Photo by Ben Piven for Worldfocus

North Korea is one of the most closed-off societies in the world. Information from inside the country is notoriously difficult to gather.

Radio signals are jammed, internet connections blocked and cell phones monitored. To combat this lack of information some news organizations pay informants to smuggle news out.

These sources, often cultivated by South Korean news agencies as “underground stringers,” risk their lives for little pay. But as many as half of their reports are false, according to a recent New York Times article by Choe Sang-hun:

The reports are sketchy at best, covering small pockets of North Korea society. Many prove wrong, contradict each other or remain unconfirmed. But they have also produced important scoops, like the currency devaluation and a recent outbreak of swine flu in North Korea. The mainstream media in South Korea now regularly quote these cottage-industry news services.

“Technology made this possible,” said Sohn Kwang-joo, the chief editor of Daily NK. “We infiltrate the wall of North Korea with cellphones.”

Over the past decade, the North’s border with China has grown more porous as famine drove many North Koreans out in search of food and an increasing traffic in goods — and information — developed. A new tribe of North Korean merchants negotiates smuggling deals with Chinese partners, using Chinese cellphones that pick up signals inside the North Korean border.

Worldfocus also spoke with Barbara Demick, Beijing bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times, about North Korean informants:

Regarding the underground news agencies, I’ve found that their reports are plausible, but a little exaggerated. For example, Good Friends’ NK Today was the first to report the famine in the 90s, but I think their claims of the death toll were overstated. These agencies have on occasion given vague reports of protests that I think have a kernel of truth — but are also exaggerated.

For example, I have never interviewed a defector who personally witnessed any kind of public protest in North Korea, although I think there have been localized incidents at the markets where vendors complained to market management or resisted arrest by the police. There have also been a fair number of incidents in which security officials were murdered.

On the ethics of the agencies paying informants, I think it would be unethical for them not to pay — in that these people are risking their lives. According to Choe Sang-hun’s recent piece [above], some of the informants are actually considered to be reporters who are working. But there is no doubt just the same that paying taints the quality of information. It creates an incentive for them to tell you what they think you would want to hear. We don’t pay for interviews with defectors, although when I interview them I am usually with a missionary who might be providing food and clothing.

Worldfocus put together a list of English-language news agencies and blogs that cover North Korea. These sites try to gather information from within North Korea:

• Daily NK was created by activists from the Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights. As the world’s first dedicated North Korean online news site, The Daily NK reports in real time.
• NK Today is produced by Good Friends USA to help the North Korean people from a humanistic point of view and describe the way North Korean people live as accurately as possible.
• North Korean Economy Watch is intended for business people, policy makers, academics and journalists but does not generally focus on human rights or the nuclear issue.

• DPRK Studies promotes awareness of North Korean security, social, political and historical issues. It is a portal to news, research, opinion, and organizations on North Korea.

• The Hankyoreh is a progressive newspaper decisively committed to journalistic freedom, democracy, peaceful coexistence and national reconciliation between South and North Korea.

• Kyodo News is distributed to almost all newspapers and radio-TV networks in Japan. Kyodo has a special English-language section dedicated to North Korea.

• Yonhap News Agency is based in Seoul and is the largest news-gathering network in Korea. There is a monthly magazine and a weekly e-newsletter dedicated to covering news from North Korea.

And these sites serve as North Korea’s official media, propagating pro-government news and information.

• Korean Central News Agency is the Pyongyang-based state-run news agency of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. News is transmitted to other countries in English, Russian, and Spanish.

• Korean Friendship Association was founded on November of the year 2000 with the purpose of building international ties with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

For more Worldfocus coverage of North Korea, visit our extended coverage page: Behind the Korean Curtain.

Hillary Clinton meets with S. Korean military officers in February 2009. Photo: Flickr user IMCOMKorea

Hillary Clinton is off to Asia, her second trip there since she took office. Right away, she became the first Secretary of State in four decades to go to Asia before Europe. The Obama Administration is playing its cards well on Asia so far.

Despite the contentious issue of the location of the American military base at Futenma, the Administration has forged solid ties with a brand-spanking-new government in Japan, which came to office having very public doubts about the alliance.

Relations with China now have a set structure, with the annual Strategic Economic Dialogue, Presidential summits and formal bilateral talks on a whole host of subjects, terrorism recently included.

The Administration is pushing China to play a constructive role on global challenges, with some results in climate and on Iran.

Rough patches are coming up, however, on trade, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, President Obama’s upcoming meeting with the Dalai Lama and China’s recent crackdown on dissidents.

And the harsh sentencing of democracy activist Lu Xiabo is a depressing sign of the times.

The U.S. has signed ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, allowing the U.S. to appoint an ambassador and formally tying the US closer to SE Asia. President Obama was the first U.S. president to attend an ASEAN summit. As China’s courting of SE Asia has been in overdrive in recent years, this is a welcome symbol of U.S. engagement in the region.

North Korea’s nuclear program continues to vex, but the Administration persevering. China actually enforced sanctions against its neighbor last year, and the Obama Administration can take some credit for that.

We’ll see whether the Obama Administration’s willingness to talk bilaterally will succeed in the end. The U.S. does not seem willing to give any additional concessions to get North Korea back to the negotiating table.

The Administration certainly breathed new life into the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement.

And they checked the box on a “strategic” relationship with India, though the relationship needs deepening.

Secretary Clinton is going to visit Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea — and then give a major address on Asia policy during her trip.

One major theme will be: America is back.

- Nina Hachigian

Worldfocus is partnering with Pearl World Youth News, an initiative of Daniel Pearl Foundation and iEARN, to bring the voices of young reporters to our viewers.

Ji Eun Lee writes about the challenges of integrating young North Korean defectors into South Korean society.

On a quiet Friday night, several North Korean defectors gathered at the camping site near Seoul World Cup Stadium. Defectors are North Koreans who have fled their country for ideological, political, or economic reasons. Risking punishment and even death in case of capture, they cross the country’s armed borders and come to South Korea.

Dressed in the latest fashions and checking text messages on their cell phones, they looked like typical young Koreans. But there was some hesitation in their eyes when they were asked about their lives in South Korea.

“It’s not that we don’t want to talk about our experience here. Most of us are hesitant because talking about the ways in which we don’t fit in only seems to accentuate the fact that we’re…different,” said 26-year-old Young-Woo, and several heads nodded in agreement. “And we really aren’t that different from South Koreans, besides the fact that we’ve escaped North Korea to come here.”

An increasing number of North Koreans are crossing over to South Korea. According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, more than 15,000 defectors live in the country, and in 2008 alone, 2,809 crossed the border.

Many South Koreans regard them as refugees and support programs aimed at helping the defectors. Ironically, it is this very help that places the defectors in an awkward position because they want to avoid standing out.

“We appreciate the help for its sake. As nice as it is to see that South Koreans are paying attention to the plight of North Koreans, the attitude behind such help is often very patronizing,” said Chul-Min, a 23-year-old college student. “Most South Koreans don’t seem to think of us as Koreans. They treat us as if we are exotic foreigners. Though we are aware of the intentions of the South Koreans who want to help us, they seem to have established a distinct mental dichotomy between the two Koreas.”

When asked about the difficulties they face in South Korea, the defectors murmured that life here isn’t as perfect as they’d imagined. Though originally one people sharing centuries of rich culture, decades of separation have widened the gap between the two Koreas.

“Even in terms of language, there is quite a lot of difference in regional dialects. We don’t have trouble communicating. But our distinct accent, or the different words we use, immediately betrays where we come from, attracting curious, uneasy looks,” added Chul-Min. “And speaking of language, proficiency in English seems to be extremely important here. Many defectors face difficulties with English as the level of English education offered in North Korea is very basic. It’s frustrating because it directly affects our opportunities for job or education.”

Many jobs applications in South Korea ask for scores from standardized English tests like TOEFL or TEPS. An estimated 100,000 institutions offer advanced English classes with one hour of lesson costing well over US $30. Expensive private education is often unaffordable for North Korean defectors. Many of them subsist on economic aid from the government. And public education does not give them an edge to compete with South Koreans in school or at the workplace.

English is only one of many difficulties faced by North Koreans in education. Most defectors pursue higher degrees after coming to South Korea, but they often have trouble adjusting to the curriculum.

“The curriculum is just so different from what we had in the North,” said Hye-Young, the youngest of the group at 19. “For instance, Korean history in North Korea is very different from what’s taught here as it’s manipulated by the government to serve as ideological propaganda.” Many defectors are forced to take classes with much younger students.

Difficulties come in many forms, but the group agreed on one thing: behind every difficulty they face is the South Koreans’ thinking that defectors are fundamentally different. “Advocating for the rights of North Koreans is evidently a strong movement here. Grants, lectures, fundraisers, there seem to be so many programs designed to ‘help us out’. Why not start by accepting us as Koreans?” said Hye-Young.

- Ji Eun Lee

(All names have been changed to avoid repercussions for family members still residing in North Korea.)

A banner promoting North Korea’s 150-day economic production campaign in August. Photo: Ben Piven

Part 6 of 6 in our Inside the Hermit Kingdom series on the people and culture of North Korea. Worldfocus multimedia producer Ben Piven writes about the contrast between the North Korean economy and the booming economies of South Korea and China.

“Why does South Korea produce Samsung, LG, and Hyundai?” I asked Jong, our 25-year-old North Korean tour guide.

She said that North Korea will manufacture sophisticated goods once the essentials — electrification and rice production — are covered. But the blank look on her face suggested that she better not discuss the issue.

Then, she perked up when someone asked about her own ideal job. She replied matter-of-factly, “I’d be a businesswoman.”

Jong’s 5,000 KPW (Korean People’s Won) monthly salary is equivalent to around $1.67. The official rate for the North Korean won is 142 per U.S. dollar, but due to severe inflation since the mid-1990’s, the black market rate is over 3000 KPW to $1.

Housing, health care and education are free in North Korea. But with her meager salary, Jong on her own could never afford the television or computer which her family of four (including her mother, father and grandmother) possess. Euros, dollars and Chinese yuan are needed for major purchases.

In North Korea, tourists are not permitted to enter non-tourist shops or purchase the local currency, since a negligible amount of foreign currency could buy out an entire store. Opening up shops and currency to the market would cause economic humiliation.

North Korea’s GDP is $1,700 per capita, 1/15 of South Korea’s, according to the CIA Factbook. Tied with Cote D’Ivoire and just a tad wealthier than Chad, North Korea is poorer than Laos and Cambodia. North Korea went from one of the most prosperous East Asian countries in the 1970s to the least prosperous today.

A Yalu River bridge once connected North Korea with China but was bombed out by the U.S. during the Korean War. Photo: Ben Piven

It wasn’t always this way. Having relied on the Soviets for economic inputs, North Korea developed faster than South Korea in the aftermath of the 1953 armistice that concluded the Korean War. The country’s infrastructure was mostly built from the late 50s to the early 70s, when the Soviet system was strong.

But by the 1980s rural South Korea had transformed into a tech-savvy urban tiger, and the stunted north turned more repressive after a number of aborted attempts to liberalize the economy.

The Juche state ideology — which emphasizes economic self-reliance  — intensified around 1982, almost certainly in response to South Korea’s explosive economic growth. Today, the paradox is that North Korea may be isolated,  but it’s not self-reliant. The authoritarian state relies heavily on food and fuel aid from abroad — as well as, some say, criminal activities.

David Rose explains in Vanity Fair how the Office 39 slush fund supplies Kim’s personal coffers, his inner circle and the missile defense program. Annual revenues from decidedly un-Juche activities, including crystal meth sales and human trafficking, may surpass $1 billion.

North Korea suffers economically from a strict economic embargo. Photo: Ben Piven

According to Rose, the D.P.R.K. is also the world’s top producer of “supernote” counterfeit $100 bills. Since the government cannot legally borrow cash, military sales and criminal rackets generate enough hard currency to keep the regime from collapse.

Since Kim Jong-il implemented songun (military-first budget policy) in 1994, the nuclear program has propped up the regime but stunted the people’s health and welfare. And economic sanctions have further impoverished ordinary Koreans.

On our officially-sanctioned tour, we gawked at workers burning rubber shoes to pave roadways and saw only one functioning crane in five days. Like the country’s infrastructure, corn and rice plots were orderly but dilapidated. Peasants worked in large groups, then napped individually in tiny wooden shacks.

Except for one rainy day, our bus was lonely on the roadways. Endless queues of people waited for antique Soviet trams and buses, while government officials drove fancy German cars. The only billboards advertised Pyonghwa Motors, co-owned by Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church and under license from Fiat.

Officially, 2012 (Kim Il-Sung’s 100th birthday, known as Juche 100) will mark the completion of several projects, including the pyramidal Ryugyong Hotel, begun in 1987 but halted in 1992 due to severe shortages. Though the country’s tallest structure, the 105-story building is absent from tourist maps.

A North Korean phone on the country’s only cellular network. Photo: Ben Piven

The top two floors are being renovated as an office for Egyptian telecom magnate Naguib Sawiris, whose Orascom employees are also installing the nation’s first cell service, KoryoLink. The company has already enlisted over 50,000 subscribers at $25 per month. Sawiris also recently launched Ora Bank, another joint venture with a North Korean government partner. (North Korea’s ties with Egypt date back to the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In return for air force squadrons, North Korea later received scud missiles).

Some Americans believe that more economic engagement is the best way to bring North Korea in from the cold. There are some signs that the Juche nation is slowly bending to Western commercial pressures - witness the Taedonggang beer ad, Pyongyang pizza craze, and a new Singaporean-owned fast food restaurant.

But for now, despite the rapid globalization on its borders, North Korea remains in an economic deep freeze.

- Ben Piven

Air Koryo stewardesses with delicately coiffed hair and impeccable red suits directed us to our seats in the stuffy Tupolev aircraft. Flimsy seat backs folded completely forward onto the seat cushions. Pyongyang-bound tourists, businessmen, and North Koreans fanned themselves ferociously, as the temperature hit 80 degrees.

Forget Bill rescuing Laura and Euna in a private jet. Our Soviet-made plane first arrived in Pyongyang when Richard Nixon was conducting ping-pong diplomacy with China.

Banned in the E.U., Air Koryo is the only international carrier with the lowest 1-star Skytrax rating. Luckily, flight JS 156 from Shenyang was only 50 minutes.

We touched down, sweaty and relieved. The head stewardess announced, “Welcome to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea!” We blue-state Americans were ready to challenge the hermit kingdom’s concept of “imperialist dogs.”

Fearlessly led by three 2009 Brown University graduates, our Five Passes group had 18 scholarly Americans — including a Berkeley sociologist and an assistant director at the Asia Society — and 1 Chinese citizen. The tricky visas for the five-day North Korea tour had been arranged through North Korea’s consulate in Shenyang by a Chinese travel agent of North Korean origin.

After landing, airport officials escorted one of our guides and me to a back room to take our temperature. (Back in New York, I had half-joked whether a senator would rescue me from ping-pong with the dictator). They said we were warm - probably false - but maybe the result of the steamy plane ride. Twenty minutes of detention were disconcerting.

We had left forbidden items in China - several iPhones, a Blackberry, Star of David necklace, and a large zoom lens. Our group was anxious that customs officials might find a New Yorker cartoon of Kim Jong-il.

After leaving the terminal, we boarded our old tour bus and saw five half-smiling North Korean hosts - our guide, guard, minder, driver — and cameraman. We instantly became the subjects of a government travel documentary. Our tailor-made Truman Show had begun — in a 1950’s dystopia behind the Korean curtain.

We stayed at the grand Yanggakdo Hotel, on an island in the middle of the sluggish Taedong River. While the rooms looked like those in a 1970’s Ramada, we delighted in the 9-hole golf course, revolving rooftop restaurant, and Chinese-owned casino.

We mingled with Westerners and local families at the outdoor bar on the island’s edge. Bar matrons tended tables until after midnight — and even remembered our Koreanized names when we stepped into the fluorescent light of the breakfast hall by 6:30 a.m.

On the third day of our 92-hour time warp to the world’s most secretive country, we drove to Mt. Myohyang, 90 miles north of Pyongyang. Bob, a University of Colorado professor and our most quintessential American, bowed awkwardly at a waxen Kim Jong-il inside the International Friendship Exhibition. We chuckled about Bob’s homage to the “dear leader.”

Walking past thousands of treasures received by the reclusive leader and his late father, our guard commented on the U.S.-D.P.R.K relationship. “When the general plays with that ball, it proves that he controls the whole world in his hands,” said Lee, glaring at the Michael Jordan-autographed basketball Madeline Albright gave to Kim Jong-il in 2000. We then nicknamed our guard “Serious-Lee.”

His diametric opposite was our baby-faced 33-year-old minder with Buddha ears - also Lee - whom we called “Happy-Lee.” Neither Lee told us his first name, enabling our good cop/bad cop monikers. “Naive-Lee” versus “Stern-Lee.” And “Nice-Lee” versus “Malevolent-Lee.”

Nice-Lee charmed us with awkward English, using “representative” and “condensed” to describe our experience. But Serious-Lee, who stars in the 2008 Vice Guide to North Korea, prevented us from causing real trouble.

Nice-Lee fondly recalled the American and North Korean flags displayed side-by-side at the February 2008 Pyongyang performance of the New York Philharmonic. He was also impressed by the orchestra’s many Asian-Americans.

Our guide was an pretty 25-year-old woman who cheerfully promoted government dogma but tired of our questions. Our postmodern sensibilities overwhelmed her, especially when we spoke candidly about diplomatic rapprochement. But we did our best to transcend ideology by discussing nonpolitical issues.

On our tightly managed tour, objectivity and authenticity were in short supply. Though culturally sensitive, we critiqued claims about the economy and the allegedly hostile U.S. government. Bearing our American soft power, we were lucky to visit in the footsteps of our ex-president. Although we feared becoming pawns of Pyongyang’s public relations campaign, we hoped that our educational tour benefited the broader diplomatic thaw.

On our last day in Pyongyang, we said goodbye to plentiful Kimjongilias and Kimilsungias, the country’s revered flowers. At the airport, we noticed only two flights listed that day.

The return flight was the most terrifying part of the entire trip. Taiwanese passengers twice shrieked when the plane dropped dramatically. The plane was a microcosm of the country: in complete disrepair, while most people inside remain mum about their plight.

We cursed that the embargo prevented Air Koryo from updating its ancient fleet. I’ll wait until new jets arrive for my next voyage to the perfectly preserved Cold War museum, our beloved Hermit Kingdom.

- Ben Piven

North Korean Major Im Dong-chul. Photos: Ben Piven

Part 3 of 6 in our Inside the Hermit Kingdom series on the people and culture of North Korea. Worldfocus multimedia producer Ben Piven writes about his encounter with Major Im Dong-chul while on the north side of the Demilitarized Zone that separates the two Koreas.

Since 1953, it has been the world’s most militarized border. Bill Clinton has called it the scariest place on earth. Undoubtedly, my most compelling moment in North Korea was at the DMZ — Demilitarized Zone.

Many Americans visit the south side of the 2.5-mile wide buffer zone that runs across the 38th parallel, dividing the Communist north from the democratic south. But our group was given a rare glimpse of the north side, where more than one million soldiers lie in waiting.

Our tour guide, Im Dong-chul, was a 21-year veteran of the Korean People’s Army with a sharp jaw and oval eyes. He offered us our only opportunity to engage in real political conversation with a North Korean soldier. Although the dialogue began with tremendous tension, we moved toward a cordial rapport during our 90 minutes together.

Speaking in Korean, Major Im fielded questions about war and peace. The major and I squared off, with two dozen others crowded around, and I seized the challenge of bilateral hardball. I was simultaneously engaged as a journalist and a diplomat. And since Americans of neither profession are common in North Korea, the task at hand was immense.

Promoting the elusive two-party talks sought by North Korea, I asked what message I should relay to President Obama.

Major Im, with the line of control and U.S.-administered building on the South Korean side in the far background.

“The U.S. should end its hostile attitude towards the DPRK by withdrawing its forces from the Korean peninsula. This is the biggest issue blocking reunification,” he said.

“As a representative of the American people, I know that we voted for a new president because we wanted big changes in foreign policy,” I responded. “President Obama is sincere, but he’s busy with a dozen other problems.”

“If every American were like you, there would be peace,” he concluded. “And I hope Obama’s policy shift happens soon.”

I apologized for American bombers leveling Pyongyang during the Korean War, and the major responded to my empathy. I then reiterated the bottom line of denuclearization: the north needs to implement security guarantees for the south.

It was shocking that Major Im even tolerated our input. Apparently, American tourists had never engaged him before. We too felt the pressure, especially in the DMZ meeting room straddling the Korean border.

I wondered about the significance of the exchange. I had come to terms with our contribution to the tourist economy but hoped that we were not becoming apologists for the state’s Juche ideology.

Back at the hotel that night, we noticed signs of diplomatic progress on BBC World News. But the process is cyclical: the North relaxes its stance, opens to talks, and then postures militarily after making impossible demands. The leadership clams up, afraid to risk humiliation at the bargaining table.

Later in the trip, we heard endless misinformation at the Korean War museum and during our tour of the captured U.S.S. Pueblo spy ship.

In the conference room that straddles the line of control between the two Koreas.

We were told repeatedly that the Korean War was used to lift the Americans out of the depression and that the U.S. had initiated the war.

Yet, we heard not a peep about the American role in liberating Korea from Japan in World War Two, though we often heard more animosity toward the Japanese than toward the sworn American enemy.

During five days in the DPRK, North Korean people never reacted contemptuously to our group as Americans. While anti-American dogma figures into museums and monuments, strangers were deferential and usually avoided us. Tourism workers were often excessively nice, especially if we addressed them in Korean or Mandarin.

My conversation with Major Im was a small but promising victory for the prospects of diplomacy aimed at bringing the world’s most isolated, nuclear-armed regime in from the cold.

- Ben Piven

North Korea is a Cold War relic, but its communist roots alone do not explain the widespread adoption of the ideology knows as Juche — essentially a hybrid of East Asian Confucianism and East European Stalinism.

Despite the fact that state literature decrees “man is the master of all things,” Juche (”self-reliance” in Korean) is relentlessly collectivist.

Juche emphasizes rigid hierarchical authority and the harmonious arrangement of highly deferential individuals. Economic independence and military self-defense are its primary goals.

Juche is the main philosophical component of the political system known as Kimilsungism, which emerged from the leadership of Kim Jong-il’s father, Kim Il-sung.

The Kim Il-sung cult overshadows reverence for Kim Jong-il, whose image is scarcely seen on monuments. Scholars debate whether Juche qualifies as a religion, but the North Korean government certainly permits worship of no other gods.

Omnipresent Juche obelisks and Kim Il-sung immortality towers memorialize the “eternal president” who died in 1994 after almost a half-century in power. His portrait adorns every major public space, as Mao and Stalin’s did in their respective societies.

But subordination to the dead emperor is more theocratic than in Maoism and Stalinism. Pyongyang is Juche’s Jerusalem, and Kim’s birthplace, Mangyongdae, is the North Korean Bethlehem. His presidential palace, Kumsusan, is a sprawling compound with intimidating right angles and exquisite marble interiors, where his body lies in state - like Mao in Tian’anmen Square.

North Korean society is organized into groups. Citizens rarely do anything alone, and there is no concept of pluralism. Self-esteem and personal confidence come from conformity and compatibility with the Juche ideological framework.

The mass culture of North Korea is stunning due to its high level of coordination and the sheer numbers of participants in events such as the Arirang Games, the mass games spectacle involving over 100,000 performers — including 20,000 schoolchildren who form a human television.

Ironically, Pyongyang was the center of Korean Christianity prior to the Korean War, but currently religious freedom is limited to three Christian churches in the capital and a handful of state-run Buddhist temples. Pohyonsa, a Buddhist temple complex near Mt. Myohyang, is designated as #40 on the “national treasure” list. A vestige of once-flourishing Buddhism, the site is reminiscent of Holocaust memorials to extinct communities.

In the Hermit Kingdom, Juche trumps all.

- Ben Piven

Pyongyang residents at the Arch of Triumph. Photo: Ben Piven

The South Korean government says that the number of North Korean refugees in South Korea has surpassed 16,000, and recent immigrants are generally uneducated and underemployed. Worldfocus contributing blogger Jamblichus writes about their plight.

South Korea’s Unification Ministry has requested 9.3 billion won (US$7.9 million) to beef up its resettlement facilities for defectors from the North as the number of refugees arriving from its destitute neighbor keeps climbing.

According to the ministry’s 2010 budget proposal, Seoul plans to spend just over four million dollars to build a second Hanawon, a resettlement center for defectors and around three million dollars to establish smaller “Hana” support centers across the nation.

Lets hope that those doling out the cash take the request seriously (the ministry has requested a 25% budget increase for next year) for North Korean refugees are becoming a growing underclass in the South whose needs current resettlement facilities are hugely under-equipped to accommodate.

Until the late 1990s, the number of North Koreans defecting to the South remained insignificant, totaling just 86 between 1990 and 1994 and remaining in double-digits each year until 1999. Numbers began to shoot up thereafter — following a devastating famine in the North — with 583 arriving in South Korea in 2001 and 1,139 the following year.

On February 16, 2007, the unification ministry pulled a cracker for Chairman Kim Jong-il on his birthday by announcing that the total number of Northern refugees arriving in the South had reached 10,000; just 32 months later there are now more than 16,000. You do the math.

The first wave — in fact more a gentle ripple — of defectors were largely drawn from the North Korean elite. But recent defectors have often been young and unskilled, hailing from the communist state’s North Hamgyong province. The sheer numbers have meant they are treated no longer as romantic escapees deserving of full approbation by the southern public — but a burden on the taxpayer, somewhat unsophisticated and potentially threatening to the social order.

The South’s rigid and hyper-competitive education system looks almost designed to alienate young defectors further from an already difficult-to-crack South Korean society. And while there are success stories — from world champion female boxer Choi Hyun-mi to journalist Kang Chol-hwan — the vast majority wind up unemployed.

A survey of 654 defectors that was conducted in December 2006, showed that 45.1% were unemployed, 30% had part-time employment, 13.1% had temporary employment, and only 11.8% were either self-employed or had full-time employment. Another survey conducted by Professor Park Sang-an of Seoul National University in the same year came up with an unemployment rate of over 67%.

Things may have improved since then, but I’m guessing not dramatically, particularly given the sheer increase in numbers arriving. Another survey reported by the Chosun Ilbo in 2007 found more than half of North Korean teens in South Korea drop out of school, a staggering figure compared to the 1-2 per cent drop out rate for South Korean students.

Given the numbers, seven million bucks doesn’t sound like all that much. There’s only so long South Korea can afford such a failure of integration — as defector numbers burgeon — before the problem becomes significantly more visible. Let’s hope the Unification Ministry gets its money.

This map, courtesy of the CIA World Factbook, uses the “Sea of Japan” label, but Koreans demand it be called the “East Sea.”

Geographical names — the names of cities, countries and oceans — can kill.

You don’t think so? Try referring to the archipelago of 778 islands 300 miles off the coast of southern South America as the Falkland Islands, and an Argentinian may think you’re picking a fight. Their name for the British-controlled islands, for which they claim sovereignty, is Islas Malvinas. Britain and Argentina fought a war over the islands in 1982, and 907 people died.

A hapless Iranian journalist with the Associated Press in Tehran during the days of the shah received visits from the Iranian secret police, and was threatened with jail and worse every time the news agency described the portion of the Indian Ocean between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula as “The Arabian Sea.”

“Please, please,” the poor Iranian reporter begged editors at AP in New York on a crackly telephone line. “Don’t call it that; call it the Persian Gulf.”

I’m reminded of all this by a full-page advertisement in the Washington Post (page A15, Wednesday, Aug. 12, 2009), in which a vaguely-named organization calls on journalists to use the name “East Sea” for the portion of the Pacific Ocean between the Korean peninsula and the Japanese Islands. The ad noted that the newspaper had used the geographical term “Sea of Japan” in a news story on July 5.

I suspect strongly that the Web site is linked to the South Korean government’s effort to change the recognized name of that body of water to East Sea. Some organizations, such as National Geographic, have been convinced to use both names together — publishing maps and gazetteers that read “Sea of Japan (East Sea).” That is somewhat appeasing to South Korean tastes.

South Korea has been lobbying for years that the body of water be officially renamed worldwide. The case hearkens back to Japan’s occupation of Korea in the 20th Century. South Korea (and North Korea is generally in agreement, in this case) argues that Korea was controlled by a colonial Japanese government when it accepted the world-recognized designation of Sea of Japan in 1929.

Japan argues that “Sea of Japan” predates the Korean occupation and denies influencing its international use.

The dispute has been considered without resolution by a commission on standardizing names at the United Nations.

What is remarkable to me is the fervor with which South Korea has dedicated efforts — and a considerable amount of money — to change the name. Diplomats, university professors and statesmen have been sent around the world to visit governments, news media and others simply to get them to change the name in their official usage.

I don’t have any advice for the Washington Post, my former employer, where I was once the editor in charge of Asian news, and where I once received an earnest and convincing delegation of South Koreans who wanted to discuss the issue. Days later, I also received a visit from the Japanese embassy, where officials apparently had gotten wind of the lobbying effort.

But wouldn’t there would be a lack of incentive to make a quick decision on changing the name? The latest advertisement must have added well-needed revenue to Washington Post coffers somewhere in the range of $40,000-60,000. Using the “wrong name” more than once could add up to real money.

P.S. I even suspect that a South Korean tracking program spotted the use of “East Sea” and “Sea of Japan” in this blog item. While it sounds like good money, WorldDesk doesn’t run advertising, doesn’t accept funding from government organizations and seeks to be balanced at all times. We’ll go with both names, right down the middle, for free.

- Peter Eisner

South Korean President Lee inspects troops.

Jonas Parello-Plesner works as senior advisor with the Danish government on Asian affairs and is currently meeting with think tanks, experts and commentators in East Asia’s major cities researching political integration.

China and India (Chindia) is on everybody’s lips when talking about rising Asia.

Then what is KIA? A car, most people would reply. Yet it could also be the new brand-name for Asia’s middle powers; (K)orea, (I)ndonesia, and (A)ustralia. They are Asia’s 4th, 5th, and 6th largest economies. All three are often dwarfed by the big power play between China, India and Japan and the region’s –and the world’s – superpower, the US.

Yet look at Indonesia’s population as the world’s third largest democracy, Korea’s economy, and Australia’s size – a continent in itself. They are solid middle powers. Relocate them to Europe and they would be large countries on most accounts. In Asia, they are too small to be big, but too large to be small.

Korea, Indonesia, Australia are all members of G20 – a forum which has gained preeminence in the on-going economic crisis. In G20, they are sitting at the table with an equal say alongside China and India.

All three have individual ambitions to leave their own print on Asian multilateral institutions and regional integration in the making, ranging from APC to G20 Caucus and E8.

South Korea, which used to describe itself as a shrimp encircled by whales, has new-found ambitions to play an independent role in Asian multilateralism. Lee Myung-bak has launched a New Asia Initiative that focuses both on strengthening Korea in Asia and Asia’s global voice.

Korea sees itself as in a position to mediate between the large powers –notably with China and Japan through its seat in ASEAN+3, which held its first independent meeting last year. It is expected to continue doing that. ASEAN+3 also produced Asia’s only joint and multilateral response to the economic crisis with the multilateralisation of the Chiang Mai Initiative (currency swaps), largely at the instigation of Korea. At the same time, Korea also sees itself as a voice for small countries and a bridge to the West with its democratic system and alliance with the USA.

All in all, Korea perceives itself as the right middle power to mediate in a global shift towards Asia. And South Korea will hold the chair of the G20 and will work towards an East Asian grouping to ensure that Asia’s united voice – if possible – is heard. Korea sees itself as able to secure the interests of smaller countries in Asia in that context. Korea’s commemorative summit with ASEAN the 1st and 2nd of June showed a determination to gain individual relevance towards the grouping. In Korea’s terminology, it’s the meeting of the equal size ‘shrimps’ that don’t feel threatened by each other.

The election of a South Korean, Ban ki-moon, as UN secretary-general – among other things – also showed that Koreans are generally liked in Asia with little political and historical animosity associated with the country and the people.

Indonesia is full of new confidence following a continued affirmation of democratic principles in the recent parliamentary and presidential elections combined with continued growth notwithstanding the economic crisis.

That new confidence is displayed in fresh foreign policy thinking. Executive Director Rizal Sukma of the influential Jakarta-based think tank, CSIS, has been arguing for an E-8 (China, Japan, India, Russia, Korea, Australia, USA, and Indonesia) as an informal forum to meet in connecting with Asian multilateral meetings and the G-20.

Sukma has also argued for a more independent Indonesian foreign policy less held back by ASEAN membership and geographical proximity1. The genuine lack of progress on human rights/democracy inside ASEAN – even with Charter and HR-Commission in place – combined with Thailand’s internal instability has reduced ASEAN’s role in the driving seat of regional integration. That is one of motivations for reducing reliance on ASEAN in Indonesia’s foreign policy. For Indonesia as a middle power, it is high time to secure an independent place at the high table of the Asian power concert.

How much of these ideas and proposals from CSIS will enter into government thinking remains to be seen when president Yudhoyono begins his new term in October. What is certain is that democratic, rising Indonesia also will be looking for increased leverage to assert its independent status as middle power in Asia and globally.

Australia is on the multilateral stage with PM Kevin Rudd’s proposal for an Asia Pacific Community (APC) as a forum for the better governance of great power relations, a proposal widely discussed in Asia and on this site. Where APEC 20 years ago, also partly an Australian initiative, was about securing the economically rising Japan in an appropriate multilateral framework, APC (with one letter fewer) has a larger ambition of managing great power relations in Asia-Pacific including in both the economic and security fields.

APC is also about continuing to make Australia relevant in Asia. As a primarily Pacific power its credentials can be questioned, like has been done in the inclusion process of Australia in the East Asia Summit, where Malaysia’s former PM Mahathir was very vocal in saying that they were neither ‘East (n)or Asians’. The next step in Australia’s initiative will be when PM Rudd is expected to brief Asian leaders at the East Asia Summit in October on APC.

The middle powers – a concerted approach?

KIA is not yet a united force. But they might want to be. All three want to brand themselves individually with their proposals and initiatives. Yet on their own, as middle powers, they might not be relevant enough with their individual proposals to secure the acceptance and interest of Asia’s great powers.

And all three still have their individual particularities and handicaps. Australia as a Pacific power continuously has to show its relevance in an Asian context. Indonesia even with new-found independent ambitions will continue to be anchored in ASEAN. Korea still gets bogged down in its immediate surroundings in the complicated relationship with its difficult twin brother, North Korea.

So they should coordinate their efforts. Two areas where KIA could take a common stance and make a difference are G20 and free trade agreements.

The April G20 meeting was in many headlines interpreted as China’s coming out as world power. That headline could have been captured by Asia’s united entry into the world stage. It wasn’t. Asia did not come out united or coordinated to the on-going economic crisis. ASEAN was out of play because of the chairman, Thailand’s incapacity to hold the summit meetings for ASEAN+ and EAS. So no early discussion of the G20 agenda took place or any debriefing on the meetings afterwards. It is time to make up for that.

The suggestion for a G20 Caucus should be enacted in order to endure that Asia’s big powers are obliged to meet and coordinate before the G20 meetings and to report to a broader Asian setting afterwards (EAS, ASEAN+). Korea as coming host of G20 could ensure this. Indonesia could work along and work to ensure that ASEAN does not feel left behind and is fully participating through the chairman’s continued inclusion in G20. In that sense, the last A in KIA could also be representing ASEAN. Australia should be pragmatic and see a G20 Caucus as a good stepping-stone for its intentions behind APC – namely to manage great power relations in Asia.

Another area where KIA could show a united front is the evolution of FTAs. In Asia, free-trade agreements are mired by a patchwork of individual agreements. Both Korea and Australia are active participants in this. Indonesia is not on the FTA-train yet, apart from the slow process inside ASEAN towards a free trade area. The middle powers would have an interest in coordinating and pushing for a region-wide agreement probably in ASEAN+6 format – which would include all three middle powers. That would remove the FTA-process from the current power play structure where FTA offers are part of a political charm offensive from Asia’s big powers.

Can middle powers really drive Asia forward?

The remaining question is if the middle powers will really get a seat at the table of the real negotiations. Rudd’s APC proposal to manage great power relations reflects a common characteristic of the KIA grouping. Alongside the nice sounding initiatives there is a growing powerlessness faced with the real power play in Asia, where KIA is aware that even as emerging middle powers it will be difficult to get a seat at the negotiation table – and once seated – a real say.

It is appropriate to quote in full Hugh White’s excellent remarks in another article at this site which highlights this difficulty in a realistic and pessimistic tone: ‘The plain fact – unpalatable though it may be – is that Asia’s new order will be negotiated between its most powerful states, and the painful process of compromise and concession will be best done away from the glare of big meetings. In its most important aspects it will not be negotiated in any literal sense at all, but will emerge as each major power remodel their policy to meet emerging realities’.

KIA is still a small car by all measurements. There will be limited space for KIA to influence the direction of Asian multilateral integration and great power relations. It should be coordinated to be effective and in order to influence China, Japan, India and the USA. Only in that case can KIA hope to also push the accelerator for rising Asia’s power structure.

- Jonas Parello-Plesner

The views expressed by contributing bloggers do not reflect the views of Worldfocus or its partners.

To read the original post, visit KIA – Asia’s middle powers on the rise?

Martin reporting from a foxhole. Photo: Martin Savidge

Worldfocus anchor Martin Savidge is heading home to celebrate Christmas with his family, but recalls spending past holidays in Kuwait and Korea — and remembers one holiday miracle.

I am taking this week off so that I can be home with my family for Christmas. Working on the holidays is one of those potential pitfalls of being a journalist. The news doesn’t take a day off — so seldom do we, holiday or no. This year, I can take some time.

I have spent many a Christmas past working, often in faraway places.

One of the most dismal was in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox, a major four-day bombing campaign by the United States and the United Kingdom on Iraqi targets. The strikes were carried out in response to Iraq’s alleged failure to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions and for interference with U.N. weapons inspectors.

The concern was that Iraq might retaliate by striking out at its neighbor, Kuwait, so I spent Christmas in the Kuwaiti desert with U.S. forces on alert. Christmas Eve was especially depressing, as I sat hunkered in a foxhole while a sand storm raged all around. Fortunately, the attack never happened and I made it home about a week later. Little did I know that five years later, I would be back in a foxhole in the same Kuwaiti desert — only this time, there would be war.

Another time, two years ago around Christmas, while at NBC, I pitched doing some stories in the upcoming year from the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. An NBC exec decided, “Heck, why wait? Christmas is as good a time as any.” Suddenly, I found myself once again on a long-distance flight heading halfway around the world taking me far from home for the holidays. It only added to my depression that it was my own idea.

I was there about a week. My last report was to be for “Nightly News” on Christmas Eve in the states. The story was about going on a patrol with U.S. soldiers as they monitored the dangerous divide between North and South Korea. Because of the time difference, I was actually reporting live from the DMZ on Christmas Day morning in Korea. I did not have to file for Christmas Day in the states because, due to football, there were no newscasts.

I suddenly realized if the planets and airplane schedules were in perfect alignment, I could still make it home on Christmas Day.

The planning had to be perfect. And, I had a big assist from both the U.S. and South Korean militaries — as soon as I finished my report, a Humvee was standing by to take me to the last checkpoint outside the DMZ, where a car had been cleared to pick me up. It whisked me to the airport where I caught a plane to Chicago, which connected with another flight to Cleveland. There, my family was gathering at my brother’s house, since I wasn’t going to be home.

I will always remember what came next — stepping out of the taxi in front of my brother’s house at three in the afternoon on Christmas Day. I walked to the front door, having told no one of my plans. Through the window, I could see my family preparing to sit down for the holiday meal. It was like an out-of-body experience…This is what they do when I’m not here; another Christmas without dad.

Then I rang the doorbell. My brother shouted, my mom nearly fainted and my wife and I both cried.

Finally, after so many times of disappointing at Christmas, I was finally able to give my family the greatest holiday gift of all…I was home.

Happy holidays to all, and above all I wish you peace.

- Martin Savidge