Map of Ogaden, Ethiopia courtesy of Wiki user Lencer.

The violent, separatist conflict in southeastern Ethiopia known as the Somali region or Ogaden has been referred by some as the next Darfur. The conflict has claimed thousands of lives over the last 15 years.

Ethiopia sealed off the region to media so there is little accurate information about the conflict, including claims of human rights abuses.

The region is rich in natural gas and is home to about 5 million predominantly Muslim people, mainly ethnic Somali nomadic tribes. The U.S. has said little about the conflict, as Ethiopia is its main regional ally in the increasingly unstable Horn of Africa region.

Worldfocus interviewed David H. Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. Amb. Shinn is currently an adjunct professor of international affairs at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. His research interests include China-Africa relations, East Africa and the Horn, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, conflict situations, U.S. policy in Africa and the African brain drain.

Worldfocus: Ethiopia has labeled the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) as a terrorist organization. Is this an accurate description?

Amb. Shinn: While the ONLF has on occasion used tactics that qualify as terrorist — for example the kidnapping and/or killing of civilian Ethiopian government officials — it does not have any links of which I am aware with international terrorist organizations.

It receives external support from the government of Eritrea, which opposes the government of Ethiopia. It also receives financial assistance from Ogadenis in the Somali Diaspora. In 2007, 74 persons, including nine Chinese oil field personnel, were killed during an ONLF attack on a Chinese oil exploration work site in the Ogaden protected by Ethiopian troops.

The Chinese may have died in a crossfire between Ethiopian and ONLF forces. In the view of the U.S. government, ONLF activity so far does not meet the test of a terrorist organization. Should the ONLF escalate its tactics, however, this could change.

Worldfocus: The U.S. denied Ethiopia’s request to label the ONLF an international terrorist organization but also remained silent on claims that the Ogaden region is potentially the next Darfur. Ethiopia has shut down media access to the region, so accusations of human rights abuses are unconfirmed. Should the U.S. and other Western countries be speaking out?

Amb. Shinn: On those occasions when there are carefully documented human rights violations by the government of Ethiopia, the ONLF or any other organization, the U.S. and the rest of the world should speak out.

Virtually all of the information coming out of the Ogaden comes from either the Ethiopian government or the ONLF. Much of the information from both sides is unreliable. The problem, therefore, is making certain that accurate information exists before speaking out publicly. A good start would be a willingness by the Ethiopian government to allow independent, third party observers into the Ogaden to provide information about events there.

Worldfocus: Do the 4.5 million ethnic Somalis living in the region mostly support the ONLF? Do the majority of Ogadenis want to secede from Ethiopia?

Men chewing khat in Jigjiga, the capital of Ogaden. Photo: Flickr user CharlesFred

Amb. Shinn: It is impossible to know with any certainty what Somalis in southeastern Ethiopia really want. Because of the difficult security situation, there are no public opinion polls in the area. I think it is reasonable to conclude that the vast majority of Somalis feel marginalized in their own country and that most of them have legitimate grievances against government policies. But do most of them support the ONLF? There is no conclusive evidence.

Not all of the Somalis living in Ethiopia’s Region Five or Somali Region are ethnic Ogaden Somalis. There are significant numbers of non-Ogaden Darod, Isaaq and Dir. Ogadeni from the Darod clan constitute the most numerous group of Somalis and occupy the largest geographical part of the region.

While there may be widespread support for the ONLF by the majority Ogadeni, many Somalis from other clans are concerned about Ogadeni domination. It is even less clear whether the Ogadeni who support the ONLF agree on a political outcome for the region.

Worldfocus: Do Ogadenis have irredentist tendencies, and what is their relationship with Somalia?

Amb. Shinn: In March 2009, there was a leadership split in the organization. The leader of the main faction of the ONLF, Mohamed Omar Osman, is on the record as saying that he wants to hold a referendum so that the Somalis in the region can determine if they wish to remain part of Ethiopia, become an independent country or join with Somalia. It is my understanding that the leadership of both factions of the ONLF prefers an independent Ogaden.

Worldfocus: With national elections slotted for next May, what is at stake for the ONLF and their representation or lack thereof in the Ethiopian government?

Amb. Shinn: Ethiopian national elections in May 2010 will probably change nothing in the Ogaden. Because of the difficult security situation, it is doubtful that elections can even take place in much of Somali Region.

The ONLF, although it participated in the government as a political organization from 1991 to 1994, has shown no interest in rejoining the political process. Even if it believed that the Ethiopian government would allow it to compete freely and fairly as a political party, which it does not believe to be the case, it does not appear that the ONLF is prepared to lay down its arms.

The head of the original ONLF faction, Mohamed Omar Osman, did state in October 2009 that he is prepared to engage in negotiations with the Ethiopian government, but only in the presence of a neutral third party and in a neutral location.

- Lisa Biagiotti

For more Worldfocus coverage of Ethiopia, visit our extended coverage page: Ethiopia Past and Present.

Somali President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed has blamed al-Shabaab, a radical Islamist group with ties to al-Qaeda, for the surge in violence. Control over the failed state is split between many groups.

The nation has had no effective government since 1991, and one third of the population requires food aid.

Read more background on Somalia’s conflict in our Q&A: Answers to lawlessness in Somalia.

David Shinn, a former ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, and Lynn Fredriksson, a researcher on the Horn of Africa for Amnesty International, join Worldfocus to discuss the spiraling crisis in Somalia.

Al-Shabaab militiamen in Somalia. Photo: IRIN

Worldfocus: What are the two sides embroiled in the current fighting, and how much of Somalia is currently controlled by either side?

Ambassador David Shinn: There may actually be more than two sides in this struggle. There is the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) led by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, which is the government recognized by the United Nations, African Union and the international community. A moderate Muslim group known as Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a is allied with the TFG.

The primary group opposing the TFG is the extremist al-Shabaab organization, which has links with al-Qaeda and now has the support of several hundred foreign jihadis. A Somali organization known as Hizbul Islam, led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, is aligned with al-Shabaab. President Ahmed and Sheikh Aweys were partners in 2007, when they controlled much of Somalia under the Union of Islamic Courts.

The TFG controls a small part of the capital of Mogadishu and some of the area along the Ethiopian border. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam control most of Mogadishu and much of southern and central Somalia. Other jurisdictions such as the Puntland administration control the rest of the country.

Worldfocus: President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed came to power in January, and he has since instituted Sharia law. Why hasn’t this appeased Islamic groups?

David Shinn: Strictly speaking, President Ahmed has not been able to implement his version of Sharia because he controls so little of the country. More importantly, this is a power struggle among different Islamic groups. Virtually all Somalis are Muslims. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam insist on a stricter version of Sharia similar to the one advocated by the Taliban in Afghanistan. President Ahmed wants a more moderate version of Sharia — but this struggle is more about political power than it is about Sharia.

Displaced Somalis near the Kenyan border. Photo: IRIN

Worldfocus: The Somali government is pleading for foreign military assistance. How would the Somali public feel about outside help, given past tension over the Ethiopian troop presence in the country (and current reports that Ethiopian troops have returned)?

David Shinn: This poses a huge dilemma for the TFG. The vast majority of Somalis do not want foreign troops of any kind in the country. This includes Ethiopians, African Union forces, United Nations forces and foreign jihadis fighting for al-Shabaab. My own view is that foreign troops can not prop up the TFG. What is required is urgent international training and equipping of Somali security forces who support the goals of the TFG. Ultimately, only Somalis are going to resolve this situation. Because of their training and experience, foreign jihadis provide al-Shabaab with a short-term advantage. It might even be enough to give them a temporary victory. But eventually Somalis are going to turn against any foreign presence and any philosophy that does not fit Somali tradition.

Ethiopian forces do periodically cross their lengthy border with Somalia and may have ventured a little deeper into Somalia in recent days. I doubt, however, that Ethiopia will commit forces deep inside Somalia.

Worldfocus: Is it in the interest of other countries in the region to intervene in Somalia?

David Shinn: In my view, it is not in their interest except for hot pursuit across the border. They should protect their sovereignty at the border and do what they can to support Somalis loyal to the TFG to regain the initiative in the country. I think the engagement of foreign troops inside Somalia will only alienate more Somalis. At the same time, the international community should take all feasible steps to prevent foreign jihadis from entering Somalia.

A young man injured in the fighting in Mogadishu. Photo: IRIN

Worldfocus: How do you see this ending? Will the TFG retain power?

David Shinn: The international community would not support a Somali regime run by al-Shabaab and its al-Qaeda patrons. In this sense, the TFG will retain power somewhere in Somalia. More than 4,000 African Union troops remain in Mogadishu. One of their tasks is to protect the TFG, although the force does not have a mandate to go after al-Shabaab. It is possible that al-Shabaab could seize power in Mogadishu and then claim to represent Somalia. I don’t believe many Somalis would willingly support an al-Shabaab government. Eventually an al-Shabaab government would take actions contrary to the views of the vast majority of Somalis and then fall. In the meantime, it could do a lot of damage.

Worldfocus: What has been happening on the ground in Somalia over the last month as fighting has worsened? Does Amnesty International have a presence in Somalia?

Lynn Fredriksson: Amnesty International not currently have access to Somalia due to security concerns. However, we have recently conducted research with Somali refugees in Nairobi and Dadaab camps in Kenya, and in the Ali Addeh camp and the city of Djibouti. We have also conducted interviews in Hargeisa, Somaliland and will continue to pursue access to Somalia or the region in order to continue this research.

Fighting between al-Shabaab and other insurgent forces against the TFG over the past several weeks has resulted in the displacement and re-displacement of more than 100,000 Somali civilians, and it has left many dead and hundreds wounded. Amnesty International continues to call on all parties to the conflict to protect civilians and refrain from all indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, including in civilian populated areas.

Worldfocus: How has the violence curtailed humanitarian operations?

Lynn Fredriksson: Humanitarian assistance is always affected by heavy fighting and these past few weeks have allowed no exception. The population of Somalia is heavily dependent on food and other emergency assistance. More than 3 million Somalis have become aid dependent. Donor governments, United Nations agencies and the African Union must take effective action to ensure unhindered access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable in Somalia, including newly and repeatedly internally displaced persons.

A family flees Mogadishu. Photo: IRIN

Worldfocus: What should be done to address the humanitarian concerns in Somalia?

Lynn Fredriksson: The International Contact Group, donor governments, the United Nations Security Council, the African Union and other concerned parties must send strong and consistent messages that ongoing human rights abuses by all parties against civilians will not be tolerated. They should work to strengthen the current U.N. arms embargo on Somalia, and ensure vetting, transparency and oversight of any security sector assistance provided to the government of Somalia. They should support concrete steps toward the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry or related mechanism to investigate recent and ongoing human rights abuses in Somalia. And they should provide immediate support to human rights defenders, journalists and humanitarian aid workers who continue to place their lives on the line to report and alleviate the dire conditions under which Somali citizens continue to suffer human rights abuses every day throughout much of southern and central Somalia.

Worldfocus: Do you think the spiraling crisis will improve or worsen?

Lynn Fredriksson: There is no way to predict this, but one can hope that recent political changes — along with strong and consistent international actions in support of civilian protection and human rights — will create the space necessary for the Somali people, together, to bring about the peace, stability, justice and development they have been waiting for.

Maersk-Alabama Capt. Richard Phillips, right, stands alongside Cmdr. Frank Castellano, commanding officer of USS Bainbridge after being rescued by U.S Naval Forces off the coast of Somalia. Philips was held hostage for four days by pirates. Photo: U.S. Navy

Recent pirate attacks on U.S.-flagged ships have thrust the issue of Somali piracy into the spotlight and prompted U.S. President Barack Obama to vow to ”halt the rise of piracy.”

But piracy off Somalia’s shores is linked to onshore problems, as the country lacks a stable government. The U.S. has a messy history in Somalia, as American forces withdrew in 1994 after a failed attempt at intervention.

David Shinn, a former ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, spoke with Worldfocus for our online radio show on lawlessness in Somalia.

Below, he discusses how the U.S. can approach Somalia given its poor reputation in the African country. Read Ambassador Shinn’s blog.

Q: If nation building is not an option, to what capacity can or should the United States get involved without further tarnishing its reputation in the area and antagonizing the Somali people?

David Shinn: Nation building is an option in the long term, but not the short term. Until it is a viable option, the United States should continue to provide humanitarian assistance that is distributed by international organizations like the World Food Program and NGOs and quietly support the new Somali government of national unity. Together with other members of the international community, the United States should identify ways that it can help this government establish a police force and eventually a national military force. The United States should be prepared to step in quickly with development assistance as soon as the security situation allows.

Q: If the United States is already seen as a collaborator with Ethiopia, who should be the “face” of Somali reconstruction?

David Shinn: The face of Somali reconstruction should be the Somalis themselves supported by either the UN or a coalition of donor countries who are willing to help fund the reconstruction effort. Somalia’s neighbors should remain on the sidelines politically but take steps as appropriate to support the establishment of a moderate Somali government.

Q: What alternative policy can the United States adopt to secure its interests in the region?

David Shinn: I don’t see an alternative U.S. policy, but one that supplements the policy suggested above. The United States should continue to maintain good relations with Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti and explore ways to improve relations with Sudan and Eritrea. The goal is to encourage all of these countries, in addition to the African Union and Arab League, to play a constructive role in Somalia. The United States should deal with Somalia in collaboration with other interested countries so that responsibility for Somalia is an international responsibility, not an American undertaking. The United States should not see Somalia solely in the context of counterterrorism, which it did until early 2008. This approach damaged U.S. goals and interests in the region. Counterterrorism should be only a part of the policy, not the entire policy. The primary goal is to help establish a broad-based Somali government that is friendly with the United States and has tolerably good relations with all countries in the region.

See the original post.

Chinese President Hu Jintao ended his tour of four African nations this week, having promised to deepen ties with the continent. See where President Hu visited by scrolling down to our interactive map.

A lot of chatter has surrounded China’s interests in Africa. Media have branded China’s role in Africa as an invasion or an era of neo-colonialism with ulterior motives of pillaging Africa’s raw materials. Rhetoric from Chinese and African leaders includes words like “friendship,” “partnership” and “brotherhood,” stressing a shared history and common experience.

Worldfocus traveled to East Africa last summer to explore the strengthening trading ties among China and African countries — Sino-African trade amounted to almost $107 billion last year and has expanded tenfold since 2000. Chinese investment has encouraged new infrastructure projects and growth on the continent.

Some of this trade, however, involves countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe, where human rights abuses have been cited. Some also criticize the flood of cheap Chinese goods because it has eliminated Africans’ jobs.

Worldfocus.org’s weekly radio show examined the roots of the China-Africa relationship dating back 50 years, exploring what it means for Africa and China and whether the U.S. has become an uncomfortable third wheel.

Worldfocus anchor Martin Savidge hosted the following guests:

Li Anshan is a professor at the School of International Studies, Peking University and the director of the Institute of Afro-Asian Studies. His publications include “A History of Chinese Overseas in Africa” and “Social History of Chinese Overseas in Africa: Selected Documents, 1800-2005,” among others. His interests include African history, China-African relations, colonialism, Chinese overseas, comparative nationalism and development studies.

David H. Shinn is a former Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. He is currently an adjunct professor at George Washington University. Amb. Shinn’s research interests include Africa, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and U.S. foreign policy in Africa. He also blogs regularly here.

Mariana van Zeller is is a correspondent for Vanguard, an original documentary series on Current TV. She’s a native of Portugal and has spent the last several years traveling the globe to cover the emerging trends that are reshaping our world. Mariana has reported on conflict, immigration and the environment. In 2008, she traveled to Angola to produce the documentary “Chinatown, Africa,” which examines China’s rapidly growing presence on the continent.

Each year since 1991, a Chinese foreign minister has selected Africa as the first overseas trip. China has diplomatic relations with 49 of Africa’s 53 countries and has ambassadors in all these countries, except for Somalia due to the security situation. Below is an interactive map detailing recent visits by President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to African nations. Click on the highlighted African countries below to see China’s recent high-level visits.

Credits:
Host: Martin Savidge
Producers: Lisa Biagiotti, Katie Combs and Stephen Puschel

Martin Savidge hosts a panel of guests and address viewer questions about the region. In addition to the audio interview, here are some written answers to user-generated questions regarding the history, politics and the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

Lynn Fredriksson is a researcher on the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, for Amnesty International. She co-leads missions to the Horn. Most recently she has traveled to Nairobi, Kenya and Hargeisa, Somaliland to interview refugees from the armed conflict in southern and central Somalia.

Abdi Samatar is a professor and chair of the department of geography and global studies at the University of Minnesota. He was Fulbright Scholar to Ethiopia and Botswana. His research focuses on the relationship between democracy and development in the Third World in general and Africa in particular, and he has written extensively about Ethiopia and Somalia.

David H. Shinn is a former Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. He is currently an adjunct professor at George Washington University.  Amb. Shinn’s research interests include Africa, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and U.S. foreign policy in Africa. He also blogs regularly here.

HISTORY OF LAWLESSNESS IN SOMALIA

Photo: Abukar Albadri

Q: Why hasn’t Somalia had a stable central government in 17 years?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: Two factors contributed to the demise of a national government: Internal and external factors. Unlike what many conventional analysts claim, it has not been the genealogical structure (clans) of Somalis that has been the problem.

Instead, the key problem has been sectarian politicians who undermined the integrity of the public order by using state resources and power for personal gain and to oppress those who challenge them. The internal problem has been political rather than cultural in the sense of genealogy.

Second, the internal factor dovetailed with cold war agendas that supported whichever local groups that served their interests. These two forces jointly destroyed the legitimacy of the state and alienated the population. Once warlords divided the country into fiefdoms it has been difficult to create the space for civic minded citizens to mount a counter-attack and the international community continues to support the sectarian politicians and warlords.

Q: Has piracy always been a problem?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: Piracy is a new phenomenon and can easily be eliminated by a legitimate Somali government.

Q: How much of this is a religious struggle between Somali Muslims and Ethiopian Christians? Is radical Islam and the war on terror the root causes here?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: There is little that is religious in the conflict between Ethiopian and Somalis. The struggle is centered on the marginalization of the Somali population in Ethiopia as well as Ethiopia¹s long-standing attempt to undermine Somali unity. The war on terror is the problem. Most of Somalis who subscribe to political Islam are nationalist.

Q: What does the resignation of the Somali president in December mean for internal Somali politics and leadership going forward? How has the power sharing between Somali leaders and Islamists worked out so far? Which party/group will likely emerge from the power vacuum?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: It will not change things significantly as far as the legitimacy and capacity of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is concerned. It is hard to predict which political grouping will come out on top.

ETHIOPIA’S WITHDRAWAL FROM SOMALIA

Q:  What were Ethiopia’s goals in occupying Somalia in 2006? Did Ethiopia accomplish them? What were Ethiopia’s interests/fears concerning Somalia?

Amb. David H. Shinn: Ethiopia actually had small numbers of troops inside Somalia before 2006. The growing strength of the militias of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and, especially, their march towards Baidoa in south central Somalia in late 2006 persuaded the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopia to take strong action. Baidoa was the TFG headquarters. A few UIC leaders had even expressed an interest in waging a jihad against Ethiopia. At least one of the leaders revived the idea of Somali irredentism, or taking back land under the control of Ethiopia.

At the time of independence in 1960, it was the goal of the Somali government to incorporate into Somalia that part of Ethiopia inhabited by Somalis. This region constitutes about one-quarter of Ethiopia’s land area. Ethiopia decided it was time to defeat the UIC militia.

After defeating the UIC, Ethiopia wanted the more compliant TFG to take control of Somalia. This would remove the threat of jihad against Ethiopia and neutralize any thought of reviving Somali irredentism. Ethiopia initially succeeded militarily by soundly defeating the UIC, whose militias evacuated the capital of Mogadishu as the Ethiopians and TFG approached. Within months, however, the situation began to deteriorate in the capital. The Islamists have slowly rebuilt their strength ever since.

The Ethiopian military force and their TFG and African Union force allies became bogged down in urban guerrilla warfare. As financial costs and casualties mounted, the Ethiopians concluded it was necessary to pull out. Ethiopia says that it achieved its objectives. Over the short term, it is true that they need not fear an attack from Somalia nor is irredentism a serious threat. On the other hand, they did not install the compliant TFG in Mogadishu and forces in Somalia opposed to Ethiopia have reasserted themselves and eventually might decide to revive the idea of Somali irredentism.

My own view is that the Ethiopians decided to cut their losses and leave Somalia. In the best case scenario, this decision may permit moderate Islamists and the TFG to take control of the country and reestablish a degree of stability.

Photo: Abukar Albadri

Q: Did Ethiopia invaded Somalia with the backing of the U.S.? How did the U.S. support Ethiopia, and why?

Amb. David H. Shinn: The U.S. denied that it supported Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia. It is important to remember that the TFG invited Ethiopian troops to join them in opposing the UIC. It is still not clear to me, and I believe the public generally, to what extent the U.S. supported Ethiopia in this endeavor. We know a few facts.

The U.S. never publicly called on Ethiopia to end its military action inside Somalia nor did it publicly criticize the effort. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi publicly acknowledged that the U.S. shared intelligence with Ethiopia as the Ethiopians moved deeper into Somalia. I do not know if the U.S. provided any military equipment that could be used in the action or paid any of the costs for the invasion.  Many Somalis and Ethiopians in the region believe that the U.S. provided more tangible support. They either have information that is not available to me or they are just guessing. At a minimum, however, the U.S. gave a green light to Ethiopia.

The U.S. was sympathetic to the Ethiopian position for several reasons. The U.S. supported the TFG and Ethiopia was trying to put the TFG in power in Mogadishu. A defeat of the UIC, which at the time had both moderate and extremist members, would in the view of the U.S. reduce the likelihood that terrorism would increase in Somalia. In fact, a TFG/Ethiopian victory might even create a situation that would allow the U.S. to root out a small number of foreign terrorists that it believed had taken refuge in the country.

Q: How does the crisis in Somalia affect the greater region (Horn of Africa)?

Amb. David H. Shinn: It has had huge, negative implications for the wider region. The crisis drove Somali refugees into neighboring countries, especially Kenya and Yemen. It attracted Ethiopian troops into Somalia, further exacerbating relations between Somalis and Ethiopians.

The crisis destroyed the economy of Somalia so that it became a net importer of virtually everything rather than a producer. Somalia is traditionally a nomadic country with herds crossing between Somalia and Ethiopia. The crisis disrupted these movements and forced many nomads to move to the capital where international agencies provided emergency food aid.

Outside powers joined in the fray, seeking advantage for their own purposes. As Ethiopia supported the TFG, Eritrea supported the UIC in an effort to put additional pressure on Ethiopia.  You will recall that relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea were poor because of a dispute over demarcation of their border. A small number of outside extremists began funding radical elements in Somalia, thus increasing the specter of terrorism.  As the Somali economy broke down, more and more Somalis took to the profitable business of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. This has had a major impact on international shipping in the region.

The biggest losers in all of this, however, have been the Somalis themselves, especially innocent men, women and children who have nothing to do with the conflict.  They face regular danger, minimal food and health care, and often find themselves internally displaced.

Q: What does the resignation of the Somali president in December mean for internal Somali politics and leadership going forward? How has the power sharing between Somali leaders and Islamists worked out so far? Which party/group will likely emerge from the power vacuum?

Prof. Abdi Samatar: It will not change things significantly as far as the legitimacy and capacity of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is concerned. It is hard to predict which political grouping will come out on top.

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

Q: On Friday, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution expressing its intention to establish the U.N. force in Somalia, but postponed the final decision for several months to assess the situation and strengthen the African Union force currently deployed in the capital. Why the delay? Is the situation in Somalia on the scale of Darfur? Has the situation changed since Ethiopia pulled out?

Lynn Fredricksson: The delay appears to be based in large part on the inability of the UNSG to find lead and other country willing to make troop and other necessary commitments to constitute a full U.N. peacekeeping operation. It is also perhaps bad timing in that the Ethiopian forces are only now pulling out and the immediate imposition of a significant international force might be less than welcome, especially before the Somali people know what is happening in relation to the presidency, the impact of Ethiopian troop withdrawal and the impact of recently strengthened anti-piracy operations.

Amnesty International’s greatest concern about the new resolution is that it does not include preparations for human rights provisions to be included in any upcoming operations nor does it address the lack of capacity and  mandate for civilian protection by the current AU peacekeeping operation. While I don’t think it’s worthwhile to compare African crisis situations, I would say that the interlinked humanitarian and human rights crises in Somalia are among the worst for civilians in the world.

Photo: Abukar Albadri

Q: When were you in Somalia last, what did you see on the ground?

Lynn Fredricksson: While direct access to Somalia has been challenging due to ongoing security concerns, Amnesty International has been regularizing its missions to the region since late 2007 — including field work in the self-declared independent Somaliland and in Nairobi, Kenya, where we have interviewed refugees from southern and central Somalia, including journalists and human rights defenders who have been forced to flee, and in Djibouti where we have been monitoring the progress of the peace process there.

Our findings throughout 2008 have indicated a disturbing and ongoing targeting of human rights defenders, humanitarian aid workers and journalists, the very people who we depend on to have revealed consistently dire human rights conditions in which humanitarian organizations are obstructed from providing desperately needed assistance to some 3.2 million vulnerable Somali civilians.

Q: Has the safety of humanitarian workers and journalists improved?

Lynn Fredricksson: Conditions for Somali human rights defenders, aid workers and journalists has not yet improved. It often takes time for developments like the Ethiopian withdrawal, the resignation of the president or United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to result in clear changes in conditions on the ground.

It is therefore essential that the international community, particularly the UNSC and donor countries, pay close attention and commit significant resources to humanitarian access and assistance, human rights monitoring and a commission of inquiry, and enforcement of the arms embargo, beyond only peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy operations.

ROLE OF BARACK OBAMA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

Q:  What will an Obama administration mean for Somalia?  Will the international community intervene?

Amb. David H. Shinn: The UNSC, with strong support from the outgoing Bush administration, adopted a resolution on Jan. 16, 2009 that called on the African Union to strengthen its force in Mogadishu from 2,600 to 8,000 troops. It also authorized the U.N. Secretary General to submit a report by April 15 that includes a possible mandate for a U.N. peacekeeping force in Somalia and to make a decision on this matter by June 1.

The U.S. has been pressing the U.N. for months to put a peacekeeping force in Somalia. So long as there is no peace to keep, this idea is problematic. U.S. ambassador-designate to the U.N., Susan Rice, expressed no enthusiasm for a U.N. peacekeeping force in recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Even if the U.N. eventually agrees to a peacekeeping force, it will probably be predicated on the ability to “keep” the peace rather than to “make” peace.  The Obama administration, in view of the unhappy U.S. experience in Somalia in 1992-1993, would not likely allow the U.S. to contribute boots on the ground. At best, the U.S. would pay its share of the cost and provide logistical and intelligence support to the peacekeeping force.

I believe the Obama administration will pursue a more flexible approach to the Somali crisis by consulting with a wider range of Somali participants involved in the conflict. It may also pay greater attention to ameliorating the humanitarian catastrophe caused by the conflict.  It may try to grapple more effectively with the root causes of the crisis rather than focus almost exclusively on the conflict as a counter-terrorism issue.

Photo: Abukar Albadri

Q: What needs to happen in order to stabilize the humanitarian crises?

Lynn Fredricksson: Stability and security in Somalia will require a the confluence of a number of factors:

• progress on the various facets of a more inclusive peace process
• development of a mandate and capacity for whatever peacekeeping operation exists in Somalia to protect civilians
• strengthening and enforcement of the arms embargo
• the eventual deployment of human rights monitors and progress toward the establishment of a commission of inquiry into past human rights abuses
• and, security focus on unhindered access and adequate funding for humanitarian operations to provide for the immediate needs of more than 1.2 million internally displaced Somali civilians, hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees in Kenya, Somaliland and other areas of the region, and other vulnerable Somali civilians; and protection for Somali human rights defenders, aid workers and journalists.

Photo courtesy of Abukar Albadri and the CIA World Factbook.

Credits:
Host: Martin Savidge
Producers: Lisa Biagiotti, Katie Combs and Stephen Puschel

Ongoing fighting in Somalia has displaced over 800,000 people. More than 40 percent of the population needs humanitarian aid.

News of sea piracy off the coast of Somalia has dominated headlines worldwide. A power vacuum and conflict between warlords and insurgents have displaced over 800,000 Somalis and left millions hungry. Lawlessness and instability are the norm in a country where no functioning central government has existed since 1991.

Earlier this month, Ethiopian troops began withdrawing from the country after a two-year occupation and handed security duties over to a joint force of Somali government officials and Islamic militiamen. The U.S.-backed Ethiopian soldiers invaded Somalia in December 2006 and ousted the Islamist leadership.

The president of the country’s transitional government resigned in late December. Concern over Somalia’s future stability has led China to request a United Nations peacekeeping presence.

Thank you for your questions. Worldfocus.org’s weekly radio show explores the worsening situation in Somalia, taking a look beyond the pirate frenzy offshore and examining the causes of instability onshore, addressing some viewer questions.

Martin Savidge hosts a panel of guests and address viewer questions about the region:

Lynn Fredriksson is a researcher on the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, for Amnesty International. She co-leads missions to the Horn. Most recently she has traveled to Nairobi, Kenya and Hargeisa, Somaliland to interview refugees from the armed conflict in southern and central Somalia.

Abdi Samatar is a professor and chair of the department of geography and global studies at the University of Minnesota. He was Fulbright Scholar to Ethiopia and Botswana. His research focuses on the relationship between democracy and development in the Third World in general and Africa in particular, and he has written extensively about Ethiopia and Somalia.

David H. Shinn is a former Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. He is currently an adjunct professor at George Washington University.  Amb. Shinn’s research interests include Africa, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and U.S. foreign policy in Africa. He also blogs regularly here.