Somali Pirates

Connie Kargbo is an associate producer at Worldfocus and a native of Sierra Leone. She writes here of the story behind Somali piracy.

There is news today that Somali pirates have hijacked a Chinese fishing vessel in the waters off the Seychelles in the Indian Ocean — a move that seems to be expanding their reach to the east.

Last week, Somali pirates who had hijacked a Spanish fishing vessel with 36 crew members on board in early October demanded a ransom of $4 million in exchange for the release of the hostages.

The ransom demand is average — pirates these days usually request between $2 and $6 million for the release of ships and hostages. The difference is that the pirates are calling the $4 million a payment for illegally fishing off the coast of Somalia.  It may come as a surprise to some but this little-known dispute about Somalia’s fishing industry is at the root of the ongoing pirate situation today.

When Somalia’s central government was overthrown in 1991 the country quickly deteriorated into what many are now calling a failed state.  With the lack of central leadership and ongoing clan warfare, law enforcement took a backseat to the violence.

This lawlessness spread to the coast of Somalia with the arrival of  illegal foreign fishing vessels.  Many of these vessels did not have the proper rights to fish in these waters, but the lack of regulation made it easy for them to fish to their hearts content. Some of these ships were owned by countries now patrolling the coast of Somalia, the country’s police chief said Wednesday.

This illegal industry in turn began to hurt local Somali fishermen who were dependent on the fish they caught. Competition from foreign fishermen depleted fish resources and also brought toxic waste to Somali waters.

Fearing for their livelihoods, local fisherman began patrolling off the coast of Somalia and fining ships that were found to be illegally fishing in the area. Just as some illegal foreign fishing vessels found an untapped and lucrative zone to make money, in time the Somalis who patrolled the coast exploited their newly found money-making opportunity.

What began as a way for Somalis to protect their livelihood eventually became the livelihood.  Reprimands and small fines for ships found illegally fishing became hijackings and million dollar ransoms on any ship that was caught, regardless of whether or not the ships actions were illegal.  And so pirates were born off the coast of Somalia.

Nowadays most Somali pirates are not former fisherman but stealth businessmen looking to make a buck. And while illegal fishing vessels have largely been replaced by foreign navies patrolling the coast on the lookout for pirates, within Somalia the problems of rampant violence and insecurity still persist.  Until there is an overhaul of the country’s fundamental problems, crime along the coast of Somalia will largely be a reflection of the country’s internal conflict.

- Connie Kargbo

In Somalia, pirates have released a German container ship and its crew. The ship was captured 400 miles off the coast of Somalia and the crew was held for ransom. On Monday, the owners of the ship paid the pirates almost $3 million.

Sarjoh Bah, a senior fellow at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation, joins Martin Savidge to discuss the chaos in Somalia, Somali militants abroad and Hillary Clinton’s expected visit with the president of Somalia.

For more, read our Q&A: Somalia’s state of emergency and listen to our online radio show on lawlessness in Somalia.

Off the coast of Somalia.

Here’s a different take on the issue of piracy off the African coast: The people we call pirates think that they are the ones under attack?

It reminds me of the old saying: One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter. In any case, no one is about to justify piracy on the high seas, but a bit of critical thinking and analyzing root causes never hurt.

The case at hand is a report in The Times of London, in which a 38-year-old man, Farah Ismail Eid, said his life was once based on running humble fishing business. Eid is now held in prison on charges of –unsuccessfully—trying to raid foreign ships.

He sets the story on its head. He told the Times:

“I believe the title of pirates should be given to those who come to our waters illegally,” he said, after shuffling into a room at the British colonial-era Mandheera prison, 40 miles south of Berbera, wearing plastic sandals, a T-shirt and a length of printed material wrapped around his skinny waist.

Eid says that life for Somali fishermen changed when foreign fishing trawlers began operating close to shore and other foreigners began dumping toxic waste close by. He’s well aware that raiding ships on the high seas and demanding ransom is wrong. But he considers it a matter of survival.

As a result, the world’s greatest navies are chasing after fast boats manned by people who feel they are justified. It doesn’t help, of course, that Somalia has been lawless for years and wracked by civil war.

Eid’s solution, also from The Times:

“The international community should come and talk to us; they should compensate us for the problems caused to our waters by illegal fishing and toxic waste,” he said. “Then, until the government is in place in Somalia, we could protect the ships as they cross our waters.”

- Peter Eisner

Photo courtesy of Flickr user guuleed under a Creative Commons license.

Maersk-Alabama Capt. Richard Phillips, right, stands alongside Cmdr. Frank Castellano, commanding officer of USS Bainbridge after being rescued by U.S Naval Forces off the coast of Somalia. Philips was held hostage for four days by pirates. Photo: U.S. Navy

Recent pirate attacks on U.S.-flagged ships have thrust the issue of Somali piracy into the spotlight and prompted U.S. President Barack Obama to vow to ”halt the rise of piracy.”

But piracy off Somalia’s shores is linked to onshore problems, as the country lacks a stable government. The U.S. has a messy history in Somalia, as American forces withdrew in 1994 after a failed attempt at intervention.

David Shinn, a former ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, spoke with Worldfocus for our online radio show on lawlessness in Somalia.

Below, he discusses how the U.S. can approach Somalia given its poor reputation in the African country. Read Ambassador Shinn’s blog.

Q: If nation building is not an option, to what capacity can or should the United States get involved without further tarnishing its reputation in the area and antagonizing the Somali people?

David Shinn: Nation building is an option in the long term, but not the short term. Until it is a viable option, the United States should continue to provide humanitarian assistance that is distributed by international organizations like the World Food Program and NGOs and quietly support the new Somali government of national unity. Together with other members of the international community, the United States should identify ways that it can help this government establish a police force and eventually a national military force. The United States should be prepared to step in quickly with development assistance as soon as the security situation allows.

Q: If the United States is already seen as a collaborator with Ethiopia, who should be the “face” of Somali reconstruction?

David Shinn: The face of Somali reconstruction should be the Somalis themselves supported by either the UN or a coalition of donor countries who are willing to help fund the reconstruction effort. Somalia’s neighbors should remain on the sidelines politically but take steps as appropriate to support the establishment of a moderate Somali government.

Q: What alternative policy can the United States adopt to secure its interests in the region?

David Shinn: I don’t see an alternative U.S. policy, but one that supplements the policy suggested above. The United States should continue to maintain good relations with Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti and explore ways to improve relations with Sudan and Eritrea. The goal is to encourage all of these countries, in addition to the African Union and Arab League, to play a constructive role in Somalia. The United States should deal with Somalia in collaboration with other interested countries so that responsibility for Somalia is an international responsibility, not an American undertaking. The United States should not see Somalia solely in the context of counterterrorism, which it did until early 2008. This approach damaged U.S. goals and interests in the region. Counterterrorism should be only a part of the policy, not the entire policy. The primary goal is to help establish a broad-based Somali government that is friendly with the United States and has tolerably good relations with all countries in the region.

See the original post.

Bronwyn Bruton, an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, joins Martin Savidge to discuss Somalia’s onshore instability, American options for dealing with Somalia and how pirates are regarded inside Somalia.

For more on Somalia’s onshore and offshore instability, listen to our online radio show on lawlessness in Somalia. 

The American use of military force brought a response from the pirates on land. In a phone call with the Associated Press, one pirate vowed revenge, saying “From now on if we capture foreign ships and their countries try to attack us, we will kill the hostages.”

A spokesman for the Navy admitted that killing pirates during the rescue of Captain Phillips may “escalate violence” in the busy shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean.

Until now, the pirates have released hostages unharmed — a Norwegian tanker sailed free on Monday after reports that a $2.5 million dollar ransom was paid. But Somali pirates are still holding as many as 300 hostages on more than a dozen ships, and over the weekend they seized an Italian tugboat with a crew of 16.

Barry Parker, a writer and a maritime consultant, joins Daljit Dhaliwal to discuss the continuing piracy problem and what can be done about it.

They discuss the continuing threat of piracy from Somalia’s failed state, the terror threat in Britain and Europe and the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea.

The shipping company says that all 20 other crew members are now safe, but the incident is yet another foreign policy headache for President Barack Obama, who declined to comment directly on the issue on Thursday afternoon. Despite growing international patrols, pirate attacks are on the rise this month.

Barry Parker, a writer and a maritime consultant, joins Daljit Dhaliwal to discuss the pirates’ operation, how best to patrol the ocean off Somalia and whether a show of force would deter pirates.

The ship was headed for Kenya with a cargo of food and relief supplies. The high seas drama is part of the ongoing battle to beat back a growing resurgence of Somali pirate attacks.

Barry Parker, a writer and a maritime consultant on shipping, joins Daljit Dhaliwal to discuss piracy, an enormous and expensive international threat.

Blogger Derek Reveron at the “New Atlanticist” blog downplays the significance of the hostages’ nationality, writing that the attack was not rooted in a desire to challenge the U.S.:

While the media continue to highlight the fact that the United States is now a victim, we shouldn’t rush to seeing this as an attack on the US government. There’s no evidence to suggest that a US-flagged ship was deliberately targeted. Rather, pirates targeted a slow ship where their probability of success was higher.

This hijacking was the sixth over the last week.  Their other targets were a British-owned cargo ship, a German container carrier, a Taiwanese tuna fishing vessel, a Yemeni tugboat and a small French yacht. All of these hijackings have one thing in common: they could not fend off a pirate attack. Greed, not ideology, underlies the attacks.

A blogger at “UN Dispatch” writes that the international community faces an insurmountable task when trying to track down pirates:

As many ships that NATO, EU, the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and other countries put off the coast of Somalia, they still have to cover an area of over a million square miles of water. And, we’re dealing with pirates out here.

[...]For now, the United States and other countries will almost certainly bolster the international naval presence, hoping, effectively, that with a few more people looking, they’ll be able to catch those needles in the haystack.

Blogger Dave Schuler at “Outside the Beltway” writes that the real problems are onshore in Somalia (listen to our online radio show on lawlessness in Somalia) and discusses how best to deal with piracy:

I’ve been covering the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia for some time here and, as I’ve said before, the real solution to the problem is a solid government in Somalia, a tall, possibly unachievable order. Failing that I think the problem should be faced pragmatically.

Putting enough naval capacity into the area to do any real good will be an expensive proposition. It might well be cheaper simply to pay the ransoms. However, there could well come a point where the piracy is more than a simple irritant.

In their current condition international institutions are not robust enough to deal with piracy or terrorism or any similar issues, indeed, they may well operate against dealing with these issues in an effective manner. It will be up to the individual navies of the world and, most especially, to ours as the largest of the world’s navies to deal with the problem.

Members of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.

Japan announced plans to deploy members from the maritime division of its Self-Defense Force (SDF) to help fight piracy off of the coast of Somalia.

Japan’s pacifist constitution prohibits waging war and provides the SDF with a strictly defensive mandate. When the country sent ground SDF forces to Iraq in 2004, the decision was met with fierce debate.

Deployment in Somalia would be considered a “police action,” and Japan is expected to focus primarily on protecting Japanese-owned ships or ships carrying Japanese cargo or crew.

Tobias Harris is a graduate student in political science at MIT who worked for a member of the Democratic Party of Japan in the national legislature for two years. He writes at “Observing Japan” to argue that Japan should acknowledge its wider responsibilities to the international community.

Japan Looks Homeward

This mission should have nothing to do with collective self-defense and everything to do with Japan’s responsibilities to the international community. If Japan’s politicians are reluctant to fulfill those responsibilities, then the question is not to pin blame to one party or another but to pull back the curtain on Japanese foreign policy and ask why the Japanese people are so reluctant to approve any mission abroad by the JSDF [Japan Self-Defense Forces].

In recent years, it appears that foreign policy has become a luxury for the Japanese people. Of course, given the difficulty of getting Japan to contribute more internationally in the best of times, is it fair to expect a substantial shift in Japan during the worst of times?

Opinion poll after opinion poll has shown that a tiny portion of the public thinks foreign policy is an important priority for the government. Polls show that a plurality favors some contribution to the multinational coalition in Somalia, but on the whole foreign policy achievements promise few gains and much risk for Japanese politicians. The Japanese people are, for the time being, interested in cultivating their own garden. Japan’s institutions are broken, the economy is tanking, and the Japanese people are rightly concerned with whether their futures are secure. Arguably ensuring access to energy is essential to the country’s economic future, but no leader has explained why events in the Horn of Africa (for example) are intimately connected with Japan’s prosperity.

No Japanese leader has gone before the Japanese people and said that Japan has been free riding throughout the postwar period, and that it is time to change. The Japanese people, it seems, would rather be Switzerland, at least for the time being, while their elected representatives are torn between the demands of their tired constituents and the demands emanating from foreign capitals, in the case of some the demands from their friends abroad.

The Japanese people have little interest in being a normal nation, at least for now. They want their abductees accounted for, they want their pensions paid, and they want to know that they will have access to quality medical care as they age. This may not be what Washington wants to hear, but for the time being it is what Washington will get. For now Japan is not a global great power, nor was meant to be.

Sooner or later Japan will resolve its foreign policy identity crisis.

To read more, see the original post.

The views expressed by contributing bloggers do not reflect the views of Worldfocus or its partners.

For more on Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and their strictly defensive mandate, see PBS Wide Angle’s documentary “Japan’s About Face.”

Photo courtesy of Flickr user kamoda under a Creative Commons license.

Martin Savidge hosts a panel of guests and address viewer questions about the region. In addition to the audio interview, here are some written answers to user-generated questions regarding the history, politics and the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

Lynn Fredriksson is a researcher on the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, for Amnesty International. She co-leads missions to the Horn. Most recently she has traveled to Nairobi, Kenya and Hargeisa, Somaliland to interview refugees from the armed conflict in southern and central Somalia.

Abdi Samatar is a professor and chair of the department of geography and global studies at the University of Minnesota. He was Fulbright Scholar to Ethiopia and Botswana. His research focuses on the relationship between democracy and development in the Third World in general and Africa in particular, and he has written extensively about Ethiopia and Somalia.

David H. Shinn is a former Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. He is currently an adjunct professor at George Washington University.  Amb. Shinn’s research interests include Africa, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and U.S. foreign policy in Africa. He also blogs regularly here.

HISTORY OF LAWLESSNESS IN SOMALIA

Photo: Abukar Albadri

Q: Why hasn’t Somalia had a stable central government in 17 years?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: Two factors contributed to the demise of a national government: Internal and external factors. Unlike what many conventional analysts claim, it has not been the genealogical structure (clans) of Somalis that has been the problem.

Instead, the key problem has been sectarian politicians who undermined the integrity of the public order by using state resources and power for personal gain and to oppress those who challenge them. The internal problem has been political rather than cultural in the sense of genealogy.

Second, the internal factor dovetailed with cold war agendas that supported whichever local groups that served their interests. These two forces jointly destroyed the legitimacy of the state and alienated the population. Once warlords divided the country into fiefdoms it has been difficult to create the space for civic minded citizens to mount a counter-attack and the international community continues to support the sectarian politicians and warlords.

Q: Has piracy always been a problem?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: Piracy is a new phenomenon and can easily be eliminated by a legitimate Somali government.

Q: How much of this is a religious struggle between Somali Muslims and Ethiopian Christians? Is radical Islam and the war on terror the root causes here?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: There is little that is religious in the conflict between Ethiopian and Somalis. The struggle is centered on the marginalization of the Somali population in Ethiopia as well as Ethiopia¹s long-standing attempt to undermine Somali unity. The war on terror is the problem. Most of Somalis who subscribe to political Islam are nationalist.

Q: What does the resignation of the Somali president in December mean for internal Somali politics and leadership going forward? How has the power sharing between Somali leaders and Islamists worked out so far? Which party/group will likely emerge from the power vacuum?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: It will not change things significantly as far as the legitimacy and capacity of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is concerned. It is hard to predict which political grouping will come out on top.

ETHIOPIA’S WITHDRAWAL FROM SOMALIA

Q:  What were Ethiopia’s goals in occupying Somalia in 2006? Did Ethiopia accomplish them? What were Ethiopia’s interests/fears concerning Somalia?

Amb. David H. Shinn: Ethiopia actually had small numbers of troops inside Somalia before 2006. The growing strength of the militias of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and, especially, their march towards Baidoa in south central Somalia in late 2006 persuaded the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopia to take strong action. Baidoa was the TFG headquarters. A few UIC leaders had even expressed an interest in waging a jihad against Ethiopia. At least one of the leaders revived the idea of Somali irredentism, or taking back land under the control of Ethiopia.

At the time of independence in 1960, it was the goal of the Somali government to incorporate into Somalia that part of Ethiopia inhabited by Somalis. This region constitutes about one-quarter of Ethiopia’s land area. Ethiopia decided it was time to defeat the UIC militia.

After defeating the UIC, Ethiopia wanted the more compliant TFG to take control of Somalia. This would remove the threat of jihad against Ethiopia and neutralize any thought of reviving Somali irredentism. Ethiopia initially succeeded militarily by soundly defeating the UIC, whose militias evacuated the capital of Mogadishu as the Ethiopians and TFG approached. Within months, however, the situation began to deteriorate in the capital. The Islamists have slowly rebuilt their strength ever since.

The Ethiopian military force and their TFG and African Union force allies became bogged down in urban guerrilla warfare. As financial costs and casualties mounted, the Ethiopians concluded it was necessary to pull out. Ethiopia says that it achieved its objectives. Over the short term, it is true that they need not fear an attack from Somalia nor is irredentism a serious threat. On the other hand, they did not install the compliant TFG in Mogadishu and forces in Somalia opposed to Ethiopia have reasserted themselves and eventually might decide to revive the idea of Somali irredentism.

My own view is that the Ethiopians decided to cut their losses and leave Somalia. In the best case scenario, this decision may permit moderate Islamists and the TFG to take control of the country and reestablish a degree of stability.

Photo: Abukar Albadri

Q: Did Ethiopia invaded Somalia with the backing of the U.S.? How did the U.S. support Ethiopia, and why?

Amb. David H. Shinn: The U.S. denied that it supported Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia. It is important to remember that the TFG invited Ethiopian troops to join them in opposing the UIC. It is still not clear to me, and I believe the public generally, to what extent the U.S. supported Ethiopia in this endeavor. We know a few facts.

The U.S. never publicly called on Ethiopia to end its military action inside Somalia nor did it publicly criticize the effort. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi publicly acknowledged that the U.S. shared intelligence with Ethiopia as the Ethiopians moved deeper into Somalia. I do not know if the U.S. provided any military equipment that could be used in the action or paid any of the costs for the invasion.  Many Somalis and Ethiopians in the region believe that the U.S. provided more tangible support. They either have information that is not available to me or they are just guessing. At a minimum, however, the U.S. gave a green light to Ethiopia.

The U.S. was sympathetic to the Ethiopian position for several reasons. The U.S. supported the TFG and Ethiopia was trying to put the TFG in power in Mogadishu. A defeat of the UIC, which at the time had both moderate and extremist members, would in the view of the U.S. reduce the likelihood that terrorism would increase in Somalia. In fact, a TFG/Ethiopian victory might even create a situation that would allow the U.S. to root out a small number of foreign terrorists that it believed had taken refuge in the country.

Q: How does the crisis in Somalia affect the greater region (Horn of Africa)?

Amb. David H. Shinn: It has had huge, negative implications for the wider region. The crisis drove Somali refugees into neighboring countries, especially Kenya and Yemen. It attracted Ethiopian troops into Somalia, further exacerbating relations between Somalis and Ethiopians.

The crisis destroyed the economy of Somalia so that it became a net importer of virtually everything rather than a producer. Somalia is traditionally a nomadic country with herds crossing between Somalia and Ethiopia. The crisis disrupted these movements and forced many nomads to move to the capital where international agencies provided emergency food aid.

Outside powers joined in the fray, seeking advantage for their own purposes. As Ethiopia supported the TFG, Eritrea supported the UIC in an effort to put additional pressure on Ethiopia.  You will recall that relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea were poor because of a dispute over demarcation of their border. A small number of outside extremists began funding radical elements in Somalia, thus increasing the specter of terrorism.  As the Somali economy broke down, more and more Somalis took to the profitable business of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. This has had a major impact on international shipping in the region.

The biggest losers in all of this, however, have been the Somalis themselves, especially innocent men, women and children who have nothing to do with the conflict.  They face regular danger, minimal food and health care, and often find themselves internally displaced.

Q: What does the resignation of the Somali president in December mean for internal Somali politics and leadership going forward? How has the power sharing between Somali leaders and Islamists worked out so far? Which party/group will likely emerge from the power vacuum?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: It will not change things significantly as far as the legitimacy and capacity of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is concerned. It is hard to predict which political grouping will come out on top.

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

Q: On Friday, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution expressing its intention to establish the U.N. force in Somalia, but postponed the final decision for several months to assess the situation and strengthen the African Union force currently deployed in the capital. Why the delay? Is the situation in Somalia on the scale of Darfur? Has the situation changed since Ethiopia pulled out?

Lynn Fredricksson: The delay appears to be based in large part on the inability of the UNSG to find lead and other country willing to make troop and other necessary commitments to constitute a full U.N. peacekeeping operation. It is also perhaps bad timing in that the Ethiopian forces are only now pulling out and the immediate imposition of a significant international force might be less than welcome, especially before the Somali people know what is happening in relation to the presidency, the impact of Ethiopian troop withdrawal and the impact of recently strengthened anti-piracy operations.

Amnesty International’s greatest concern about the new resolution is that it does not include preparations for human rights provisions to be included in any upcoming operations nor does it address the lack of capacity and  mandate for civilian protection by the current AU peacekeeping operation. While I don’t think it’s worthwhile to compare African crisis situations, I would say that the interlinked humanitarian and human rights crises in Somalia are among the worst for civilians in the world.

Photo: Abukar Albadri

Q: When were you in Somalia last, what did you see on the ground?

Lynn Fredricksson: While direct access to Somalia has been challenging due to ongoing security concerns, Amnesty International has been regularizing its missions to the region since late 2007 — including field work in the self-declared independent Somaliland and in Nairobi, Kenya, where we have interviewed refugees from southern and central Somalia, including journalists and human rights defenders who have been forced to flee, and in Djibouti where we have been monitoring the progress of the peace process there.

Our findings throughout 2008 have indicated a disturbing and ongoing targeting of human rights defenders, humanitarian aid workers and journalists, the very people who we depend on to have revealed consistently dire human rights conditions in which humanitarian organizations are obstructed from providing desperately needed assistance to some 3.2 million vulnerable Somali civilians.

Q: Has the safety of humanitarian workers and journalists improved?

Lynn Fredricksson: Conditions for Somali human rights defenders, aid workers and journalists has not yet improved. It often takes time for developments like the Ethiopian withdrawal, the resignation of the president or United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to result in clear changes in conditions on the ground.

It is therefore essential that the international community, particularly the UNSC and donor countries, pay close attention and commit significant resources to humanitarian access and assistance, human rights monitoring and a commission of inquiry, and enforcement of the arms embargo, beyond only peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy operations.

ROLE OF BARACK OBAMA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

Q:  What will an Obama administration mean for Somalia?  Will the international community intervene?

Amb. David H. Shinn: The UNSC, with strong support from the outgoing Bush administration, adopted a resolution on Jan. 16, 2009 that called on the African Union to strengthen its force in Mogadishu from 2,600 to 8,000 troops. It also authorized the U.N. Secretary General to submit a report by April 15 that includes a possible mandate for a U.N. peacekeeping force in Somalia and to make a decision on this matter by June 1.

The U.S. has been pressing the U.N. for months to put a peacekeeping force in Somalia. So long as there is no peace to keep, this idea is problematic. U.S. ambassador-designate to the U.N., Susan Rice, expressed no enthusiasm for a U.N. peacekeeping force in recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Even if the U.N. eventually agrees to a peacekeeping force, it will probably be predicated on the ability to “keep” the peace rather than to “make” peace.  The Obama administration, in view of the unhappy U.S. experience in Somalia in 1992-1993, would not likely allow the U.S. to contribute boots on the ground. At best, the U.S. would pay its share of the cost and provide logistical and intelligence support to the peacekeeping force.

I believe the Obama administration will pursue a more flexible approach to the Somali crisis by consulting with a wider range of Somali participants involved in the conflict. It may also pay greater attention to ameliorating the humanitarian catastrophe caused by the conflict.  It may try to grapple more effectively with the root causes of the crisis rather than focus almost exclusively on the conflict as a counter-terrorism issue.

Photo: Abukar Albadri

Q: What needs to happen in order to stabilize the humanitarian crises?

Lynn Fredricksson: Stability and security in Somalia will require a the confluence of a number of factors:

• progress on the various facets of a more inclusive peace process
• development of a mandate and capacity for whatever peacekeeping operation exists in Somalia to protect civilians
• strengthening and enforcement of the arms embargo
• the eventual deployment of human rights monitors and progress toward the establishment of a commission of inquiry into past human rights abuses
• and, security focus on unhindered access and adequate funding for humanitarian operations to provide for the immediate needs of more than 1.2 million internally displaced Somali civilians, hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees in Kenya, Somaliland and other areas of the region, and other vulnerable Somali civilians; and protection for Somali human rights defenders, aid workers and journalists.

Photo courtesy of Abukar Albadri and the CIA World Factbook.

Credits:
Host: Martin Savidge
Producers: Lisa Biagiotti, Katie Combs and Stephen Puschel

The World Food Programme provides humanitarian aid in Somalia.

As U.S. President-elect Barack Obama prepares to take office, some analysts have suggested that he will usher in an international policy rooted in “soft power” — with focus on dialogue rather than confrontation. 

David Axe is an independent correspondent contributing to From the Frontline and World Politics Review. He blogs at ”War is Boring” and writes about a new generation of war in Africa, one waged in courtrooms and through humanitarian aid. 

U.S. wages first battles in new generation of war

War has evolved rapidly in the last 100 years, prompting historians and strategists to come up with new terms for new ways of fighting. They call mechanized warfare, which originated in the early 20th century, the third “generation” of war, and ideological warfare waged by guerilla groups the fourth.

But what about guerilla-style warfare waged by non-ideological groups against traditional states — pirates, for instance, whose attacks can destabilize trade-dependent nations, but who don’t have strategic goals beyond just getting rich? Free-for-all violence, with indirect global effects, represents a fifth generation of war, according to some experts. And when it comes to defeating fifth-gen enemies, “the old rules of warfare do not apply,” declared Marine Lt. Col. Stanton Coerr, writing in Marine Corps Gazette, a professional journal.

So the U.S. military and its government partners are writing new rules, and putting them to the test on the first of the fifth-generation battlefields emerging in Africa.

Fifth-gen enemies do not have traditional “centers of gravity” — armies, governments, factories, charismatic leaders — that can be destroyed by military attacks. By their mere survival, these enemies undermine the notion that nation-states, their ideals and their economies are viable in the modern world.

Examples of emerging fifth-generation wars include: the escalating piracy campaign off the coast of Somalia which has threatened 10 percent of the world’s sea trade; the 18-year-old anarchy on land in Somalia, which has allowed that piracy to flourish; and the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic that has exacerbated rebellions in all three countries and defied the efforts of scores of nations to resolve it.

The Pentagon is just beginning to write the new rulebook for addressing these conflicts. Already, one thing is clear: old-fashioned brute force is worse than useless when it comes to beating fifth-gen enemies. Physical attacks by military forces can actually be counterproductive.

“Precisely the same technology that wins conventional wars loses unconventional ones,” Coerr contended. Trying to wage a third-generation, firepower-heavy war against an elusive, sometimes hard-to-define fifth-generation enemy will only cost the United States its wealth, its domestic political unity and its good standing in the eyes of the world.

Instead, the Pentagon plans to use less-than-lethal means to defeat — gradually, and over long periods of time — the latest-generation threats. These means include economic and humanitarian assistance, legal action and communication. Their goal is to alleviate “the insecurities and the conditions of human beings that create these insecurities across state borders,” in the words of Maj. Shannon Beebe, the U.S. Army’s top intelligence officer for Africa. These plans have already been put into effect in all three of the fifth-generation wars listed above.

To read more, see the original post.

The views expressed by contributing bloggers do not reflect the views of Worldfocus or its partners.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Peter Casier under a Creative Commons license.

A bombed ship in Berbera.

China’s navy announced plans to send at least three ships to Somalia to protect Chinese vessels from rampant piracy.

About 20 percent of the 1,265 Chinese ships that have passed through the Gulf of Aden this year have reportedly come under attack.

Bright Simons is an executive at the African nonprofit IMANI Center for Policy and Education. He writes at citizen journalism portal OhMyNews about China’s role in Somalia and the Asian country’s naval ambitions.

China, Somalia: Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

China’s He Yafei, second in command of the Asian Giant’s diplomatic corps, told the United Nations Security Council at a December 16th session on the Somali piracy crisis that Beijing may authorize an expeditionary naval force to the Gulf of Aden.

Two issues arise from this statement for observers of China’s foreign policy.

Firstly, it provides another piece in the puzzle of China’s blue water naval ambitions, by affirming the much suspected link between seafaring commerce and open ocean warfare in the minds of Admiral Liu Huaqing’s disciples at the top of the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army’s Navy).

Secondly, it projects Africa into the heart of China’s geopolitical ambitions by offering the possibility that the emergent world power might use the continent as a sounding board for the much anticipated blue water strategy.

The second point is much vindicated in the context of the historical situation in the Straits of Malacca, where China’s participation in regional anti-piracy efforts has been less than aggressive. Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and also Japan, whose trade is highly dependent on quietude in the Straits, have constantly had to look up to the USA for strategic backup in the event things get out of hand.

So, then, the question on everybody’s lips is: given the relative sanguinity China has shown about threats in its own backyard, why is the PLAN pushing the pliant Foreign Service into a blue water scheme off the shores of Africa?

To attempt to answer that question, one must first explore into a bit more detail the concept of blue-water geopolitics.

Not many countries can effectively, like the U.S. of today and the USSR of yesterday, circulate battle stations around the planet by relying on a Navy with truly global reach.

The United States can at a moment notice dispatch an ‘Aircraft Carrier Group’ to nearly any naval theater anywhere on the planet in a few days or weeks at most. The group will usually consist of the Aircraft carrier itself, a floating hangar cum runway from which some 100 fighter jets may be maintained and supplied in a continuous aerial tactical scenario, and a couple of frigates and destroyers backed by amphibious special force units and perhaps a splattering of submarines.

Frigates and destroyers are great for protecting and supplying expeditionary forces as well as for pummeling the coastlines of enemy states. Like all battle cruisers, a few ballistic missiles in the mix make these perfect launching pads for broad-front attacks as well as for surgical maneuvers, involving amphibious vessels and tactical squadrons.

Simply put, if China wants to be in a position where it can clamp down on a full-blown civil war in the Sudan, for instance, and prevents such from imperiling its energy security interests it will need a blue water navy.

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The views expressed by contributing bloggers do not reflect the views of Worldfocus or its partners.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user friendly-fire under a Creative Commons license.

The United Nations estimates that 3.25 million Somalis, or 43 percent of the population, will require food aid until the end of the year.

The number of Somalis requiring humanitarian assistance doubled in 2008 and continues to climb. Aid workers have also come under fire. As of Oct. 27, 30 aid workers had been killed and another 10 kidnapped.

Zam Zam Abdullahi Abdi once counseled victims of violence at a hospital in Mogadishu run by the Africa Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia — coming face to face with women and children who face rape and deadly beatings. She left Somalia after receiving death threats, and now joins Martin Savidge to discuss Somalia’s plight.

Photos by Abukar Albadri

Live Piracy Map 2008: Click on the map to see all the piracy and armed robbery incidents reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre during 2008.

Three weeks ago, a cargo ship carrying steel headed for Indonesia was hijacked. It is one of the many instances of piracy happening off Somalia’s coast.

Per Gullestrup, CEO of the Danish Clipper Group shipping company — whose hijacked cargo ship is mentioned above — speaks with Martin Savidge about how the crew members are holding up as hostages to Somali pirates.

To explore an interactive map detailing the frequency of pirate attacks, visit the ICC’s Live Piracy Map.

AUDIO: Jane Campbell, a spokeswoman for the U.S. Navy’s fifth fleet stationed in Bahrain, discusses the situation in Somalia and the Navy’s role in protecting ships.

People flee the Somali capital of Mogadishu, where Islamist forces have launched attacks against the government.

On Saturday, pirates seized a Saudi supertanker holding $100 million in crude oil —  the largest vessel ever hijacked by pirates, reflecting their boldness and heightened ambitions.

On Tuesday, the ship anchored in Harardhere, a pirate stronghold in Somalia.

As the piracy threat escalates — costing the maritime industry billions and putting the lives of hostages in danger — bloggers around the world are assessing the causes and asking what the international community can do.

The surge in piracy stems in part from violence onshore, where Islamist forces continue to fight a Western-backed government.

The U.S. supported Ethiopia’s 2006 intervention in Somalia, which helped end Islamist rule, but Ethiopian troops who once supported the transitional Somali government are now withdrawing.

“The Nairobi Chronicle” blog expresses frustration that “the international community does not see the link between piracy in Somalia and the impotence of the transitional government,” and blames the Western powers that helped oust the Islamist government.

A writer at the “East Africa Forum” blog says that pirates seek a lucrative alternative to the poverty and violence onshore, asking “Why stay on land and fight Ethiopia’s occupying forces (and for what?) when one can rule the seas for riches?”

The “Justus for All” blog writes that international bodies can mitigate piracy by addressing Somalia’s onshore issues.

The Islamist forces claim they can stop piracy, as they attempted to do during the brief period of rule by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006.

David Axe of the “War is Boring” blog writes that given the current violence and piracy, some Somalis might welcome the return of Islamist control.

Frank Pope writes in an editorial for The Times Online that because shipowners see pirates as businessmen — with an emphasis on profit rather than violence — they are hesitant to arm guards, which could potentially lead to gun battles.

National governments, too, often prefer to pay pirates ransom. “The American Empire” blog argues that these governments and U.S. Navy act ”more like international lawyers than warriors” and argues that order can be restored through internationally coordinated military action — headed by China and the U.S., who both have interests in Africa.

The “Good Read” blog writes that international governments have been more successful in coordinating the fight against pirates in southeast Asia, urging swift resolution of military, legal and technical issues in Somalia.

For more on piracy and violence in Somalia, see our ongoing coverage.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user ISN Security Watch under a Creative Commons license.

The recent pirate attacks in Somalia have brought international attention to the war-torn and drought-stricken country, but the fighting is a result of a decades-long conflict between warlords and insurgents.

In the early 1990s, Somalia underwent a power shift. In 1991, dictator Mohammed Siad Barre was ousted by opposition forces and replaced by an interim leader who was not accepted by all Somalis.

Clan fighting ensued, displacing over a million Somalis, and United Nations observers were sent to monitor the situation. The U.S. sent troops to Somalia as part of “Operation Restore Hope,” but continued clan warfare led up to the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993.

The fight killed over 1,000 Somali militiamen and civilians and more than a dozen U.S. soldiers, and soon after, President Clinton called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The U.N. withdrew in 1995 and Somalia faces inter-clan fighting and political upheaval to this day.

Somalis at a water well in Wajhid. Photo: Bryan Myers

Bryan Myers:

Famine was everywhere, and the country was lawless. There was no government; most of the country was ruled by clans who enforced their authority at gunpoint. You may recall seeing television images of so-called “technicals,” young men in pick-up trucks with machine guns mounted in the back.

Somalia had no running water or electricity—thieves had stolen all the parts from the factories to sell on the black market. There was no phone service either. The bandits had also stolen all the wire from the phone lines (this was before cell phones).

The situation was so bad, the first President Bush had ordered several divisions of U.S. troops to Somalia to distribute food and restore order. Their base of operations was the capital of Mogadishu.

At first, things went well. The famine was brought under control pretty quickly. However, when the U.S. military tried to disarm the clans, things turned sour. The clans resisted, and many shootouts followed.

After spending several weeks covering the violence, we were eager to find out if there was any part of the country that still functioned normally. Someone mentioned the remote town of Wajhid, near the border with Ethiopia. Close to Wajhid was a garrison of French Foreign Legionnaires which was working with elders in Wajhid to create a local police force.

After two days of hard driving up dusty ravines that barely qualified as roads, we finally came upon Wajhid. It was one of the most amazing sights I’ve ever seen.

It was nothing less than Biblical. Set on a pale dust plain, Wajhid was a walled town, with a huge wooden entrance gate that was closed in the evenings. Outside the main gate was a large well.

Because of the well, Wajhid served as a crossroads for every nomad in the region. Local men brought up water in leather sacks, no doubt the same as had been done for centuries. Hundreds of camels and scores of goats crowded in, eager for a taste as the water poured down wooden sluices. Among the animals, children splashed themselves, trying to beat the heat.

Amid the horror, we had somehow managed to find beauty.

Read the latest news on Somalis fleeing to Yemen: Somalia struggles with famine, fear and flight.

On Tuesday, Yemen announced it would ban entry of Ethiopians and Eritreans in response to an influx of refugees, though Somalis are still permitted entry.

Dr. Maximo Migliori of Doctors Without Borders describes the scene at the village of Ahwar in southern Yemen, where refugees wash up on shore — dead or alive.

Below, bloggers in Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere in the region discuss the refugee dilemma and international coverage of Somalia.

Yemeni blogger Omar Barsawad expresses his amazement that Yemen, itself extremely poor, has aided Somali refugees in ways that richer countries have not.

The “Yemenade” blog assesses Yemen’s resources, arguing that they are insufficient and that the international community must take action.

A blogger at “East African Philosopher,” raised in both Kenya and Somalia, discusses the most recent Transparency International report, which listed Somalia as the world’s most corrupt nation. He argues that Somalia is a failed state rather than a corrupt one and criticizes the U.S.’s handling of Somali warlords.

Blogger Nick Wadhams, a freelance journalist based in Kenya, argues that press coverage of piracy ignores the seriousness of the crisis in Somalia.

Journalist Rob Crilly responds, claiming attention on Somalia in any form is an improvement and suggesting journalists “smuggle in some of the serious stuff just below your reference to Johnny Depp.”

The recent pirate attacks brought international attention to war-torn and drought-stricken Somalia. The country’s ongoing fighting — a result of a power vacuum and conflict between warlords and insurgents — has received less attention, though it has displaced over 160,000 Somalis this year alone and left millions hungry.

Worldfocus producer Bryan Myers reflects on his experience covering the conflict in the 1990s: Remembering Somalia before the pirate attacks.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user ISN Security Watch under a Creative Commons license.

AUDIO: Rob Crilly of The Christian Science Monitor discusses international efforts by America and Russia to combat Somali pirates.

CLICK on the image above for a complete interactive map from ICC Commercial Crime Services.

Somalia said today that it will allow foreign powers to use force against pirates who hijacked a Ukrainian ship as the pirates continue to face off with U.S. warships.

Rob Crilly is a freelance journalist based in Nairobi. He has written for The Times, The Irish Times, The Daily Mail, The Scotsman and The Christian Science Monitor. Crilly’s blog “African Safari” appears on the blog network “From the Frontline.”

It’s All Our Fault

It’s starting to look as if the problems in Somalia are all down to the inability of journalists to cover the conflict there properly - rather than say the complete hash of things made by the country’s neighbours, the United Nations’ and donors’ misguided attempts to prop up an unpopular government of warlords, and the repeated attempts of the US to solve the problem by bombing a stone-age country back to the, erm, stone age.

Hot on the heels of Kenya’s angry accusations that journalists were buying the terrorists’ propaganda, comes a rather snippy press release from Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN Special Representative for Somalia.

Mr Ould-Abdallah called on the media to treat the pirates’ actions as unlawful activities and use the same judgment as they would in other regions of the world. He said journalists should not allow themselves to be used to broadcast messages from the pirates or help glorify their actions.

I’m tempted to respond that UN officials should use the same judgment as they would in other regions of the world when welcoming peace agreements between two sides who have lied their way to the negotiating table and have no interest in laying down their weapons, and who don’t even control the insurgents or Ethiopian troops responsible for wreaking havoc on the ground. But that would be childish.

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The views expressed by contributing bloggers do not reflect the views of Worldfocus or its partners.