on the ground.

It is therefore essential that the international community, particularly the UNSC and donor countries, pay close attention and commit significant resources to humanitarian access and assistance, human rights monitoring and a commission of inquiry, and enforcement of the arms embargo, beyond only peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy operations.

ROLE OF BARACK OBAMA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

Q:  What will an Obama administration mean for Somalia?  Will the international community intervene?

Amb. David H. Shinn: The UNSC, with strong support from the outgoing Bush administration, adopted a resolution on Jan. 16, 2009 that called on the African Union to strengthen its force in Mogadishu from 2,600 to 8,000 troops. It also authorized the U.N. Secretary General to submit a report by April 15 that includes a possible mandate for a U.N. peacekeeping force in Somalia and to make a decision on this matter by June 1.

The U.S. has been pressing the U.N. for months to put a peacekeeping force in Somalia. So long as there is no peace to keep, this idea is problematic. U.S. ambassador-designate to the U.N., Susan Rice, expressed no enthusiasm for a U.N. peacekeeping force in recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Even if the U.N. eventually agrees to a peacekeeping force, it will probably be predicated on the ability to “keep” the peace rather than to “make” peace.  The Obama administration, in view of the unhappy U.S. experience in Somalia in 1992-1993, would not likely allow the U.S. to contribute boots on the ground. At best, the U.S. would pay its share of the cost and provide logistical and intelligence support to the peacekeeping force.

I believe the Obama administration will pursue a more flexible approach to the Somali crisis by consulting with a wider range of Somali participants involved in the conflict. It may also pay greater attention to ameliorating the humanitarian catastrophe caused by the conflict.  It may try to grapple more effectively with the root causes of the crisis rather than focus almost exclusively on the conflict as a counter-terrorism issue.

Photo: Abukar Albadri

Q: What needs to happen in order to stabilize the humanitarian crises?

Lynn Fredricksson: Stability and security in Somalia will require a the confluence of a number of factors:

• progress on the various facets of a more inclusive peace process
• development of a mandate and capacity for whatever peacekeeping operation exists in Somalia to protect civilians
• strengthening and enforcement of the arms embargo
• the eventual deployment of human rights monitors and progress toward the establishment of a commission of inquiry into past human rights abuses
• and, security focus on unhindered access and adequate funding for humanitarian operations to provide for the immediate needs of more than 1.2 million internally displaced Somali civilians, hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees in Kenya, Somaliland and other areas of the region, and other vulnerable Somali civilians; and protection for Somali human rights defenders, aid workers and journalists.

Photo courtesy of Abukar Albadri and the CIA World Factbook.

Credits:
Host: Martin Savidge
Producers: Lisa Biagiotti, Katie Combs and Stephen Puschel

Haley Duschinski, assistant professor of cultural anthropology at Ohio University, has researched issues of the Kashmiri people for the past 10 years.

Professor Haley Duschinski answers your questions about Kashmir. Listen to our  webcasted radio show with Prof. Duschinski, other experts and Kashmiri-Americans here.

Thank you for the dozens of insightful questions about the current situation in South Asia and your perspectives and concerns about the Kashmiri people. I have batched your questions into themes below.

By way of background, I’m a cultural anthropologist at Ohio University, and I’ve been conducting research on issues relating to the Kashmir conflict for the past 10 years through long-term field research in India and Kashmir Valley.

As an anthropologist, I use a bottom-up approach to understanding current politics and economics. This means that I approach the Kashmir situation by trying to understand Kashmiris’ everyday lives and local worlds –- by trying to see things from Kashmiri perspectives and Kashmiri points of view.

KASHMIR AT A GLANCE

Q. How large is Kashmir? How many Kashmiris are there? What are the ethnic/religious breakdowns in Kashmir?

Haley Duschinski: Kashmir Valley is part of India’s northernmost state, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), which lies in the Himalayan Mountains on the borders with Pakistan, Tibet and China.

The state itself is made up of three distinctive regions with different religious and ethnic compositions:

Jammu — about 65 percent Hindu, mainly ethnic Dogras
Ladakh — about 50 percent Tibetan Buddhist with significant Muslim communities
Kashmir Valley — about 90 percent Kashmiri Muslim

Kashmir Valley is located past the Pir Panjal mountain range along the sensitive boundary line with Pakistan, Jammu is located beanth the mountains and closer to the plains, while Ladakh shares many topographical features with neighboring Tibet. The population of the entire state is about 10 million, with approximately 5.5 million people in Kashmir Valley.

Map of the Jammu and Kashmir region. Source: CIA

Kashmir Valley is also home to a minority community of Kashmiri Hindus, who largely migrated out of the region when the separatist movement escalated around 1990. About 7,000 Kashmiri Hindus remain in Kashmir Valley today.

This statewide religious, ethnic and regional variation makes the situation there very complicated.

It’s important to remember that when Kashmiris talk about their homeland, they’re referring to the original territory of Jammu and Kashmir that spans the heavily militarized ceasefire line between India and Pakistan known as the Line of Control.

This original territory has been carved up since independence in 1947 into several different portions. Pakistan controls about one-third of the original territory and China controls a smaller part.

LIFE IN KASHMIR

Q. What is life like for Kashmiris?

Haley Duschinski: Since 1990, India has maintained more than 500,000 armed security forces in the region, making Kashmir Valley one of the most heavily militarized areas in the entire world.

The capital city of Srinagar is mapped with armed patrol units, sandbag posts, concrete and barbed wire bunkers and military checkpoints for pedestrians and automobiles. Outside of the capital city, the presence of armed security forces is pervasive, with army and paramilitary forces appropriating public schools, private hotels, cinema halls, government offices, orchard lands and abandoned houses.  Basharat Peer provides a stirring account of everyday life in Kashmir in his upcoming memoir entitled “Curfewed Night.”

Kashmiris are required to carry official identification cards with them when traveling in public, and they are subject to interrogation and search at any time. Many Kashmiris have told me that they feel like they are living in a prison –- that their homeland is under siege. Doctors Without Borders has published reports about the psycho-social and general health of the Kashmiri population.

Everyday life in Kashmir Valley today is largely determined by a special law called the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).

Some Kashmiris feel they are living in a prison.

As the Kashmiri independence movement escalated in the late 1980s, the Indian central government declared J&K a “disturbed area” and passed the AFSPA to grant extraordinary powers to security forces personnel, including authority to use lethal force against any individuals suspected of breaking the law and disturbing the peace.

The AFSPA has facilitated various human rights abuses including extrajudicial killing, disappearance, torture and rape. International human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as well as Kashmiri human rights organizations have strongly criticized the special act for violating international humanitarian law, particularly the right to life, and for granting state agents impunity for human rights violations.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Q. What is the state of human rights in the region?

Haley Duschinski: The official civilian death toll in the conflict is 20,000. Kashmiri human rights organizations claim that 70,000 people have died during the conflict and 8,000 have disappeared.

Just this summer, Indian armed forces opened fire on unarmed Kashmiri civilians protesting in the streets, killing nearly 40 and injuring 600.

Earlier this year, mass graves [PDF] of approximately 1,000 individuals were exhumed in Kashmir Valley. Due to the special acts, Kashmiris find it very difficult — if not impossible — to pursue justice for these types of human rights violations, and they feel that their suffering has been ignored by the international community.

Kashmiri human rights lawyers emphasize that any sustainable peace in the region must be founded on principles of truth, justice, and accountability.

INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE GOVERNMENT

Q. Who runs Kashmir? Are there local officials? How does the government work with the state?

Haley Duschinski: Like other Indian states, Jammu and Kashmir has a multiparty democratic system of governance, with elections to determine members the union parliament and the state assembly.  Elections were suspended during the peak years of the conflict from 1990 to 1996, but there have been several rounds of elections over the past decade.

The strongest political parties in Kashmir Valley are the National Conference, the Congress Party, and the People’s Democratic Party. In fact, elections are happening right now, and you can follow them on the website of the English-language news site Greater Kashmir.

As a result of the unusual circumstances surrounding its accession to India, Jammu and Kashmir is the only Indian state that has a special degree of autonomy under Article 370 of the Indian constitution. Article 370 grants the state autonomy in determining its own affairs except in defense, foreign affairs, and communication. Since the 1950s, Article 370 has been substantially eroded through various measures of the Indian central government.

The Hajipir Pass, near the Line of Control.

Q. What is it that India and Pakistan covet in Kashmir? Are there natural resources or strategic advantages that pit the countries against one another?

Haley Duschinski: It is certainly true that Kashmir is located in a strategically advantageous position on the border between India and Pakistan, adjacent to China and Tibet.

But I feel that the contestation over Kashmir is less about the region’s strategic location or natural resources (although there are disputes over a critical water source there) and more about its symbolic and political significance to both neighboring countries.

When the British left the subcontinent in 1947, the colonial territory was partitioned into India, which espoused a principal of secular nationalism, and Pakistan, which espoused a principle of religious (Islamic) nationalism.

India has always claimed Kashmir Valley as proof of its commitment to secularism, while Pakistan claims Kashmir Valley on the basis of its Muslim majority population.  Of course, the situation is more complicated than this, because over the decades India and Pakistan have become locked into a sort of Cold War standoff over the region, with both sides refusing to back down in their territorial claims.

Political parties in each country have benefited from this situation by mobilizing popular support for their political positions and platforms through incendiary rhetoric involving Kashmir.

It often feels as though India and Pakistan are playing out their national security performances along the Line of Control in this border region, with quite devastating consequences for the Kashmiri people.

Q. What do the people of Kashmir want — independence? Will Kashmir ever receive independence from India or Pakistan? Can Kashmir be split up? Could the Kashmiris effectively govern the region?

Haley Duschinski: Kashmiris are vocal in their demand for independence, or azaadi.  The concept of azaadi is complicated, and it means different things to different people at different times.  Kashmiris’ desire for independence is a longstanding one that is shaped by peoples’ collective memories of occupation and exploitation by a series of outside rulers –- Mughuls, Afghans, Sikhs, Dogras and now Indians –- across history. This means that the Kashmiri demand for self-determination is not simply about seceding or breaking away from India; it’s also a way of demanding an opportunity to express their collective will in relation to their own political future.

To learn more about Kashmiri experiences and aspirations, I highly recommend a recent documentary film called Jashn-e-Azadi (“How We Celebrate Freedom”) by a Kashmiri filmmaker named Sanjay Kak.

Many Kashmiris feel dissatisfied with the way that their community has been treated by India since independence in 1947. Indian rule in the region since the 1940s has included repression, economic deprivation and indiscriminate violence, including, at various times, the denial of democratic processes, the manipulation of elections, and the jailing of political leaders.  These practices, and especially the widespread human rights violations since 1990, have made generations of Kashmiris feel very alienated from the Indian state. Kashmiris also remember that they were promised the opportunity to determine their own futures through a plebiscite at the time of accession to India, and that this promise has never been fulfilled.

India and Pakistan have been pursuing a peace process since 2004 that focuses in large part on finding a way to resolve their contested claims to Kashmir. The peace process has produced some tangible results, most notably a ceasefire across the Line of Control, as well as a series of confidence-building measures such as cross-border bus service and cross-border trade routes. Although Kashmiris have generally responded positively to these developments, the measures still remain largely symbolic gestures without tangible consequence for most people living in the valley.

A soldier by the Dal Lake in Srinagar.

Q. How can this situation be resolved?

Haley Duschinski: Many different plans have been proposed for resolving the Kashmir situation. Before he resigned as president of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf proposed a four-point solution involving (1) porous borders in Kashmir with freedom of movement for Kashmiri people, (2) local self-governance within each region of Kashmir, (3) phased withdrawal of troops from all regions, and (4) a joint supervisory mechanism involving India and Pakistan.

Some political factions in Kashmir Valley support this plan, or variations of it, while others continue to push a separatist agenda.

U.S. President-Elect Barack Obama has indicated that he will prioritize a resolution to the Kashmir conflict as part of a more comprehensive and interlocking strategy in South Asia.

As an American academic, it’s certainly not my place to offer resolutions to the Kashmir situation.  I will, however, point out that it’s impossible to imagine any meaningful or productive political settlement that does not take seriously the longstanding grievances and democratic aspirations of the Kashmiri people.

- Haley Duschinski

Photos courtesy of Flickr users NotMicroButSoft and dave watts under a Creative Commons license.

The attacks in Mumbai have brought new attention to an old dispute between India and Pakistan about the land of Kashmir.

The region of 13 million straddles Pakistan, India and China, but India has controlled the majority of Kashmir for decades. Pakistan controls a much smaller area, as does China.

Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three wars over the part of Kashmir controlled by India. Though India is mainly Hindu, two-thirds of the population in this part of Kashmir is Muslim, the predominant religion of Pakistan.

An anti-Indian insurgency in Kashmir has recently intenstified, and India believes such insurgents may have been responsible for the attacks in Mumbai.

Haley Duschinski is a cultural anthropologist at Ohio University who regularly travels to Kashmir, most recently in February. Her research focuses on violence and war, human rights and transitional justice in Kashmir within the context of the ongoing peace process between India and Pakistan.

Thank you all for your questions. Professor Duschinski has answered them here.

Michael J. Kavanagh reporting from The Democratic Republic of Congo. Photo: Taylor Krauss

Michael J. Kavanagh is a journalist with the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting. He returned from The Democratic Republic of Congo last week and answers questions from Worldfocus viewers on the crisis in eastern Congo.

A lot of really interesting questions, I have to say — thank you. It makes me feel really hopeful that people are starting to understand DR Congo more and more.

I’m going to group questions into three themes: History of the conflict, rebel fighting in Congo and the humanitarian crisis.

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT

Q. Is this a Hutu/Tutsi conflict spilling over from Rwanda?

Michael J. Kavanagh: Let me start by talking about group identity in eastern Congo, which is incredibly difficult to wrap one’s head around.

This is not a Hutu/Tutsi conflict, per se. This is a political and economic conflict in which group identity is manipulated by opportunistic politicians and military leaders for their own political/military/economic ends.

There are at least a dozen tribal groups in eastern Congo, and even among those groups, there are local/regional differences that cause people of the same group to support different sides in the conflict (or none at all).

In Congo – like anywhere in the world, including Rwanda – identity is a fluid thing and at any one time a person might choose to ally himself/herself to any group that is part of his/her identity. This includes church, party, family, clan, tribe, village, profession and any other number of things that have a purchase on how we conceive of who we are.

For the last 15 years, Congolese Tutsis, the Tutsi-led government of Rwanda, and a group of other Congolese allied with these two groups – mostly Congolese Hutu but also supporters from other tribes – have had an enormous amount of power in eastern Congo. They own vast amounts of land, they own mines and cattle and hotels and are captains of industry. Some of this wealth came legally over decades, some of it came extra-legally during the wars that started in 1996 when Rwanda invaded Congo.

For many years, these men (they’re mostly men) were backed by the significant military might of Rwanda and their allied army in eastern Congo, the RCD (don’t worry about the name – it doesn’t exist anymore). But in spite of their enormous military and economic power, they make up a very small part of the Congolese population. So when the war ended and elections took place in 2006, Congolese Tutsi and their allies essentially lost all their electoral power.

There was legitimate fear that much of their economic power might be at risk, both because of the corruption of the Congolese government and lingering animosity towards Rwanda and its Congolese supporters in the east after years of war between the two countries. Seeing no political avenues to ensure their power, these men instead chose to exploit legitimate grievances – the continued presence of Rwandan Hutu génocidaires in Congo (FDLR), 40,000 Congolese Tutsi refugees in exile in Rwanda and anti-Tutsi sentiment – as a justification to taking up arms and force their way into politics to protect their interests.

This is a thumbnail sketch of why war continues in the Kivus.

Q. Who’s supplying weapons?

Rebel leader, General Laurent Nkunda. Photo: Michael J. Kavanagh

Michael J. Kavanagh: The Congolese government has typically supplied FDLR (the Rwandan Hutus), though it’s no longer overt (the FDLR are considered a terrorist group by the U.S.). The government of Congo also works openly with many local militia groups.

Interestingly, General Laurent Nkunda also gets most of his weapons from the government of Congo – by stealing them.  There’s some evidence that some supplies come from Rwanda as well (or at least Rwandan sympathizers.)

Q. Most often in Africa, extractive resources are being fought over. Is that a factor here?

Michael J. Kavanagh: You can never reduce any conflict to one variable but you’re right that many conflicts in Africa (and elsewhere: e.g., Iraq) have a component that is related to fighting over an extractive industry or other natural resources. In this case, Congo is full of minerals and fertile land and economics plays a huge role in the perpetuation of this conflict, even if we’re not always talking about an extractive industry.

Q. Why would the Congolese government support Hutu militias?

Michael J. Kavanagh: The best way to answer this question is to begin by clarifying it: Why is the Congolese government supporting Rwandan Hutus? Because the FDLR are primarily Rwandan Hutus who came to Congo as refugees after the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

The alliance is more political than tribal – the FDLR were important allies of Congo in the second Congolese war (1998-2003), which pitted Tutsi-led Rwanda against the Congolese government led by current President Joseph Kabila’s father, Laurent Kabila.

For the time being, Congo’s government and the FDLR have similar interests: Certain economic ventures and diminishment of Rwanda’s power in the region. If their interests diverge, the alliance between Congo and the FDLR attenuates quite quickly.

But to expand, there are many Hutus in eastern Congo who are not Rwandan – they are, in fact, the largest single identity group in the conflict zone in North Kivu. Some have joined the FDLR or sympathize with them. Many, if not most, have/do not.

Congolese Hutu identity is complicated by several factors – on the one hand, they’ve been historically discriminated against by the Congolese state as foreigners who speak Kinyarwanda (the language of Rwanda), just like Congolese Tutsis. As a result, there have been important ties between Congolese Hutus and Tutsis and there are many Hutus who are fervent supporters of Nkunda.

On the other hand, many Congolese Hutu were killed by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan army in the Congo wars starting in 1996 in reprisal for the genocide. It’s a part of the Rwandan genocide story that has yet to fully be documented, but it’s part of the historical memory of many Congolese and Rwandan Hutus.

In part because of their alliance during those wars, many eastern Congolese feel affinity for Hutus and vice versa as their tribal brothers, and they say Tutsis are from a different tribal lineage.  This is genetically and historically very dubious, but many Congolese believe it.

My most interesting conversations in eastern Congo are often with Hutus explaining why they support whatever group they support, because it’s often a decision grounded in a very personal – not group – history.

REBEL FIGHTING IN CONGO

UN vehicles patrol the streets of Rutshuru. Photo: Michael J. Kavanagh

Q. Who are the rebels? Are they primarily educated members of the middle class, like the mujahideen in Afghanistan? Or are they victims of economic devastation?

Michael J. Kavanagh: The CNDP rebels are a mix of dairy farmers/cattle herders, hardcore believers in combating Tutsi oppression, demobilized Rwandan professional soldiers, and forcibly recruited cadres from Congolese Hutu communities and from Rwanda’s working class. They primarily speak Kinyarwanda and the leaders are generally Tutsi (who fought with the Rwandan Patriotic Army in the 1990s).

Many of the leaders are relatively well educated – like RPA, CNDP has always stressed education, training, discipline.  Are they middle class?  It’s hard to say if there is such a thing as a middle class in Congo – even those who aren’t subsistence farmers aren’t particularly well off.  However, many of the CNDPs most fervent supporters are extremely well-off Tutsis who own a lot of land and cows and see the CNDP as their protectors.

Q. What is the involvement of Muslims in this conflict? Which of the protagonists are primarily Muslim?

Michael J. Kavanagh: Very little/none. Congolese are mostly Catholic and Christian. Nkunda himself is Christian. When I was last with him in late February he was wearing a pin that said “Rebels for Christ.”

Q. I’ve read that one of the big issues being contended is a big deal to give China mineral access in return for transportation systems. Is this cause related to those of groups like MEND?

Michael J. Kavanagh: Yes – Congo’s president Kabila has sold off huge mineral contracts to China in exchange for infrastructure construction.  This is one of the topics that Nkunda wants to discuss with the president directly, if he ever gets that chance (I’m not sure what he wants to say, however).  There’s an impressive Fast Company article, China Invades Africa, that talks about China’s influence in Congo if you’re interested.

As far as I know, there are no links between CNDP and MEND.  CNDP and MEND come from slightly different places politically and economically – some Tutsis already have a lot of economic power and they’re protecting it; MEND is trying to get Nigeria and the oil companies to redistribute economic power more equitably.

Q. Who benefits from the situation over there, and are the mobs being manipulated to anyone’s advantage?

Michael J.Kavanagh: A lot of people.  Some Congolese and FDLR rebel commanders and some Congolese army commanders have stakes in mines.  Anyone who trades on the black market in minerals benefits.  Businessmen who are exploiting the national park that CNDP controls benefit.  Rwanda benefits to some extent though less so than in the past – they have proxies in eastern Congo in the mines and many Rwandans keep cows in eastern Congo.

Finally, yes – the mobs are manipulated by the government against the UN, against the CNDP, and against Tutsis.  It’s a dangerous game, since MONUC is supposed to protect the population and genuinely tries to, and one of the main justifications for CNDP’s continued existence and Rwanda’s interest in the region is exactly this anti-Tutsi sentiment.

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

A medical center in Kashuga, which was ransacked a month ago. Photo: Michael Kavanagh

Q. What are the conditions of the hospitals/medical centers like? Are they being ransacked as well? I imagine with the current health condition, it would be important for medical help to reach into the villages/homes. Is any of that going on?

Michael J. Kavanagh: I’ve traveled throughout the region with doctors from Heal Africa and Doctors Without Borders. Health centers in North Kivu are horribly equipped – they’re located in remote areas that are hard to access and supply.  They often don’t have electricity or running water. When you hear about 5 million people dying in the Congolese wars, most of those deaths are a result of inadequate medical care.

Armed groups often ransack medical centers immediately – they need the supplies for their troops. There are a few decent hospitals in Goma, and a few others staffed by Doctors without Borders in North Kivu.  There’s also one in the heart of Nkunda’s territory run by a doctor and his wife, who is also a doctor – both are extremely influential in Nkunda’s movement.  Nkunda’s soldiers also get medical care in Rwanda.

Q. Is sufficient food still available to families in South Kivu? And, please estimate how much basic food costs have increased in South Kivu in recent months.

Michael J. Kavanagh: I’m less familiar with the situation in South Kivu – I haven’t been there for an extended trip since 2006.  The leaders of the peace process are much more optimistic about peace holding in South Kivu.  In terms of food availability and pricing: food prices have gone up in Congo as they have everywhere in the world, and that’s been very difficult for Congolese families. A lot of food for the region comes from North Kivu, and the fighting there has made prices rises more than normal.

I can’t give an estimate on costs — sorry!

Q. What can ordinary people here in the U.S. do to give support? I read recently that the UN was likely to send 17,000 additional peacekeepers. I also read a conflicting report which seemed to indicate that the UN was not decisive. Will you be going back there soon?

Michael J. Kavanagh: There are already 17,000 peacekeepers throughout Congo, so the UN mission in Congo is asking for more.

As for what you can do…keep reading – forward stories around to your friends. Write two lines to your congresspeople saying you care. Donate to organizations that do good work there – in North Kivu there are the Congolese organizations Heal Africa, SOPROP, Synergy des Femmes – these all deal with human rights and health. Internationally, International Rescue Committee and Doctors without Borders (MSF) do fantastic, brave work in Congo.

Finally, and MOST IMPORTANTLY, click on every single Congo story you see and email it to friends. Editors notice how many hits different stories get, and that’s what will let me go back there –- if editors realize people actually care, they’ll shell out the money to let journalists like me cover this disaster with the depth it deserves.

Thanks all.

- Michael J. Kavanagh