Martin Savidge hosts Filipino peace negotiator and Catholic priest Eliseo Mercado and security analyst Zachary Abuza when Worldfocus Radio explores the forgotten terrorist front in the Philippines.

For more on Worldfocus’ coverage of the Philippines, including original videos, click here.

Since 9/11, the U.S. has stationed 500 to 600 troops in the Philippines to strengthen military forces there. The U.S. counter-insurgency effort in the Philippines has been applauded as a success story for its mix of military action and soft power — including one of the largest USAID packages in the world.

But how lasting is this counter-insurgency success? Does it solve the root problems of poverty and lack of schools and infrastructure? And, if the U.S. pulls out, is the Philippines prepared to stop the tide of terrorism?

The U.S. strategy has been to root out terrorists from the lawless jungles of the south, which is home to the country’s Muslim minority and vulnerable to external terrorist groups like al-Qaeda.

The show:

• explains the current insurgency in the poor, predominantly Muslim south of the Philippines
• evaluates how Filipino counter-insurgency tactics measure up to other Southeast Asian counter-insurgency efforts
• examines the mix of U.S. military might, diplomacy and humanitarian aid to combat local and regional instability
• discusses the importance of peace and reconciliation between the numerous Filipino ethnic groups

Martin Savidge hosts the following guests:

Zachary Abuza is a professor at Simmons College, Boston, specializing in Southeast Asian politics and security issues. He visits the region four to five times a year. Zachary is the author of Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand and its Implications for Southeast Asian Security, Muslims, Politics and Violence in Indonesia and Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, among other publications. He contributes frequently to the Jane’s Intelligence Review, the Counterterrorism Blog and the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Father Eliseo “Jun” Mercado, Jr. is a Catholic priest and peace advocate who has been extensively involved in the peace process in Mindanao, the southern part of the Philippines. He is an expert on the role of Islam in the Philippines and led the independent cease-fire between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front separatist group. Father Mercado has also been extensively involved in peace process in Mindanao. In October 2007, he was selected to be one of the 20 delegates representing all NGO and CSO accredited at the UN to the High Level UN Session on inter-religious dialogue.

Credits:
Host: Martin Savidge
Producers: Lisa Biagiotti and Ben Piven

Schools have been destroyed by violence in Pakistan’s Swat Valley, but some are reopening under the new peace deal with militants. Photo: IRIN

In Pakistan on Tuesday, Taliban militants agreed to extend a cease-fire in Swat Valley, which is largely under control of the militants. Violence in the area has killed hundreds, and up to a third of the population has left.

The Taliban said the cease-fire announced with the government last week would be extended for an indefinite period. As part of the truce, the government agreed to allow the Taliban to impose stricter Islamic law.

The truce has brought relative peace to the area, with schools re-opening. But some argue that the price for this respite is too high, and that the government has conceded to insurgents.

A blogger at “Deadpan Thoughts” in Karachi, Pakistan, criticizes the government for the deal:

So what have we gained from this ceasefire? Stoppage of the bloodshed I guess and the return of Swat to perhaps a peaceful state.  However we have also left the implementation of this shariah law in the hands of people who may chose to do with it as they want. [...]

Thus in short the government of Pakistan has abandoned Swat to the wolves, and our esteemed politicians are more than happy crowing about the saving of lives and what not, going on about their bandwagon long march with no goal in sight.

Blogger Ahmed Humayun at World Politics Review agrees, arguing that the deal will have severe and damaging effects on the power of the state:

What has prompted the government to surrender its electoral mandate? Fear. In recent months, 12,000 Pakistani troops stationed in Swat and its surrounding environs have been unable to dislodge 3,000 determined militants. Extremists have killed tribal elders, law enforcement officers, and elected representatives of the ANP, and then displayed their bodies in public squares. After repeated assassination attempts on his life, even the ANP’s leader was forced to temporarily flee the province three months ago.

[...]If Pakistan eventually sets up the courts demanded by the militants, it will have ratified a new political dispensation where non-state actors are free to dictate state policy. Islamists will be convinced that what they cannot achieve electorally, they can win through armed force. As it currently stands, rather than isolating and marginalizing extremists, the compact has conferred legitimacy on radical ideology and vindicated jihadist tactics.

Blogger “Zaheerul Hassan” in Lahore disagrees, writing that Pakistan should look for more opportunities to work with Islamists:

Islamists whom we brand as extremists and terrorists, if handled wisely, can become the real strategic assets of Pakistan. [...] I reckon, whether we like it or not, we will have to admit that the Islamists are the best fighting force available in Pakistan. By virtue of rough terrain and inclement weather conditions they live in, frugal way of living, valorous stories of their rich past, their ability to fight and use the gun and to brave extreme hardships, closeness to religion and believing in life hereafter, fearless and preferring to die than to surrender, not leaving their dead or wounded in battle behind under any circumstances, dedicated to the given cause and fighting their foes to the last irrespective of superiority of the enemy in terms of manpower, material and technology.

[...]Accord in Swat is a good beginning which must be followed up. Unwarranted concerns expressed by USA, western countries and India must be ignored. President Zardari should give peace a chance and shouldnʼt dither signing the accord. If this chance is frittered away under pressure from our detractors, the bloodletting would intensify with harrowing consequences.

The agreement could have implications on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Ahmad Kamal, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations, speaks with Martin Savidge about the impact of the deal on America’s war on terror and on the Taliban presence in Pakistan.

Read what a Worldfocus contributing blogger had to say about the Swat Valley deal: Pakistan adopts Islamic law in Swat Valley.

Pakistan’s Swat Valley is now under sharia law.

Pakistan this week agreed to a peace deal with the Taliban in the area known as the Swat Valley, suspending its military offensive and imposing tough Islamic law in that area. Religious experts will now sit in courts with judges to make sure rulings comply with Islam.

U.S. officials have expressed great concern about the deal struck between the Pakistani government and Taliban leaders.

See the Worldfocus interview about Swat Valley: Pakistan strikes peace deal with Taliban.

Jauhar Ismail blogs at “All Things Pakistan” and discusses the implications of the agreement for the U.S. and for locals in Swat Valley.

Deal in Swat: Good Move or Bad Move?

In my opinion, the devil is really in the details and the implementation of this agreement. I have mixed feeling on this: It is hard to see how the situation in Swat can be controlled only through the military means; there has to be a political dimension. This is what the U.S. is also learning the hard way in Afghanistan where there is already a talk of having some sort of adjustment with “moderate Afghan Taliban”.

In an ideal world, you would have hoped that Pakistan army would have gained the upper hand in Swat and then they could have negotiated from the position of strength. Unfortunately this is not the case. Despite several attempts, the army could not make any significant gains in Swat. Part of this is due to bad strategy and partly due the nature of guerrilla-warfare. Pakistan army was never trained to fight a counter-insurgency; fighting against India is what the focus has been so it does’t come as a surprise that it didn’t perform very well.

As far as their strategy goes, it was based primarily on using gunships and (artillery) shelling against suspected militant hide-outs. This approach is not very conducive to counter-insurgency because it leads to a lot of collateral damage. As the U.S. experience in Iraq shows, your mission in such a situation must really be to “secure the population”. This was the fundamental change in strategy that U.S. Gen. David Petraeus made but such a change requires putting a lot of boots on the ground, taking a lot more causalities and better intelligence. Unfortunately the Pak army was unwilling and incapable to take this approach which resulted in the bloody Swat stalemate.

Against this backdrop, the agreement can offer a way out if government can play its cards correctly. It should also be noted that this is not the first time that Swat will be under the so-called Shari’s law. This was the case for decades when Swat/Dir region was part of the princely state and life was governed by “Customary law”. The elected representatives of the Swat region have also been in favor of incorporating some populist militant demands such as Qazi courts and quick and simply justice with a 6 months deadline to process all cases.

One can hope that by incorporating the populist demands and a willingness to understand and work with local sensitivities, the authorities can gain credibility with the local population and take some of the wind out of the insurgency’s sails.

To read more, see the original post.

The views expressed by contributing bloggers do not reflect the views of Worldfocus or its partners.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Scott Christian under a Creative Commons license.

Thailand’s southern insurgency has killed thousands. Photo: Ara Ayer

Muslims make up less than 5 percent of Thailand’s 63 million people and most live in the southernmost provinces. Ethnic and religious divisions have generated tension in this region, which was formerly part of Malaysia.

In 2004, Bangkok declared martial law in the south after violence erupted. Continued conflict — from bombings to shootings and beheadings — has since claimed more than 3,500 lives.

Watch our Worldfocus signature video to learn more: Muslim insurgency simmers in southern Thailand.

Luke Hunt is a Hong Kong-based correspondent who writes at World Politics Review about the solidification of the separatist movement and Thailand’s approach to dealing with the insurgency.

Thailand Rethinks Approach to Southern Insurgency

Regular bombings, killings and skirmishes between rebels and the military in southern Thailand have forced Thai authorities to finally grasp the scope of a conflict that has scarred thousands and changed the lives of millions.

Previously, Thai police, military and politicians had dismissed the attacks as random violence committed by bandits or a handful of disgruntled Islamic militants. Such attempts to play down the carnage were dismissed by Western governments, who see the confrontation with ethnic Malay-Muslim separatists in the south as a persistent threat to regional security.

Now, as the rebellion enters its sixth year, Thai police admit that the separatist movement is a well-structured organization operating across four provinces with a combined population of six million inhabitants: Songkhla, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat.

There are also growing claims of links to al-Qaida and the regional terrorist outfit, Jemmah Islamiya (JI), which advocates for a Southeast Asian Islamic state. Diplomatic sources said their concerns were driven by a series of interviews believed to have been granted by the self-described leader of al-Qaida in Southeast Asia, known as “Abu Ubaidah,” in the middle of last year.

In the interviews, Abu claimed that the armed struggle had changed significantly since 2004, when the rebellion was based more on locally driven nationalist aspirations than on the logic of international jihad.

“What is happening in Pattani is not an internal conflict. Some [fighters] come from the neighboring country, some come from far away, many thousands of miles,” he said.

Abu maintained that the mass killings at the Kerisik Mosque in April 2004, when more than 100 people died, and further atrocities committed by the Thai military at Tak Bai in October of the same year helped in the transformation.

But security analyst Keith Loverard from Jakarta-based Concord Consulting doubts the extent of Abu’s jihad claims, and said there was no convincing evidence linking rebels with Islamic radicalism.

Noting that southern Thai separatists are Malay-speaking Muslims who feel deeply alienated from the Thai-speaking Buddhist majority, he nevertheless maintained that, “while it is logical that Islamist groups would try to capitalize on the situation and enlist the southern Thai movement to wider terrorist activity, there is no sign that there has been any success in any such endeavor.”

If the conflict remains locally contained, the patchwork of southern separatist movements has become increasingly well-organized, with police identifying five principal divisions.

To read more, see the original post.

The views expressed by contributing bloggers do not reflect the views of Worldfocus or its partners.

Muslims make up less than 5 percent of Thailand’s 63 million people and most live in the southernmost provinces. Ethnic and religious divisions have generated tension in this region, which was formerly part of Malaysia.

In 2004, Bangkok declared martial law in the south after violence erupted. Continued conflict — from bombings to shootings and beheadings — has since claimed more than 3,300 lives. Read more about the historical and political background to Thailand’s separatist movement and the situation of Malay Muslims here.

Worldfocus special correspondent Mark Litke and producer Ara Ayer report from Thailand.

Below, read what bloggers and commentators have said about Thailand’s struggles in the south.

John Virgoe of “OpenDemocracy” writes that the political situation in Bangkok is distracting Thailand’s leaders from the urgent need to find solutions to the southern insurgency.

Prashanth Parameswaran of “World Politics Review” writes that progress has been made, including implementation of more security checkpoints, but that the Thai government needs to address the needs of Malay Muslims and give them an enhanced role.

Blogger “gerrypopplestone” at “NowPublic” writes that Muslims in the region have been treated poorly, and that there have been a range of human rights abuses.

Photographer Masaru Goto posts images of “red zones” in southern Thailand where support for separatists is strong.

A foreign editor at “The Australian” writes an editorial claiming that although the insurgents in Thailand are not affiliated with al-Qaeda,  they fit into a global pattern of Islamist insurgency.

The Indian state of Assam has been troubled for years by ethnic tension and violence. Dozens of separatist groups have been fighting the government and each other in the region.

Martin Savidge talks with Asia Society fellow Sadanand Dhume to learn who might be behind the bombings and how they relate to the recent surge of violence in the region.

Shahan Mufti of the Christian Science Monitor reports from Islamabad.

A suicide bomber in Pakistan killed at least 30 and wounded 100 when he drove into a gathering of tribesmen who were in the midst of plans to combat insurgents in the country.

Since the beginning of the year, 28 bombings have killed over 471 people in Pakistan by suicide bombers — more deaths than either Iraq or Afghanistan.

Shahan Mufti of the Christian Science Monitor speaks with Martin Savidge from Islamabad about the escalating violence in Pakistan, President Asif Ali Zardari’s ability to handle the insurgency and the challenges of dealing with various opposition forces.