SOUTH KOREA: U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates maintained a tough stand Wednesday against North Korea, calling its nuclear threat more lethal than ever. He said, “We do not today - nor will we ever - accept a North Korea with nuclear weapons.”

CHINA: The admiral in charge of the U.S. Pacific Command said Wednesday that U.S. intelligence estimates have underestimated China’s military abilities annually over the past decade. “They’ve grown at an unprecedented rate,” he said.

A UN investigator presented a report to the UN General Assembly on Tuesday outlining some of the worst prisons in the world. It included the West African nations of Nigeria and Togo, cited for gross human rights violations.

SOMALIA: The Somali militant group Al-Shabaab has silenced two independent radio stations in the town of Baidoa. There was no reason given for the decision.

Mohammad Al-Kassim is an associate producer at Worldfocus. He blogs here about the significance of the visit of Saudi Arabia’s king to Syria.

Since ascending to the throne in 2005, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah is making his first visit to Syria. The visit is being enthusiastically received by officials and political analysts in both countries. Relations between the two nations became tense following the U.S invasion of Iraq and the kingdom’s support for it. Two years later, relations deteriorated further after the alleged Syrian link to the assassination of Lebanon’s ex-premier, Rafiq Hariri.

Saudi Arabia is aggressively trying to assert itself as the leader of both the Arab and Muslim worlds. Having two of the holiest sites in Islam located within its borders helps a lot, in addition to having lots of petrodollars to spread around.

On the other hand, Syria considers itself the last Arab state standing up for the Arab cause, and the only remaining Arab state that publicly challenges Israel. It therefore sees itself as the natural leader of the Arabs.

But there are other major issues that threaten the relationship between the kingdom and the republic.

Saudi Arabia is not happy with Syria’s close ties with Iran and it has concerns about Damascus’ support for the Lebanese Shiite party Hezbollah.

The issue of Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East disturbs Saudi Arabia, who represents the so-called “moderate Arab state.” The Saudis would love to bring Syria back into the “Arab side.”  It’s very important for Saudi Arabia to have stubborn Syria on its side while aiming to take the leadership position for both the Arab and Muslim worlds.

If relations improve between the two countries, it may finally translate into the formation of a Lebanese government, the process of which has been deadlocked for months. Syria could use its influence on Hezbollah, and Saudi Arabia would do the same on its Lebanese Sunni ally led by Sa’ed Hariri.

Saudi Arabia certainly could use whatever tools at its disposals to persuade Syria.  The rich oil monarchy can start by injecting some much-needed financial help into the Syrian economy. Saudi Arabia could also use its clout with the U.S. and help Syria with opening the door to diplomatic dealings with the White House, something the Syrian government is eager to do.

The thaw in the relationship is in motion; it seems that both leaders are in agreement that rapprochement must not be stopped. But how long will it be before both recall their ambassadors back home is anybody’s guess.

- Mohammad Al-Kassim

On election day in Lebanon, I visited multiple polling stations and attended election rallies and events organized by various parties.

The Future Movement’s pre-printed ballot for the Beirut III electoral district. The expansive font provides little space for voters to cross off candidate names and replace them with others. Photo: Melani Cammett

That morning, I started by accompanying a friend — I’ll call her “Mona” — to cast her ballot in predominantly Sunni Tarik el-Jedideh, a neighborhood in Beirut. As we approached the polling station, a rush of Future Movement [the party led by Saad Hariri that is a member of March 14] election workers appeared with lists of registered voters in the district. After obtaining Mona’s voter registration number, they handed her a pre-printed paper with the names of the Future Movement candidates in the Beirut III district and urged her to vote for the whole list without crossing off and replacing any names.

In Lebanon, there is no official ballot, enabling parties to print ballots that they distribute freely outside of polling stations. In addition, in this “open-list” system, voters have the right to cross off names of candidates [tashteeb] on a party list and replace them with the names of candidates running as independents or on other lists.

An avowed opponent of the sectarian political system — which allocates seats and other political and administrative offices by fixed quotas on a district-by-district basis — Mona waited for hours inside the crowded polling station to cast a blank ballot in order to express her opposition to the system. While she knew that her vote would not affect the results in this overwhelmingly pro-Hariri district, she, like others, felt that turning out to cast a null ballot was the most effective way to convey her opposition to the system and to its main protagonists.

Later, I visited a polling station in Haret Hreik, a municipality in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut known in the Western press as a “Hezbollah stronghold.” Outside of the precinct, representatives from the opposition parties, including the Christian FPM and Shi’i Amal Movement and Hezbollah, gave us pre-printed ballots with the names of the Opposition list candidates, while delegates from the March 14 coalition were nowhere to be found.

Election workers in Broumanna, Metn District. Photo: Melani Cammett

At around 6 p.m. — an hour before the polls were scheduled to close — we made a swing through the first and second Beirut districts, which could not have been more different. In Beirut I (district), where 91 percent of registered voters are Christians, competing March 8 and March 14 groups battled for control over the district’s five electoral seats reserved for Christians from various sects.

Meanwhile, in Beirut II, thanks to pre-election deals among party elites, candidates ran unopposed and, as a result, the district featured the lowest voter turnout in the country. As we drove by the precinct, party workers barely exerted themselves to throw pre-printed ballots into our open car windows, as they had done throughout the day in our visits to more competitive districts.

By this time, electoral precincts were preparing to shut down, polling companies were busy analyzing data from exit polls, and citizens across Lebanon were settling themselves in front of their television sets to watch the projected returns aired on local news channels. I decided to call it a day.

I awoke the next morning to discover the surprising news that the majority March 14 won by a significant margin with 71 seats — a 13-seat lead over the opposition. (Recall that most local polling companies had forecast at least a slim victory for the opposition.) Supporters celebrated throughout the day.

In Future Movement strongholds in West Beirut, Christian areas of Achrafieh with concentrations of Lebanese Forces and Kataeb supporters, and parts of Aley with many Druze backers of the March 14 coalition, I saw people dancing, singing, setting off fireworks, playing music, honking horns and celebrating. Leaders of the opposition parties were silent for most of the day, refraining from making statements about the unexpected results.

A Future Movement campaign billboard in Beirut: ‘[Vote] as it is [the full list], as long as the sky is blue.” Photo: Melani Cammett

In Lebanon’s complex political system, the end of the elections marks the beginning of what will undoubtedly be a long process of forming a new government, with bargaining both within and across the opposing coalitions over cabinet posts (and likely fractionalization within the main coalitions themselves).

The March 14 victory, however, does not give the majority unlimited license in the delicately calibrated Lebanese political system. With 57 out of 128 seats, the opposition retains well over the number of seats needed to block legislation on important issues (one-third plus one seat). Furthermore, although the FPM failed to garner as many seats as it hoped, it swept core Christian areas in Mount Lebanon, permitting Aoun to claim that he represents the majority of the Christian community.

On the international scale, the outcome of the elections has averted the feared confrontation between a Hezbollah-led government and the U.S. But Hezbollah and the FPM remain key players in the government and represent large components of Lebanese society.

At least rhetorically, leaders in the ruling majority have recognized this by expressing their commitment to a unity government. To help to avoid a potential impasse in Lebanese politics, international leaders will need to follow suit by emphasizing their commitment to working with all elements of the new government.

- Melani Cammett

That coalition beat out another one led by Hezbollah, the party backed by Iran and Syria, which will nonetheless remain an important influence in Lebanon.

Learn more about the players in Lebanon’s election by listening to our online radio show on Lebanon’s election.

Mohamad Bazzi, an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a professor of journalism at New York University, joins Martin Savidge to discuss what the results mean for Hezbollah, for the stability of Lebanon and for American foreign policy in the region.

Don Duncan of Worldfocus partner The Media Line reports on the elections from Beirut.

Although cities in the north and south have traditionally been at the greatest risk of missile attacks, the government is practicing these drills nationwide.

Watch the report from Worldfocus partner The Media Line.

Blogger “mimi54” describes the drill, writing that some ignored it:

It’s a very loud, urgent, scary wail. When it resounds across the country to remind us of our dead, it does sound like crying. I suppose it’s because we ourselves are weeping then. But in a real emergency, when adrenelin [sic] is pouring through the blood and our hearts are jumping, it sounds like a wavering howl. I wonder how many ignored it today and just got on with whatever they were doing, and how many complied with the Home Front’s orders. 

At the clinic, I saw signs with arrows pointing to the safe areas. Banks, supermarkets – big, organized places – and certainly schools, complied. However many individuals that I talked to today took a cynical view of the drill. My friend in the second-hand store told me that it’s just the government’s way of covering its back: “They don’t help in emergencies. They’re just doing this so they can say ‘We gave instructions and did our bit.’ ” (I don’t agree; the government does protect the population as far as possible in war.) “Anyway,” he added, “I’m not going to close shop and go to the shelter just for a drill. Who wants to look like a fool on the street?”

Watch a video of the drill as experienced by YouTube user bspier1, showing many people who were unconcerned:

A blogger at “From the hills of Jerusalem” echoes the sentiment, writing that after so many real attacks, it is hard to take simulations seriously: 

This wasn’t a crisis, of course, it was just a drill. But it was a drill that reminded us that we’ve been through many drills - real ones. The residents of Sderot, and towns along the southern borders, as well as those in the north, have already had many and constant real life exercises to practice. I have had my own runs for shelter when in some of those towns. Sometimes a safe room was available, sometimes we stood under a doorway…like in an earthquake. You do your best.

Today, no one moved. We just continued on with whatever we were doing. [...]It’s not that we are really nonchalant or lackadaisical….it’s just…well, alright already, we know the big one is coming…nuke, earthquake, bolts from heaven…. It’s Israel - our minds are already stretched as far as they can go in the survival mode. 

A blogger at “A Soldier’s Mother” explains why she warned her daughter of the drill in advance:

For some reason, perhaps to add to a feeling of urgency, the school decided not to explain to my 9-year-old daughter in advance that this would be an exercise. During the war, a siren was accidentally sounded in our city and the children were quickly moved to bomb shelters, fearing it was a real attack. There was no warning (as we have now) and therefore no chance to prepare the kids. All that mattered was a frantic but orderly move to bomb shelters in case our city, so far from Gaza, would somehow also be hit by missiles.

There was no time to find out if it was a mistake, human error. Later, they would confirm at attack on Beersheva and a mistake made. But at that moment, it was as real as if we too lived within seconds of Gaza.

I didn’t want my daughter to go through that again and so I told her, secretly, that when she heard the siren, she should listen to the teachers, but not be afraid. Every child has the right to live without fear, including that sudden panic that comes with hearing a siren and knowing you have to run quickly to seek shelter.

User “Traxus” comments on the “World Affairs Board,” addressing concerns that Israel may be preparing for war with Iran: 

Posturing and preparing… the lines are so blurred. This is definitely a posturing move though, at least in part. They are being quite vocal in preparing for war, I’m sure this is a message more aimed at the US and Europe rather than Iran.

Would Israel put so much effort into this if they had no intention of attacking Iran? Hard to say. This is also a PR move for Israeli citizens. Gets them used to the idea of being at war with Iran, makes the idea a lot more comfortable especially if these drills have a positive result.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Nahariense under a Creative Commons license.

Lebanon will head to the polls on June 7 in an election that could alter the political fabric of the country, with Hezbollah and its allies poised to make significant gains.

Hezbollah is pitted against the current anti-Syria majority. The robust campaign has split Lebanese voters.

Young Lebanese men wave the flag of Hezbollah.

For more on the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics, watch the Worldfocus signature story: Hezbollah heads into mainstream Lebanese life and politics.

On a visit to Lebanon in late May, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden — the highest-level U.S. official to visit Lebanon in over two decades — warned that U.S. aid would be dependent on the outcome of the elections.

Hezbollah is backed by Iran and Syria, while the U.S. and its allies support the current parliamentary majority, who came to power in the previous election after Sunni leader and former prime minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in 2005.

Worldfocus.org’s weekly radio show examined the issues and implications of Lebanon’s election, looking back to the country’s turbulent history and forward to a potentially new political landscape.

Worldfocus anchor Martin Savidge hosted a panel of guests:

Melani Cammett is an assistant professor of political science at Brown University. She specializes in the political economy of development and the Middle East. She is currently working on a book entitled “Social Welfare in Plural Societies,” a study of healthcare, schooling and short-term loans in Lebanon, where she has conducted extensive field research. She is also the author of “Globalization and Business Politics in North Africa: A Comparative Perspective.”

Ben Gilbert is the Lebanon Correspondent for GlobalPost. He also works as an independent radio, newspaper and magazine reporter covering Middle East news, culture, conflict and economics. His work has aired on National Public Radio, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, BBC and ABC Radio, among others. He has also written for the U.S. News and World Report, The Christian Science Monitor and The San Francisco Chronicle.

Ghassan Schbley is a scholar and project associate with RAND based in Washington. He specializes in Lebanese and Middle East politics and U.S. relations in the region.

View videos and blogs from the Worldfocus series The New Lebanon.

Read what bloggers have to say about the election: Controversy stirs ahead of major election in Lebanon

Associated photo courtesy of Flickr user Paul Keller under a Creative Commons license.

Credits:
Host: Martin Savidge
Producers: Lisa Biagiotti, Katie Combs and Nicole E. Foster

A memorial for former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, who was assassinated in 2005. Recently, Der Spiegel came out with a report linking Hezbollah to the assassination.

Lebanon will head to the polls on June 7 in an election that could alter the political fabric of the country, with Hezbollah and its allies poised to make significant gains.

Hezbollah is pitted against the current anti-Syria majority. For more on the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics, watch the Worldfocus signature story: Hezbollah heads into mainstream Lebanese life and politics.

On a visit to Lebanon last week, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden — the highest-level U.S. official to visit Lebanon in over two decades — warned that U.S. aid would be dependent on the outcome of the elections.

For more, listen to our online radio show on Lebanon’s election.

Hezbollah is backed by Iran and Syria, while the U.S. and its allies support the current parliamentary majority. Thomas Strouse writes at the “Informed Comment” blog to break down these two competing groups:

The two major alliances currently in Lebanon, “March 8” and “March 14,” are relatively informal blocs which formed along with events which took place in 2005. Allies and sworn enemies have been known to make dramatic shifts in Lebanese politics over the years. If an opportunity presents itself for one part of the alliance to gain politically, the current alliance framework could easily shift, especially following the June elections.

The March 8 alliance dates back to March 8, 2005 when various pro-Syrian factions held a massive demonstration in downtown Beirut, standing in support of Syria and accusing the U.S. and Israel of meddling in Lebanon’s domestic affairs. The March 14 alliance dates back to March 14, 2005, the one-month anniversary of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, when another major demonstration was held in downtown Beirut, demanding an end to the Syrian occupation of Lebanon.

In the 2005 parliamentary elections, which were held on four consecutive Sunday’s beginning on May 29, the March 14 alliance capitalized on the anger over the assassination of Hariri and the momentum that they were provided with after successfully pressuring for Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon on April 26 of that year.

The elections in five weeks will demonstrate how much support the March 14 alliance has been able to sustain over the past four years.

Frida Ghitis at “World Politics Review” explores the potential effect of a Hezbollah victory:

In the short term, a victory at the polls by Hezbollah’s coalition would not make a big difference inside Lebanon. But that could change quickly. A sharp drop in aid and a return of open Syrian and Iranian involvement in the country’s domestic affairs would raise tensions and could ultimately tip Lebanon into violence. If Hezbollah were to find itself under pressure, it could conceivably divert attention by sparking a confrontation with Israel.

A number of flashpoints could easily trigger a new war, not least of which are the anti-aircraft missiles Hezbollah has been acquiring from Iran. With Israeli surveillance flights regularly crossing Lebanese airspace, the opportunity to use the missiles would present itself directly overhead.

Deen Sharp, a journalist based in Lebanon, wrote about Biden’s visit, concluding that it was for show:

Vice-President Biden is in town and among the tabouleh surrounding his visit he has said nothing new. The policy that US will tie aid to votes was reiterated and the standard we support no one expecpt for the people that we support…

Thus, the same dance between America and Iran is being played out in Lebanon. However, all we be pleased that the tempo is slower and although there is no love music the death metal has at last been put away.

The blogosphere also lit up when Der Spiegel came out with a report linking Hezbollah to the assassination of Rafik Hariri, a former prime minister. Many regarded the report with skepticism, including blogger Michael Totten:

Der Spiegel might be wrong, and, if not, UN investigators themselves might be wrong. I’m no fan of Hezbollah, but I need more evidence before I’m willing to say “Hezbollah did it.”

Even so, this could be an enormous bombshell in Lebanon where voters go to the polls in a few weeks.

The Der Spiegel story isn’t sourced, so it could be bogus. But NOW Lebanon reports that the UN spokesperson for the tribunal has “no comment.” I’d expect the spokesperson to deny the story if it were false. At this point, I’m willing to assume the UN really does think Hezbollah did it.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Travel Aficionado under a Creative Commons license.

Lebanese pop singer Suzanne Tamim was found murdered in July 2008. Photo: Official Web Site

In a case that has captivated the Arab world, multimillionaire Egyptian businessman Hisham Talaat Moustafa was sentenced to death on Thursday for his role in the killing of a former lover, Lebanese pop singer Suzanne Tamim.

Many had wondered if Moustafa would go free, thanks to his wealth and connections to President Hosni Mubarak’s family. 

Blogger Will at “Notes from the Underground” disagrees with the verdict, arguing against the death penalty:

I’m against capital punishment, and even more so with fishy cases like that of the guy who killed Layla Ghoufran’s daughter and most recently Hisham Talaat Moustafa. The problem with such cases is that it’s obvious there is something wrong with them, something doesn’t add up and that presents what is referred to as reasonable doubt. 

The fact that there is reasonable doubt is enough to set someone free, and perhaps I’m not even asking that, only asking that he not be put to death.

[...]The death of a businessman reflects an extremity that is so characteristic of our country. In Egypt so many bad deeds go unpunished and when the law is implemented, it can take an extreme of being implemented with too much viciousness according to the whim of those entrusted with its implementation. We’re extremists in our lethargy and in our viciousness. We turn a blind eye to many evils and when it comes to punishing, we kill even if there isn’t enough proof and we burry alive those poor pigs who have done us no harm.  

But user “3abirsabeel” disagrees, responding in the comments: 

It is good that finally one of Egypt’s corrupt businessmen will be punished instead of the usual way of buying their way out of trouble with big bucks and framing somebody else who didn’t have quite the right wasta or enough money to counter.

The “7starsdubai” blog writes that the verdict suggests that even the well-connected are not beyond the rule of law in Egypt:

When a crime is committed in the Middle East and nobody is punished, invariably the explanation is that the rich and powerful have proved once again that they are beyond the reach of the law.

For years the shady activities of Gulf sheikhs, powerful ministers and rich businessmen have been swept under the carpet. But something profound could be changing in the Arab world.

Thanks in part to the advance of technology, satellite news channels and internet blogs, the elite are no longer shielded from public scrutiny. Now they may also have to answer to the law.

Now we have the case in Egypt of Hisham Moustafa, a businessman and member of Cairo’s elite being sentenced to death for ordering the murder of Suzanne Tamim.

The actions could give renewed hope to others seeking justice in the region, like the family of Martine Vik Magnussen, the Norwegian student who was murdered in London last year. Police want to question Farouk Abdulhak, the son of an Arab billionaire, who left Britain soon after the murder in Mayfair and is now in Yemen.

A blogger at “Egyptian Chronicles” agrees, stating that the verdict has political and social significance in Egypt: 

I expected this verdict somehow because of its political and social significance:

1) The Egyptian Government does not protect its men, the NDP men, the businessmen tycoon regardless of how big they are and how strong their connection with Mubarak’s family is.

2) There is no difference between a businessman tycoon, former state security officer and a poor man who are accused of murder, they will face the death penalty judgment.

3) There are three countries involved in the case besides Egypt : UAE , UK and Lebanon , already there were rumors in UAE last year that Egypt wanted to prosecute both men in the country in order to give an opportunity to Hisham to flee the punishment.

Gemayze has a vibrant night life. Photo: Kristen Gillespie

Worldfocus special correspondent Kristen Gillespie reported on the signature story “From streets to clubs, sexual attitudes shift in Lebanon.” Here, she writes about her experience reporting on the underground gay community from a small bar in Gemayze. 

It’s Friday night at a bar on a side street in Gemayze.

Two young women sitting at the end of the bar discreetly hold hands. The female DJ wears a T-shirt that reads, “My boyfriend is out of town.” Everyone in the bar is female. In the underground gay community, Friday nights at this particular bar is known to be ladies’ night. The gay scene in Beirut, says one woman while sipping her drink, “is big, but people aren’t open about it. You have to know where to go.”

The woman, 33, lives at home, but her parents don’t know that she is a lesbian. For now, they don’t have to. For younger people looking to date casually, it’s not difficult to meet people, have fun and stay in the closet.

But for homosexual couples looking to have a serious relationship — or children — the choice often boils down to staying in Lebanon and compromising, or moving abroad. I ask if it bothers her that she can’t be “out” with her partner. “What I want is to live with my partner and have a family. But realistically, I wouldn’t be able to have children and give them a good life here.” It upsets her that she would have to leave the country to do that. “We’re not there yet,” she says about Lebanon.

As it gets later, the music gets louder, the drinks keep coming and the narrow bar fills up. Another woman, 32 years old, sees me taking notes and comes over to chat. She echoes the sentiments of the first woman, emphasizing that she will remain in the closet. Her parents ”will never know” about her, even as they pressure her to get married. She is unsure how things will turn out for her.

The bar hosted at least a couple of dozen women that night, most of whom probably live at home with their parents. While Beirut is the most gay-friendly city in the Arab world, it is still a conservative society where gay couples are not socially accepted.

Homosexuals are at the beginning of a struggle for rights in Lebanon. It is one that will set an example for the rest of the Arab world.

- Kristen Gillespie

Worldfocus special correspondent Kristen Gillespie ventures through Lebanon’s vineyards.

Below, she blogs about her experience in the field.

From the Field

Let’s be up front about it: this story is unapologetically biased. I love Lebanese wine.

Putting together this story wasn’t exactly a hardship assignment. There are so many excellent producers in Lebanon, but I chose Chateau Belle-Vue because Naji and Jill Boutros represent a new generation of winemakers. It’s not just about the product — they are creating meaningful social change in their village while producing organically grown, award-winning wines. Jill made sure we had tasted plenty of samples from the oak barrels, which is where the wine from each specific grape variety lies for two years until it is blended to create a new vintage.

Chateau Ksara is one of Lebanon’s oldest producers, and aside from the consistent quality of their wines, the miles of mysterious, Roman-era subterranean tunnels fuel speculation as to what they were used for. Ksara graciously opened their doors, and their wine cellars, for us to film.

Another top producer not to be missed is Chateau Kefraya, which produces a reliably crisp Blanc de Blanc for about $6. For travelers to Lebanon, it’s available, along with many others, at Beirut’s airport.

Sahtain! (Cheers!)

- Kristen Gillespie

In the back corner of the fourth floor of West Hall, the Secular Club shares a small room with the Palestine Culture Club. The room is big enough to hold a few desks and chairs.

As we get ready to film the discussion, the students start joking about how the space is divided down the middle of the room by a row of paper Palestinian flags taped to the ceiling. Typical Arab unity, says one, Palestinians alone and everyone else on the other side. Laughs all around.

But it’s the most practical arrangement, says another, and everyone agrees. A poster of Yasser Arafat from the 1970s is turned to face the wall. For this filming, the Secular Club is crossing into Palestinian territory.

I was looking for a student club to talk to for this report and happened to wander in to West Hall, where Ahmad, the young man with the dark beard and leather jacket who participated in the roundtable discussion, was exhibiting his watercolor paintings. One is on the poster for the Secular Club, seen in the report.

Ahmad and some other friends from the club sat down to talk about secularism as the only solution for the future of Lebanon. A system based on religious quotas means a fractious, divided society where intermarriage is discouraged and people live within prescribed geographical and social boundaries.

It’s common for a taxi driver who lives in Muslim West Beirut not to be familiar at all with major landmarks in sections of Christian East Beirut. He may never have even been there before, just a few miles from his home.

The Secular Club, and the slowly growing secular movement in Lebanon, want to move beyond these social boundaries; for people to be Lebanese citizens first, and to be judged on their merits, not on their religion.

- Kristen Gillespie

Worldfocus correspondent Kristen Gillespie reports from a college campus that promotes a radical idea in the Middle East: free speech and democracy.

One of the expected big winners is Hezbollah, which commands a huge and growing influence in Lebanon.

Some call it a state within a state; a movement that is all too willing to fill any gaps it perceives left open by the government. Hezbollah, with its close ties to Iran, has become very influential — and though the U.S. government considers them terrorists, they are heroes to their many followers.

Worldfocus special correspondent Kristen Gillespie reports on Hezbollah.

Read more and view pictures from Kristen Gillespie’s reporting experience in Beirut: Scenes of Hezbollah in south Beirut

One out of four Lebanese citizens lives in the south Beirut area known as the Dahiya, or “suburbs” in Arabic. The war with Israel in 2006 hit this area particularly hard, with blocks and blocks of neighborhoods flattened. I covered the 2006 war from Beirut, and came back three years later to see how much progress had been made in reconstruction.

The overload of billboards, posters, Hezbollah souvenir shops and the oppressive security presence remind visitors that the Party of God is organized and ready for battle. It’s a war mode, even when there is no actual war.

This partially explains the secrecy and distrust of outsiders. The American government says Hezbollah is a terrorist group, but within Lebanon, it’s more complicated. The Hezbollah political party actively participates in the Lebanese government, while not only refusing to disarm but actively stockpiling weapons outside the scope of the state.

“Now they have a say in national politics,” says Timur Goksel, who liaised with Hezbollah for 20 years as a senior United Nations advisor. “They are not going to give that up, but they also know they got there with Hezbollah’s guns.”

- Kristen Gillespie

Photos by Kristen Gillespie.

Hamra Street. Photo: Kristen Gillespie

Kristen Gillespie is currently reporting from Beirut on an upcoming signature series about life in Lebanon. She recounts life on Hamra Street in Beirut, where cafes and eclectic storefronts mask the past scenes of violent fighting.

Hamra Street in Beirut, Lebanon is a random mix of sleek cafes and sketchy nighttime establishments with names like “Tico tico” and “Goldfinger.” It is also the home of Bread Republic, part of the international Slow Food movement, and Café Younes, one of Beirut’s oldest cafes that still prepares its beans in the original roaster from 1935.

The past two years have brought new life to a once-desolate Hamra Street. Restaurants, cafes and lounges are opening, and in a city where the short term can bring just about anything, it is a much-needed sign of confidence that the future will be better than the past.

For a country known more for being politically and socially divided along religious lines, Hamra Street is something of a refuge from the unrelenting sectarianism that haunts Lebanon’s past, present and future.

In the past four decades, the fighting has also swept over the street. It was occupied by Yasser Arafat’s forces, Israel’s army, pro-Syrian factions and Hezbollah, in addition to countless other militias. But Hamra, ultimately, has never belonged to one group, and it is that freewheeling spirit that makes it what Rami Khouri of the American University of Beirut calls “the last, great cosmopolitan neighborhood in the Arab world.”

The Tico Tico club. Photo: Kristen Gillespie

Nearby, a woman from the Arabian Gulf, dressed in head-to-toe black, looks at the risque lingerie in a shop window. A little further up Hamra Street, readers have their choice of well-stocked bookstores, which confidently present their wares in Arabic, French and English. While a café sits on nearly every block, international coffee chains along Hamra threaten the famous café culture of the neighborhood.

Young shoeshine boys wander the street to attract clients, and then set up their portable shoe-polish stand, squatting on the sidewalk, furiously rubbing in the polish with their hands for a small tip. Maher, the host of the tiny Abu Hassan restaurant specializing in grilled meats just past Hamra Street, expounds on why he became a vegetarian as he serves picture-perfect salads and other Lebanese dishes at this shabby hidden gem. Cab drivers shove each other while yelling about some sort of internal turf war. Traffic jams up along the two-lane street, and frustrated drivers honk into oblivion, all to no effect.

- Kristen Gillespie

Link TV’s “Mosaic” program explores the fate of Lebanese workers in Dubai. Below, bloggers in Dubai and elsewhere discuss Dubai’s dilemma.

An architect at the “Seth State” blog blames overzealous business practices during Dubai’s boom for the current situation:

In ways I saw this coming, but not to the extent that my job would cease to exist. [...] Dubai was growing unchecked, but we were getting so many new projects and working towards regular deadlines the end did not seem eminent.  Did I agree with everything we were doing there?  No, but it was a paycheck and we were working on some amazing projects.

[...]Dubai as many of you know had become a fantasy land.  They were building anything and everything.  Recreating locations of the past in the desert.  One project was directly modeled after Bath, England.  Dubai wanted to be everything to everyone.  Bigger, brighter, and more expensive seemed to be the goal. [...] When things were good, many people mortgaged their lives.  The economy is crashing and these ludicrous buildings and islands are going to stand as relics and reminders of what not to do.

My question is who will live here?  Why would you live here?  People are fleeing in alarming numbers, leaving their vehicles at the airport.

Blogger “Mohd Fudzail” describes one such scene, discussing the abandoned cars parked near his workplace:

There is a new big parking space near my office to park unsold cars. The car sales have dropped drastically as well as local police have found at least 3,000 automobiles — sedans, SUVs, regulars — abandoned outside Dubai International Airport in the last four months.

Police say most of the vehicles had keys in the ignition, a clear sign they were left behind by owners in a hurry to take flight. A large number of such owners are from Indian, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and other South Asian countries

Blogger “Anna” writes from the UAE, arguing that media reports of Dubai’s fall are overblown:

Is Dubai’s economy disintegrating before our eyes? Is the former boomtown only a few more failed investments away from bankruptcy? The NY Times seems to think so, although from my perspective here on the ground, I’m not so convinced.

I was in Dubai earlier this week and I saw little evidence that the emirate is in trouble. The “mostly clear” roads described in the Times article were certainly nowhere in evidence as we battled traffic for 45 minutes on our way to dinner at a Sri Lankan restaurant only one neighborhood away from where we’d started. The brand new Dubai Mall filled up with shoppers as soon as the workday ended, and even if this can be attributed in part to the steep discounts (up to 75 percent) currently offered at many retail outlets in honor of the month-long Dubai Shopping Festival, it was still a sign that Dubaians aren’t hoarding their dirhams so closely that they can’t still indulge in frivolous consumerism.

In the end, it may be exactly that enthusiasm to spend, spend, spend that Dubai is famous for that saves them, keeping their economy alive where that of the thrifty Americans failed.

Hezbollah’s ally Iran is also a strong supporter of Hamas and has been very critical of Israel’s offensive in Gaza.

Hillel Fradkin, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, joins Martin Savidge to discuss where the blame lies for the rocket fire and Iran’s involvement in the Gaza conflict.

A bomb site in Beirut, Lebanon, where Israel struck in the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war. Israeli military tactics have changed since that time.

Thousands of Israeli troops are massing on the Gaza border, and a ground invasion is now considered imminent. This seven-day Gaza conflict has so far seen Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip and Hamas rocket attacks in Israel. The Israeli cabinet approved a ground invasion of Gaza last week.

Hampton Stephens is the editor-in-chief and publisher of World Politics Review. He writes about prospects for an Israeli ground invasion and discusses Israel’s military improvements since its widely-criticized ground assault on Lebanon in 2006.

See his interview with Martin Savidge here: Israeli ground invasion of Gaza considered imminent. 

The war in Gaza: Can Israel have military success?

Much of the commentary surrounding the current Israel-Hamas war has been addressed to the question of whether Israel has any hope of achieving its goals militarily, given that Hamas, like Hezbollah in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, is a non-state actor that does not fight conventionally and is therefore difficult to defeat with conventional military means.

Israel’s goals: Short-term vs. long-term

When addressing this question, it’s important to be clear about what Israel’s goals are in this current operation. Israel’s short-term military objectives need to be distinguished from the long-term objective of security for the state of Israel, which ultimately means some sort of sustainable peace with its Palestinian neighbors.

As many commentators have pointed out, it is indeed hard to imagine how this war with Hamas will further that ultimate goal of peace, given that conflict of this sort could well strengthen Hamas politically in the region, and given that Israel’s bombing campaign, by killing civilians and inflaming the “Arab street,” makes it difficult even for those Arab governments that might well like to see Hamas be dealt a setback to support Israel’s actions.

However, in contrast to the 2006 Hezbollah war, Israel seems to have, at least initially, set rather modest military objectives. At the outset of the Hezbollah war, Israel announced that it wanted to achieve the return of Israeli soldiers held by Hezbollah, cripple the group militarily, and prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its military capacity in Southern Lebanon. By confounding those very high expectations that Israel created, Hezbollah was able to claim victory, cement the perception of that victory among its constituents in Lebanon as well as internationally and gain politically as a result.

Having apparently learned those lessons from the Hezbollah war, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and other Israeli officials have been much more circumspect in their declarations about Israel’s intentions this time around. Far from seeking any kind of definitive victory over Hamas, their announced intention is merely to degrade Hamas’ ability to terrorize southern Israel with rocket attacks. In a statement at the outset of the current operation on Dec. 28, Olmert said the main objective would be “to restore normal life and quiet to residents of the south.”

While the asymmetrical nature of the fight against an organization like Hamas presents distinct challenges for a traditional military operation, Israel may well be able to achieve this rather modest goal.

Israel’s successes and challenges

Israel’s bombing campaign has sought to degrade Hamas’ ability to threaten southern Israel by targeting the group’s rocket installations, destroying its existing stock of weapons, killing members of its leadership, and destroying smuggling tunnels along the Israel-Egypt border that Hamas has used to import weapons into the Gaza strip.

There are indications that Israel is having some success on all of these fronts so far, although it remains to be seen whether a bombing campaign alone will sufficiently degrade Hamas’ rocket-attack capability.

It is very difficult to find reliable damage assessments in the midst of a war, but anecdotal evidence indicates that Israel has made significant progress in achieving its goals in the early part of a campaign that could last for many days. Israeli news reports indicate that the Israeli Air Force has been gathering intelligence on Hamas smuggling tunnels along the Israel-Egypt border for months, and that it has succeeded in destroying a significant number of those tunnels in the early days of the war. Meanwhile, other reports in the Israeli press indicate that Israel may have already destroyed approximately one-third of Hamas rocket stockpiles. In the campaign to target Hamas leadership, Israel reportedly scored a significant success on Jan. 1, killing Hamas official Nizar Rayan in his home.

Even this significant success, however, highlighted how Israel’s short-term military objectives are often in conflict with its long-term strategic interests. The strike that killed Rayan reportedly also killed four of his wives and nine of his children, providing more ammunition against Israel in the international information war that is such a significant part of this conflict and of the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In a microcosm of the most significant dilemma facing Israel in its war against Hamas, the Israeli military has said that secondary explosions after the strike prove that Rayan’s home was being used to store weapons and ammunition. As of Dec. 31, a United Nations official estimated that of the approximate 400 people killed so far in the Gaza war, about 80 have been civilians, including more than 40 children.

Not all asymmetric conflicts are created equal

Beyond the dilemma that is at the heart of any asymmetric fight against a non-traditional force such as Hamas, it appears that Israel is in a better position to achieve its military objectives in this campaign against Hamas than it was vis-à-vis Hezbollah in the 2006 war to which the current conflict has so often been compared, for reasons that have to do with the nature of the battlefield on which the current campaign is being prosecuted.

In general, Hezbollah was much better able to conceal its fighters and weapons from the reach of Israeli bombs than Hamas has been, given the geography of the Gaza strip and the state of Israeli knowledge about Hamas operations there.

Whereas southern Lebanon is a mountainous region with complex geography that provides good defensive cover, one observer summed up the rather more featureless geography of the Gaza strip as “a cross between a beach, a desert and a slum.”

In addition, Gaza is an area of just 360 square kilometers, providing a circumscribed target for Israeli intelligence gathering. Having occupied the Gaza strip for almost 30 years, Israel has a robust base of knowledge about the area. Israeli intelligence gathering and military planning, it is now clear, did not cease during the six-month ceasefire with Hamas that ended last month. Citing sources in the Israeli defense establishment, Haaretz reported Dec. 31 that the Israeli military had been gathering information for months in preparation for the Gaza operation.

New weapons on both sides

In addition to gathering information, Israel appears also to have acquired in recent months a significant new weapon that it has first used in the Gaza conflict. While Israel’s fighter aircraft have typically carried 1,000- and 2,000-pound satellite-guided munitions, the Israel Air Force in September 2008 began acquiring from the United States up to 1,000 new Boeing-made 250-pound Small Diameter Bombs. The so-called GBU-29 gives the Israeli Air Force the ability to carry up to four bombs on each of its fighter planes, allowing them to make more bombing runs per sortie, and reduces collateral damage while remaining sufficiently destructive to be effective, according to the U.S. Air Force. In addition, the bomb has some capability to penetrate hardened structures, according to Boeing, a capability that has no doubt proven useful to Israel in its efforts to destroy Hamas infrastructure in Gaza.

Hamas, of course, also used the ceasefire to prepare for the day when it would end, and while Israel has a profound advantage when it comes to the weapons and technology available to it, this conflict has revealed that Hamas’ capabilities are also improving.

Previous Hamas rocket attacks on southern Israel have employed two main types of rockets: homemade Qassam rockets that are wildly inaccurate and have a maximum range of less than 10 miles; and Iranian-made, Soviet-designed Grad rockets that can fly longer distances but are still inaccurate. However, the post-ceasefire period has seen the debut of new, more accurate and more deadly Chinese-made 122 millimeter rockets that can fly up to 25 miles. On Dec. 30, one such rocket hit an empty schoolhouse in the Negev Desert city of Beersheba, about 22 miles from the Gaza strip.

A ground offensive?

It remains to be seen whether the escalation of Hamas rocket attacks that has been seen since Israel began its bombing campaign will lead Israel to conclude that it must expand its operation from an air campaign to a full-scale ground assault. What is clear, however, is that Israel is preparing for such an invasion on the ground.

Another key lesson that came out of Israel’s troubled war against Hezbollah in 2006 is that Israel was not sufficiently prepared for the ground invasion that eventually came. The report of the Winograd Commission that examined Israel’s failures in the Hezbollah warconcluded that the Israeli Defense Forces “did not demand . . . early mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a ground operation would be required.”

It is clear from the preparations that are being seen on the ground that Israel does not want to make the same mistake again. However, it is perhaps premature to conclude that these preparations for a ground invasion indicate that such an invasion is inevitable. Given the undesirable results of the ground war in Lebanon in 2006, and given the unpredictable consequences of a ground invasion with regard to both the difficulty of the fight and the international reaction to such a move, Israel has significant reason to be wary of expanding the war to the ground.

Three factors are likely to determine whether a ground invasion will come: whether Israel assesses that is making sufficient progress toward degrading Hamas’ ability to threaten southern Israel with an air campaign alone, whether those voices within Israel that are agitating for expanding the objectives of the war will win out, and whether Hamas will agree to a ceasefire on Israel’s terms.

While, as mentioned above, Israeli leaders have so far been determined to keep their objectives modest, some in the Israeli defense establishment have said that Israel should not pass up an opportunity to completely destroy Hamas in the Gaza strip and to topple the group from power.

Meanwhile, there are indications that Israel might forego a ground invasion and accept a ceasefire on its own terms, which Israeli officials have said would involve international monitors to ensure compliance with any truce.

The problem for Israel is not only that a ground invasion would require a relatively higher price in blood compared to a bombing campaign alone, but that keeping Hamas out of power after having deposed it would likely necessitate a re-occupation of the Gaza strip for an indeterminate period. Such a course would then risk further tension between Israel’s short-term objective of degrading Hamas’ ability to threaten southern Israel and the country’s long-term strategic objectives.

In a comprehensive analysis of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war, military analyst William Arkin articulated a key strategic objective that Israel must also keep in mind in the current war. He wrote that that if Israel had prosecuted the 2006 Hezbollah war differently, it might have better achieved not only its short-term objectives, but also “the fundamental long-term objective of counterterrorism: not creating even more enemies tomorrow.” While Israel appears to be making progress toward achieving its immediate goals in Gaza, the conflict’s remaining days will tell whether it manages to avoid significantly undermining its long-term interests in the process.

Read this post on World Politics Review. 

Photo courtesy of Flickr user delayed gratification under a Creative Commons license.

Hampton Stephens, the editor-in-chief and publisher of World Politics Review, joins Martin Savidge to discuss Israeli response to Hamas rockets, likely tactics in a ground invasion and lessons learned from Israel’s war with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006.

Read his extended commentary about Israeli military capability here: Can Israel’s military succeed in Gaza?

The Baalbek ruins in Lebanon, where Phoenicians once lived.

Tensions between Christian and Muslim communities in Lebanon have simmered since the country’s 1975-90 civil war. Currently, Lebanon’s power-sharing agreement provides for a Maronite Christian president, a Sunni Muslim prime minister and a Shi’ite Muslim speaker of parliament.

Recently, Lebanese geneticists mapping human migration discovered that both Christian and Muslim residents share Phoenician ancestry — a legacy that was a source of dispute during the civil war. The ancient Phoenicians thrived in the Mediterranean from 1500 to 300 B.C.

Juan Cole is a professor of history at the University of Michigan and writes at the “Informed Comment” blog about what the discovery will mean for Christian-Muslim relations in Lebanon.

Lebanese are Phoenicians after all; and so are many of the rest of us

A team of biologists at Lebanese American University estimates that 1 in 17 persons around the Mediterranean carries genetic markers distinctive to the ancient Phoenician people who resided in what is now Lebanon. The Phoenicians spread out in a trade diaspora two millennia ago, establishing colonies from Spain to Cyprus. The team also found that one third of Lebanese have the markers for Phoenician descent, and that these are spread evenly through the population, among both Christians and Muslims. In fact, all Lebanese have broadly similar sets of genetic markers. The lead researcher commented, “Whether you take a Christian village in the north of Lebanon or a Muslim village in the south, the DNA make-up of its residents is likely to be identical…”

In a Lebanese context these findings are politically explosive. There is a longstanding conflict among Lebanese as to whether they are Arabs or Phoenicians, with adherents of the Phoenician identity predominantly Christian. This sort of identity politics fed into the civil wars. In fact, Arabic is a language, not a race, and Phoenician descent is a heritage of all humankind by now.

I don’t want to sound like a broken record, but the presence those distinctive “Phoenician” haplotypes on the Y chromosome only tells us about a fraction of the descendants of Phoenicians. Let’s say you had a Phoenician father in the port of Tyre in 50 BC who only had two daughters and no sons. And let us say he married one daughter to a resident Greek merchant. The sons and male descendants of the Greek merchant would lack the Phoenician signature on their Y chromosome, but would have a genetic inheritance from their Phoenician female ancestor. Since most genes get mixed up in every generation, there just would not be any way, after a while, to tell it.

Almost everyone in the world by now probably has some Phoenician ancestry. What the LAU team is finding is those lineages that retain markers for it. It is conceptually a difficult thing to keep in mind, but I am alarmed that a kind of Y chromosome or mitochondrial DNA fundamentalism will make people divide themselves up on these grounds and create new forms of racism.

To read more, see the original post.

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