On election day in Lebanon, I visited multiple polling stations and attended election rallies and events organized by various parties.

The Future Movement’s pre-printed ballot for the Beirut III electoral district. The expansive font provides little space for voters to cross off candidate names and replace them with others. Photo: Melani Cammett

That morning, I started by accompanying a friend — I’ll call her “Mona” — to cast her ballot in predominantly Sunni Tarik el-Jedideh, a neighborhood in Beirut. As we approached the polling station, a rush of Future Movement [the party led by Saad Hariri that is a member of March 14] election workers appeared with lists of registered voters in the district. After obtaining Mona’s voter registration number, they handed her a pre-printed paper with the names of the Future Movement candidates in the Beirut III district and urged her to vote for the whole list without crossing off and replacing any names.

In Lebanon, there is no official ballot, enabling parties to print ballots that they distribute freely outside of polling stations. In addition, in this “open-list” system, voters have the right to cross off names of candidates [tashteeb] on a party list and replace them with the names of candidates running as independents or on other lists.

An avowed opponent of the sectarian political system — which allocates seats and other political and administrative offices by fixed quotas on a district-by-district basis — Mona waited for hours inside the crowded polling station to cast a blank ballot in order to express her opposition to the system. While she knew that her vote would not affect the results in this overwhelmingly pro-Hariri district, she, like others, felt that turning out to cast a null ballot was the most effective way to convey her opposition to the system and to its main protagonists.

Later, I visited a polling station in Haret Hreik, a municipality in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut known in the Western press as a “Hezbollah stronghold.” Outside of the precinct, representatives from the opposition parties, including the Christian FPM and Shi’i Amal Movement and Hezbollah, gave us pre-printed ballots with the names of the Opposition list candidates, while delegates from the March 14 coalition were nowhere to be found.

Election workers in Broumanna, Metn District. Photo: Melani Cammett

At around 6 p.m. — an hour before the polls were scheduled to close — we made a swing through the first and second Beirut districts, which could not have been more different. In Beirut I (district), where 91 percent of registered voters are Christians, competing March 8 and March 14 groups battled for control over the district’s five electoral seats reserved for Christians from various sects.

Meanwhile, in Beirut II, thanks to pre-election deals among party elites, candidates ran unopposed and, as a result, the district featured the lowest voter turnout in the country. As we drove by the precinct, party workers barely exerted themselves to throw pre-printed ballots into our open car windows, as they had done throughout the day in our visits to more competitive districts.

By this time, electoral precincts were preparing to shut down, polling companies were busy analyzing data from exit polls, and citizens across Lebanon were settling themselves in front of their television sets to watch the projected returns aired on local news channels. I decided to call it a day.

I awoke the next morning to discover the surprising news that the majority March 14 won by a significant margin with 71 seats — a 13-seat lead over the opposition. (Recall that most local polling companies had forecast at least a slim victory for the opposition.) Supporters celebrated throughout the day.

In Future Movement strongholds in West Beirut, Christian areas of Achrafieh with concentrations of Lebanese Forces and Kataeb supporters, and parts of Aley with many Druze backers of the March 14 coalition, I saw people dancing, singing, setting off fireworks, playing music, honking horns and celebrating. Leaders of the opposition parties were silent for most of the day, refraining from making statements about the unexpected results.

A Future Movement campaign billboard in Beirut: ‘[Vote] as it is [the full list], as long as the sky is blue.” Photo: Melani Cammett

In Lebanon’s complex political system, the end of the elections marks the beginning of what will undoubtedly be a long process of forming a new government, with bargaining both within and across the opposing coalitions over cabinet posts (and likely fractionalization within the main coalitions themselves).

The March 14 victory, however, does not give the majority unlimited license in the delicately calibrated Lebanese political system. With 57 out of 128 seats, the opposition retains well over the number of seats needed to block legislation on important issues (one-third plus one seat). Furthermore, although the FPM failed to garner as many seats as it hoped, it swept core Christian areas in Mount Lebanon, permitting Aoun to claim that he represents the majority of the Christian community.

On the international scale, the outcome of the elections has averted the feared confrontation between a Hezbollah-led government and the U.S. But Hezbollah and the FPM remain key players in the government and represent large components of Lebanese society.

At least rhetorically, leaders in the ruling majority have recognized this by expressing their commitment to a unity government. To help to avoid a potential impasse in Lebanese politics, international leaders will need to follow suit by emphasizing their commitment to working with all elements of the new government.

- Melani Cammett

That coalition beat out another one led by Hezbollah, the party backed by Iran and Syria, which will nonetheless remain an important influence in Lebanon.

Learn more about the players in Lebanon’s election by listening to our online radio show on Lebanon’s election.

Mohamad Bazzi, an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a professor of journalism at New York University, joins Martin Savidge to discuss what the results mean for Hezbollah, for the stability of Lebanon and for American foreign policy in the region.

Don Duncan of Worldfocus partner The Media Line reports on the elections from Beirut.

Lebanon will head to the polls on June 7 in an election that could alter the political fabric of the country, with Hezbollah and its allies poised to make significant gains.

Hezbollah is pitted against the current anti-Syria majority. The robust campaign has split Lebanese voters.

Young Lebanese men wave the flag of Hezbollah.

For more on the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics, watch the Worldfocus signature story: Hezbollah heads into mainstream Lebanese life and politics.

On a visit to Lebanon in late May, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden — the highest-level U.S. official to visit Lebanon in over two decades — warned that U.S. aid would be dependent on the outcome of the elections.

Hezbollah is backed by Iran and Syria, while the U.S. and its allies support the current parliamentary majority, who came to power in the previous election after Sunni leader and former prime minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in 2005.

Worldfocus.org’s weekly radio show examined the issues and implications of Lebanon’s election, looking back to the country’s turbulent history and forward to a potentially new political landscape.

Worldfocus anchor Martin Savidge hosted a panel of guests:

Melani Cammett is an assistant professor of political science at Brown University. She specializes in the political economy of development and the Middle East. She is currently working on a book entitled “Social Welfare in Plural Societies,” a study of healthcare, schooling and short-term loans in Lebanon, where she has conducted extensive field research. She is also the author of “Globalization and Business Politics in North Africa: A Comparative Perspective.”

Ben Gilbert is the Lebanon Correspondent for GlobalPost. He also works as an independent radio, newspaper and magazine reporter covering Middle East news, culture, conflict and economics. His work has aired on National Public Radio, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, BBC and ABC Radio, among others. He has also written for the U.S. News and World Report, The Christian Science Monitor and The San Francisco Chronicle.

Ghassan Schbley is a scholar and project associate with RAND based in Washington. He specializes in Lebanese and Middle East politics and U.S. relations in the region.

View videos and blogs from the Worldfocus series The New Lebanon.

Read what bloggers have to say about the election: Controversy stirs ahead of major election in Lebanon

Associated photo courtesy of Flickr user Paul Keller under a Creative Commons license.

Credits:
Host: Martin Savidge
Producers: Lisa Biagiotti, Katie Combs and Nicole E. Foster

A memorial for former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, who was assassinated in 2005. Recently, Der Spiegel came out with a report linking Hezbollah to the assassination.

Lebanon will head to the polls on June 7 in an election that could alter the political fabric of the country, with Hezbollah and its allies poised to make significant gains.

Hezbollah is pitted against the current anti-Syria majority. For more on the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics, watch the Worldfocus signature story: Hezbollah heads into mainstream Lebanese life and politics.

On a visit to Lebanon last week, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden — the highest-level U.S. official to visit Lebanon in over two decades — warned that U.S. aid would be dependent on the outcome of the elections.

For more, listen to our online radio show on Lebanon’s election.

Hezbollah is backed by Iran and Syria, while the U.S. and its allies support the current parliamentary majority. Thomas Strouse writes at the “Informed Comment” blog to break down these two competing groups:

The two major alliances currently in Lebanon, “March 8” and “March 14,” are relatively informal blocs which formed along with events which took place in 2005. Allies and sworn enemies have been known to make dramatic shifts in Lebanese politics over the years. If an opportunity presents itself for one part of the alliance to gain politically, the current alliance framework could easily shift, especially following the June elections.

The March 8 alliance dates back to March 8, 2005 when various pro-Syrian factions held a massive demonstration in downtown Beirut, standing in support of Syria and accusing the U.S. and Israel of meddling in Lebanon’s domestic affairs. The March 14 alliance dates back to March 14, 2005, the one-month anniversary of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, when another major demonstration was held in downtown Beirut, demanding an end to the Syrian occupation of Lebanon.

In the 2005 parliamentary elections, which were held on four consecutive Sunday’s beginning on May 29, the March 14 alliance capitalized on the anger over the assassination of Hariri and the momentum that they were provided with after successfully pressuring for Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon on April 26 of that year.

The elections in five weeks will demonstrate how much support the March 14 alliance has been able to sustain over the past four years.

Frida Ghitis at “World Politics Review” explores the potential effect of a Hezbollah victory:

In the short term, a victory at the polls by Hezbollah’s coalition would not make a big difference inside Lebanon. But that could change quickly. A sharp drop in aid and a return of open Syrian and Iranian involvement in the country’s domestic affairs would raise tensions and could ultimately tip Lebanon into violence. If Hezbollah were to find itself under pressure, it could conceivably divert attention by sparking a confrontation with Israel.

A number of flashpoints could easily trigger a new war, not least of which are the anti-aircraft missiles Hezbollah has been acquiring from Iran. With Israeli surveillance flights regularly crossing Lebanese airspace, the opportunity to use the missiles would present itself directly overhead.

Deen Sharp, a journalist based in Lebanon, wrote about Biden’s visit, concluding that it was for show:

Vice-President Biden is in town and among the tabouleh surrounding his visit he has said nothing new. The policy that US will tie aid to votes was reiterated and the standard we support no one expecpt for the people that we support…

Thus, the same dance between America and Iran is being played out in Lebanon. However, all we be pleased that the tempo is slower and although there is no love music the death metal has at last been put away.

The blogosphere also lit up when Der Spiegel came out with a report linking Hezbollah to the assassination of Rafik Hariri, a former prime minister. Many regarded the report with skepticism, including blogger Michael Totten:

Der Spiegel might be wrong, and, if not, UN investigators themselves might be wrong. I’m no fan of Hezbollah, but I need more evidence before I’m willing to say “Hezbollah did it.”

Even so, this could be an enormous bombshell in Lebanon where voters go to the polls in a few weeks.

The Der Spiegel story isn’t sourced, so it could be bogus. But NOW Lebanon reports that the UN spokesperson for the tribunal has “no comment.” I’d expect the spokesperson to deny the story if it were false. At this point, I’m willing to assume the UN really does think Hezbollah did it.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Travel Aficionado under a Creative Commons license.

Goksel makes an appearance in Worldfocus Signature Story Hezbollah heads into mainstream Lebanese life and politics.

One of the expected big winners is Hezbollah, which commands a huge and growing influence in Lebanon.

Some call it a state within a state; a movement that is all too willing to fill any gaps it perceives left open by the government. Hezbollah, with its close ties to Iran, has become very influential — and though the U.S. government considers them terrorists, they are heroes to their many followers.

Worldfocus special correspondent Kristen Gillespie reports on Hezbollah.

Read more and view pictures from Kristen Gillespie’s reporting experience in Beirut: Scenes of Hezbollah in south Beirut

One out of four Lebanese citizens lives in the south Beirut area known as the Dahiya, or “suburbs” in Arabic. The war with Israel in 2006 hit this area particularly hard, with blocks and blocks of neighborhoods flattened. I covered the 2006 war from Beirut, and came back three years later to see how much progress had been made in reconstruction.

The overload of billboards, posters, Hezbollah souvenir shops and the oppressive security presence remind visitors that the Party of God is organized and ready for battle. It’s a war mode, even when there is no actual war.

This partially explains the secrecy and distrust of outsiders. The American government says Hezbollah is a terrorist group, but within Lebanon, it’s more complicated. The Hezbollah political party actively participates in the Lebanese government, while not only refusing to disarm but actively stockpiling weapons outside the scope of the state.

“Now they have a say in national politics,” says Timur Goksel, who liaised with Hezbollah for 20 years as a senior United Nations advisor. “They are not going to give that up, but they also know they got there with Hezbollah’s guns.”

- Kristen Gillespie

Photos by Kristen Gillespie.

A bomb site in Beirut, Lebanon, where Israel struck in the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war. Israeli military tactics have changed since that time.

Thousands of Israeli troops are massing on the Gaza border, and a ground invasion is now considered imminent. This seven-day Gaza conflict has so far seen Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip and Hamas rocket attacks in Israel. The Israeli cabinet approved a ground invasion of Gaza last week.

Hampton Stephens is the editor-in-chief and publisher of World Politics Review. He writes about prospects for an Israeli ground invasion and discusses Israel’s military improvements since its widely-criticized ground assault on Lebanon in 2006.

See his interview with Martin Savidge here: Israeli ground invasion of Gaza considered imminent. 

The war in Gaza: Can Israel have military success?

Much of the commentary surrounding the current Israel-Hamas war has been addressed to the question of whether Israel has any hope of achieving its goals militarily, given that Hamas, like Hezbollah in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, is a non-state actor that does not fight conventionally and is therefore difficult to defeat with conventional military means.

Israel’s goals: Short-term vs. long-term

When addressing this question, it’s important to be clear about what Israel’s goals are in this current operation. Israel’s short-term military objectives need to be distinguished from the long-term objective of security for the state of Israel, which ultimately means some sort of sustainable peace with its Palestinian neighbors.

As many commentators have pointed out, it is indeed hard to imagine how this war with Hamas will further that ultimate goal of peace, given that conflict of this sort could well strengthen Hamas politically in the region, and given that Israel’s bombing campaign, by killing civilians and inflaming the “Arab street,” makes it difficult even for those Arab governments that might well like to see Hamas be dealt a setback to support Israel’s actions.

However, in contrast to the 2006 Hezbollah war, Israel seems to have, at least initially, set rather modest military objectives. At the outset of the Hezbollah war, Israel announced that it wanted to achieve the return of Israeli soldiers held by Hezbollah, cripple the group militarily, and prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its military capacity in Southern Lebanon. By confounding those very high expectations that Israel created, Hezbollah was able to claim victory, cement the perception of that victory among its constituents in Lebanon as well as internationally and gain politically as a result.

Having apparently learned those lessons from the Hezbollah war, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and other Israeli officials have been much more circumspect in their declarations about Israel’s intentions this time around. Far from seeking any kind of definitive victory over Hamas, their announced intention is merely to degrade Hamas’ ability to terrorize southern Israel with rocket attacks. In a statement at the outset of the current operation on Dec. 28, Olmert said the main objective would be “to restore normal life and quiet to residents of the south.”

While the asymmetrical nature of the fight against an organization like Hamas presents distinct challenges for a traditional military operation, Israel may well be able to achieve this rather modest goal.

Israel’s successes and challenges

Israel’s bombing campaign has sought to degrade Hamas’ ability to threaten southern Israel by targeting the group’s rocket installations, destroying its existing stock of weapons, killing members of its leadership, and destroying smuggling tunnels along the Israel-Egypt border that Hamas has used to import weapons into the Gaza strip.

There are indications that Israel is having some success on all of these fronts so far, although it remains to be seen whether a bombing campaign alone will sufficiently degrade Hamas’ rocket-attack capability.

It is very difficult to find reliable damage assessments in the midst of a war, but anecdotal evidence indicates that Israel has made significant progress in achieving its goals in the early part of a campaign that could last for many days. Israeli news reports indicate that the Israeli Air Force has been gathering intelligence on Hamas smuggling tunnels along the Israel-Egypt border for months, and that it has succeeded in destroying a significant number of those tunnels in the early days of the war. Meanwhile, other reports in the Israeli press indicate that Israel may have already destroyed approximately one-third of Hamas rocket stockpiles. In the campaign to target Hamas leadership, Israel reportedly scored a significant success on Jan. 1, killing Hamas official Nizar Rayan in his home.

Even this significant success, however, highlighted how Israel’s short-term military objectives are often in conflict with its long-term strategic interests. The strike that killed Rayan reportedly also killed four of his wives and nine of his children, providing more ammunition against Israel in the international information war that is such a significant part of this conflict and of the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In a microcosm of the most significant dilemma facing Israel in its war against Hamas, the Israeli military has said that secondary explosions after the strike prove that Rayan’s home was being used to store weapons and ammunition. As of Dec. 31, a United Nations official estimated that of the approximate 400 people killed so far in the Gaza war, about 80 have been civilians, including more than 40 children.

Not all asymmetric conflicts are created equal

Beyond the dilemma that is at the heart of any asymmetric fight against a non-traditional force such as Hamas, it appears that Israel is in a better position to achieve its military objectives in this campaign against Hamas than it was vis-à-vis Hezbollah in the 2006 war to which the current conflict has so often been compared, for reasons that have to do with the nature of the battlefield on which the current campaign is being prosecuted.

In general, Hezbollah was much better able to conceal its fighters and weapons from the reach of Israeli bombs than Hamas has been, given the geography of the Gaza strip and the state of Israeli knowledge about Hamas operations there.

Whereas southern Lebanon is a mountainous region with complex geography that provides good defensive cover, one observer summed up the rather more featureless geography of the Gaza strip as “a cross between a beach, a desert and a slum.”

In addition, Gaza is an area of just 360 square kilometers, providing a circumscribed target for Israeli intelligence gathering. Having occupied the Gaza strip for almost 30 years, Israel has a robust base of knowledge about the area. Israeli intelligence gathering and military planning, it is now clear, did not cease during the six-month ceasefire with Hamas that ended last month. Citing sources in the Israeli defense establishment, Haaretz reported Dec. 31 that the Israeli military had been gathering information for months in preparation for the Gaza operation.

New weapons on both sides

In addition to gathering information, Israel appears also to have acquired in recent months a significant new weapon that it has first used in the Gaza conflict. While Israel’s fighter aircraft have typically carried 1,000- and 2,000-pound satellite-guided munitions, the Israel Air Force in September 2008 began acquiring from the United States up to 1,000 new Boeing-made 250-pound Small Diameter Bombs. The so-called GBU-29 gives the Israeli Air Force the ability to carry up to four bombs on each of its fighter planes, allowing them to make more bombing runs per sortie, and reduces collateral damage while remaining sufficiently destructive to be effective, according to the U.S. Air Force. In addition, the bomb has some capability to penetrate hardened structures, according to Boeing, a capability that has no doubt proven useful to Israel in its efforts to destroy Hamas infrastructure in Gaza.

Hamas, of course, also used the ceasefire to prepare for the day when it would end, and while Israel has a profound advantage when it comes to the weapons and technology available to it, this conflict has revealed that Hamas’ capabilities are also improving.

Previous Hamas rocket attacks on southern Israel have employed two main types of rockets: homemade Qassam rockets that are wildly inaccurate and have a maximum range of less than 10 miles; and Iranian-made, Soviet-designed Grad rockets that can fly longer distances but are still inaccurate. However, the post-ceasefire period has seen the debut of new, more accurate and more deadly Chinese-made 122 millimeter rockets that can fly up to 25 miles. On Dec. 30, one such rocket hit an empty schoolhouse in the Negev Desert city of Beersheba, about 22 miles from the Gaza strip.

A ground offensive?

It remains to be seen whether the escalation of Hamas rocket attacks that has been seen since Israel began its bombing campaign will lead Israel to conclude that it must expand its operation from an air campaign to a full-scale ground assault. What is clear, however, is that Israel is preparing for such an invasion on the ground.

Another key lesson that came out of Israel’s troubled war against Hezbollah in 2006 is that Israel was not sufficiently prepared for the ground invasion that eventually came. The report of the Winograd Commission that examined Israel’s failures in the Hezbollah warconcluded that the Israeli Defense Forces “did not demand . . . early mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a ground operation would be required.”

It is clear from the preparations that are being seen on the ground that Israel does not want to make the same mistake again. However, it is perhaps premature to conclude that these preparations for a ground invasion indicate that such an invasion is inevitable. Given the undesirable results of the ground war in Lebanon in 2006, and given the unpredictable consequences of a ground invasion with regard to both the difficulty of the fight and the international reaction to such a move, Israel has significant reason to be wary of expanding the war to the ground.

Three factors are likely to determine whether a ground invasion will come: whether Israel assesses that is making sufficient progress toward degrading Hamas’ ability to threaten southern Israel with an air campaign alone, whether those voices within Israel that are agitating for expanding the objectives of the war will win out, and whether Hamas will agree to a ceasefire on Israel’s terms.

While, as mentioned above, Israeli leaders have so far been determined to keep their objectives modest, some in the Israeli defense establishment have said that Israel should not pass up an opportunity to completely destroy Hamas in the Gaza strip and to topple the group from power.

Meanwhile, there are indications that Israel might forego a ground invasion and accept a ceasefire on its own terms, which Israeli officials have said would involve international monitors to ensure compliance with any truce.

The problem for Israel is not only that a ground invasion would require a relatively higher price in blood compared to a bombing campaign alone, but that keeping Hamas out of power after having deposed it would likely necessitate a re-occupation of the Gaza strip for an indeterminate period. Such a course would then risk further tension between Israel’s short-term objective of degrading Hamas’ ability to threaten southern Israel and the country’s long-term strategic objectives.

In a comprehensive analysis of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war, military analyst William Arkin articulated a key strategic objective that Israel must also keep in mind in the current war. He wrote that that if Israel had prosecuted the 2006 Hezbollah war differently, it might have better achieved not only its short-term objectives, but also “the fundamental long-term objective of counterterrorism: not creating even more enemies tomorrow.” While Israel appears to be making progress toward achieving its immediate goals in Gaza, the conflict’s remaining days will tell whether it manages to avoid significantly undermining its long-term interests in the process.

Read this post on World Politics Review. 

Photo courtesy of Flickr user delayed gratification under a Creative Commons license.

Hampton Stephens, the editor-in-chief and publisher of World Politics Review, joins Martin Savidge to discuss Israeli response to Hamas rockets, likely tactics in a ground invasion and lessons learned from Israel’s war with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006.

Read his extended commentary about Israeli military capability here: Can Israel’s military succeed in Gaza?