U.S. soldiers training Afghan military and police. Photo: Flickr user USAarmy

In a reminder of just how bad the problem of corruption is in Afghanistan, today’s Washington Post quotes an American official as saying that the Afghan minister of mines accepted a $30 million bribe to award its largest mining project to a Chinese firm.

According to the report, the minister received payment in exchange for awarding the Chinese company the rights to one of the world’s largest reserves of copper. The minister is now also reviewing offers for an iron ore project, and the Chinese bidder is said to be the front runner.

Should the United States continue to give aid if Afghanistan doesn’t clean up corruption?

President Obama at the Ft. Hood memorial service. Photo: Flickr user USarmy

Ambassador S. Azmat Hassan is a former Ambassador of Pakistan to Malaysia, Syria and Morocco and Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations. He is currently an adjunct professor at Seton Hall University and is a contributing Worldfocus blogger.

The implications of Major Nidal Malik Hasan’s rampage at Fort Hood continue to excite public scrutiny. The US is no stranger to deranged individuals of different religious persuasions indulging in mass murder in the past.

President Obama, in a moving eulogy to the dead, cautioned against a rush to judgment. The facts would have to be painstaking pieced together before a fair approximation of what motivated Hasan’s dastardly attack on fellow servicemen can be arrived at.

The fact that Hasan was an Army psychiatrist administering to the post traumatic stress syndrome issues faced by returning Army soldiers from Iraq and Afghanistan, added to the puzzling enigma of his act.

It seemed that a healer, trained to mend soldiers broken by the awful physical and psychological traumas inflicted on them by war, had himself cracked under the professional and personal strain he had apparently undergone.

There is little doubt that Hasan had increasingly become a misfit in the Army. Reportedly a loner, he found solace in increasing religiosity. As a Muslim-American, he appeared to be struggling to come to terms with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

He had publicly declared that he considered America’s involvement in these wars as a war against Islam. He agonized over whether Islam permitted Muslims to fight Muslims in war. It seems these warning signs were not noticed by his superiors who were about to deploy him to Afghanistan.

If the U.S. Army draws the conclusion that its Muslim soldiers are not to be trusted, this would be a big mistake. Most Muslims soldier and officers have fought bravely in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some have given the supreme sacrifice for their country.

Colin Powell personally knew and attested to the valor of one such Muslim officer who died in Afghanistan. He rests in peace in the Arlington cemetery, an acknowledged hero. The acts of one deranged man cannot and should not sway our military leadership. If we succumb to this attitude how can we trust our Iraqi, Afghani, Pakistani and other Muslim allies?

Instead, it would be better to reform Army procedures to catch its misfits in time. Such persons who cannot be nursed back to mental normality should be weeded out.

I cannot end without commenting on the ease with which weapons can be procured in America. In most first world countries this is not the case. There it is very difficult, if not virtually impossible to get a license for lethal weapons.

With stringent gun control imposed here, it might just be possible to avoid putting guns in the hands of alienated individuals who can wreak havoc on innocent citizens. Otherwise we are probably fated to see a repeat of such horrific incidents in the future. Civil society should take the lead in asking for reforms of the current gun laws.

When I served in Malaysia two decades ago, I noticed that it was a crime punishable by death to own an unlicensed revolver. Even owning bullets attracted heavy punishment. Crimes such as the recent rampage are unknown in Malaysia. They are also virtually unknown in Europe, although there are plenty of misfits in these countries.

Think about it.

- Amb. S. Azmat Hassan

For more on the emerging U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, Daljit Dhaliwal talks with Marvin Weinbaum, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and a former State Department analyst on Afghanistan.

Weinbaum discusses what he sees as the most important strategic focus in Afghanistan and an assessment of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry’s recently leaked comments calling for fewer troops.

There is another issue that permeates just about any conversation surrounding troop levels — the perception and the reality of widespread corruption in Afghanistan. Jonah Hull of Al Jazeera English reports on the perceptions of corruption from inside Afghanistan.

They discuss Hamid Karzai’s second term, international calls to clean up corruption and the worsening security situation.

They also look at the fallout from a landmark case in Italy involving the alleged CIA abduction and so-called rendition of a Muslim cleric. An Italian judge convicted and sentenced 23 CIA agents, in their absence, of abducting the  cleric in Italy and taking him to Egypt where he says he was tortured.

In a country where a woman is confined to her home, Joya is breaking all kinds of cultural, social and religious stereotypes. In May 2007, she was suspended after referring to the parliament as a stable, she said at least in “in a stable we have animals like a cow which is useful in that it provides milk and a donkey that carry a load.”

She speaks candidly about the challenges facing Afghanistan. She says that the low turnout in the presidential election is proof that the Afghan people are dissatisfied with the current government. She attributes the rise of Taliban to the failed policy of the U.S. in Afghanistan. She is also a staunch opponent of increasing U.S. troop levels in her country. Joya wants the U.S. and NATO to keep in mind that no foreign military has ever succeeded in controlling Afghanistan.

For her, the status of women now is no different than under the Taliban. She says that it may even be worse because the rate of suicide and abduction is high, and many rapists go untouched.

Because she is unabashedly outspoken, her life is under constant threat and she must be accompanied by bodyguards. But nothing so far seems to succeed in slowing her down. For sure not the many failed assassination attempts on her life, or the awful treatment she gets from her male colleagues in parliament.

Joya spent her childhood at a refugee camp in Iran and Pakistan, and returned to the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan in the late 1990s and worked for an underground organization helping women. She is now on a book tour in the U.S.  promoting her memoir, A Woman Among Warlords: The Extraordinary Story of an Afghan Woman Who Dared to Speak Out, co-written by Derrick O’Keefe.

- Mohammad Al Kassim

Martin Savidge hosts Filipino peace negotiator and Catholic priest Eliseo Mercado and security analyst Zachary Abuza when Worldfocus Radio explores the forgotten terrorist front in the Philippines.

For more on Worldfocus’ coverage of the Philippines, including original videos, click here.

Since 9/11, the U.S. has stationed 500 to 600 troops in the Philippines to strengthen military forces there. The U.S. counter-insurgency effort in the Philippines has been applauded as a success story for its mix of military action and soft power — including one of the largest USAID packages in the world.

But how lasting is this counter-insurgency success? Does it solve the root problems of poverty and lack of schools and infrastructure? And, if the U.S. pulls out, is the Philippines prepared to stop the tide of terrorism?

The U.S. strategy has been to root out terrorists from the lawless jungles of the south, which is home to the country’s Muslim minority and vulnerable to external terrorist groups like al-Qaeda.

The show:

• explains the current insurgency in the poor, predominantly Muslim south of the Philippines
• evaluates how Filipino counter-insurgency tactics measure up to other Southeast Asian counter-insurgency efforts
• examines the mix of U.S. military might, diplomacy and humanitarian aid to combat local and regional instability
• discusses the importance of peace and reconciliation between the numerous Filipino ethnic groups

Martin Savidge hosts the following guests:

Zachary Abuza is a professor at Simmons College, Boston, specializing in Southeast Asian politics and security issues. He visits the region four to five times a year. Zachary is the author of Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand and its Implications for Southeast Asian Security, Muslims, Politics and Violence in Indonesia and Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, among other publications. He contributes frequently to the Jane’s Intelligence Review, the Counterterrorism Blog and the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Father Eliseo “Jun” Mercado, Jr. is a Catholic priest and peace advocate who has been extensively involved in the peace process in Mindanao, the southern part of the Philippines. He is an expert on the role of Islam in the Philippines and led the independent cease-fire between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front separatist group. Father Mercado has also been extensively involved in peace process in Mindanao. In October 2007, he was selected to be one of the 20 delegates representing all NGO and CSO accredited at the UN to the High Level UN Session on inter-religious dialogue.

Credits:
Host: Martin Savidge
Producers: Lisa Biagiotti and Ben Piven

Daljit Dhaliwal speaks with Gideon Lichfield, deputy editor of The Economist online in New York, about British public sentiment and the reaction of Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

Read more about his experience overseas in his blog, Embedded in Afghanistan.

The wait continues for the president’s decision on General McChrystal’s recommendation. The unfortunate aspect of all of this business is that the debate is taking place in the public eye. While having a public debate on the efficacy of sending more troops certainly satisfies the exigencies of American politics, it’s most certainly not beneficial to the war effort as a whole. I say this because if the decision is made to not send more troops, or even not send as many as asked for the by the general, we will be perceived by the Afghan government, people, and security forces as abandoning them and losing our will to fight the insurgents. I can confirm that the ANA leaders I habitually talked with were always worried about our ability to stick things out and did not want to see us go anywhere until the country had progressed significantly.

Perception is an incredibly important part of any counter-insurgency, as winning the support of the people should ultimately lead to victory. I can confirm that many of the people of Afghanistan don’t really care who wins this war, just so long as someone wins it, and they can live a semblance of a normal life…i.e. the people will support the side that appears to be on the path to victory.

For these reasons, any action leading to the perception of weakness or lack of commitment on our part needs to be scrupulously avoided. It would have been better to avoid all of this public debate on the issue…unless the request is granted of course, in which case we may take some small benefit from all of this publicizing of our intentions on the matter.

The views expressed by contributing bloggers do not reflect the views of Worldfocus or its partners.

Hassan Abbas, a Bernard Schwartz Fellow at the Asia Society and former Pakistani government official, joins Daljit Dhaliwal to discuss what Karzai’s second term means for the U.S. and the international community.

Jonah Hull of Al Jazeera English reports from Kabul on delays, violence and voter fraud.

Approximately 150 miles away In the northwestern city of Peshawar, a car bomb tore through a busy market. The death toll from today’s terror attacks in Pakistan has risen to some 100 people. The bombing is thought to be the work of militants allied with the Taliban.

Ahmad Kamal, a Pakistani diplomat for 40 years - 10 of them as Pakistan’s UN ambassador - speaks with Daljit Dhaliwal about the relationship between the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan and the escalation of attacks. He also examines what it will take to end the violence in both countries.

Children with U.S. soldier in Afghanista. Photo: Flickr user theUSarmy

U.S. President Barack Obama continues to grapple with the complex situation in Afghanistan.

The American leader has recently been accused of taking too long to make a decision about whether to send more troops.

With allegations of election fraud surrounding Afghan president Hamid Karzai and new allegations against his brother, should the U.S. cut ties with the controversial president?

Tell us what you think in the comments section below. Please remember to be respectful and on-point in your comments. Malicious or offensive comments will be deleted and repeat offenders will be banned.

A Burka-clad woman in Afghanistan. Photo: Flickr user YanBoechat

S. Azmat Hassan, a former Pakistani diplomat, is now a professor at Seton Hall University.  He writes about the unending search for Osama bin Laden and why the U.S. should shift its strategy.

The month of October marks the eighth anniversary of the war in Afghanistan. It is now over eight years since the Bush administration successfully removed the Taliban regime from power in Kabul. But there was a crucial difference between the US eviction of Saddam from Kuwait and forcible regime change in Afghanistan.

In the former case the U.S. led coalition made sure that the Iraqi Army was destroyed. In the case of the Taliban many of their soldiers were allowed to escape to the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar. Inexplicably, they were not pursued and neutralized. The Taliban lived to fight another day, and today they have regrouped to become a formidable fighting force.

Similarly, Osama bin Laden, who was virtually trapped in the Tora Bora Mountains in eastern Afghanistan, eluded capture. His whereabouts have remained unknown despite the millions of dollars spent on the largest manhunt in history. A FBI reward promising $25 million for information leading to his arrest has also proved unavailing so far. More pertinent I believe is the question: how relevant is bin Laden to America’s security concerns?

Bin Laden’s views may still appeal to a scattered following in Yemen, Somalia, parts of North Africa and elsewhere, but his ability to energize a vast multitude of Muslims to fight America seems to have been seriously compromised.

So the time has probably come to lessen our morbid fascination with the man. The Taliban leadership in Afghanistan may have already written him off as a credible ally. Instead of continuing to expend resources and efforts to find Bin Laden, it may be better for the US to reach out to elements among the Afghan Taliban.The attempt should be to wean them away from the diehard elements around Mullah Omar.

This effort would require, in security expert Bruce Hoffman’s words, “intelligence on the ground.” Do the U.S. and NATO have enough Pashto-speaking operatives deployed in Afghanistan to accomplish this task? If the Taliban commanders can be assured of a power sharing arrangement in the Afghan government, the present fraught situation in Afghanistan could conceivably take a turn for the better.

The Pashtun tribesmen do not form a monolithic bloc. It is military confrontation by the US that unites them against what they perceive to be a foreign military occupying their land. If they see the prospect of an end to the Afghan war through co-optation in the Afghan government, they may be willing to lay down their weapons.

I believe it is desirable to explore this option to end a ruinous war which if pursued militarily alone, could last indefinitely. This prospect would not be in the interest of any of the principal actors. It would probably engender more turmoil, more bloodshed and more agony in that region, with ominous consequences for all.

The Times reporter conducting an interview. Photo: Tomas Munita for The New York Times

Edward Deitch is the consulting producer and head writer at Worldfocus. He looks at how one reporter describes an ordeal in Afghanistan and Pakistan — and what it may mean for U.S. policymakers.

It was unfortunate, even heartbreaking, how David Rohde gained first-hand knowledge of the Taliban. The New York Times correspondent went to Afghanistan last November to research a book, but before getting very far he was kidnapped by a Taliban commander who had invited him for an interview.

Held for more than seven months across the border in Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas, he lived to write about his experience. It’s the kind of story that no one would have wished for but that few will turn away from.

In a series of Times articles this week, Rohde recounts his experience and those of two Afghan colleagues abducted with him. You can see a related video segment from this Worldfocus partner in tonight’s broadcast.

Rohde’s perspective on the Taliban is particularly relevant. Pakistan is conducting a large-scale offensive against the insurgents in South Waziristan, one of the areas where Rohde was held. And President Obama is pondering whether to commit more troops to the effort against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

There will most certainly be a book and, inevitably, a movie. But I doubt Hollywood will do justice to the material. Rohde’s ordeal, in his own words, is the kind of story you can’t make up.

There have been countless dispatches on the fight against the Taliban from the American and British points of view. Following the troops in Afghanistan for a few days or weeks is routine for reporters, whether they are from The Times, American television news outlets, or foreign broadcasters such as Australia’s ABC or Al Jazeera English, whose reports we have featured on our program. Al Jazeera English has also provided glimpses into the Taliban side, especially in Pakistan.

By contrast, David Rohde, without a choice in the matter, experienced what might be described as the ultimate embed with the Taliban, and some of his revelations are worth noting as U.S. policymakers confront the growing dangers in Afghanistan and Pakistan:

• The group that held him “oversaw a sprawling Taliban mini-state in the tribal areas with the de facto acquiescence of the Pakistani military.”

• U.S. drone attacks on Taliban targets “killed many senior commanders and hindered their operations. Yet the Taliban were able to garner recruits in their aftermath by exaggerating the number of civilian casualties.”

• The Taliban “were more sophisticated than I expected. They browsed the Internet and listened to hourly news updates on Azadi radio, a station run by the American government. But then they dismissed whatever information did not meet their preconceptions.”

Even the surreal moments are instructive. Rohde was baffled, he tells us, by how his guards liked to sing with him, and their favorite song was none other than “She Loves You” by the Beatles. He recounts how he would sing the first verse and the guards and his fellow captives would join in for the chorus. “’She loves you – yeah, yeah, yeah,’ we sang, with Kalashnikovs lying on the floor around us.” One can only imagine it.

I’ve barely scratched the surface of Rohde’s story, with all its twists and turns. It is a thriller set in an unfolding and deepening conflict with no end in sight. It provides a rare and raw look at just what the United States and its allies are up against. It’s difficult to read but hard to put down.

- Edward Deitch

Kay Shimizu, a visiting assistant professor at Harvard University, joins Daljit Dhaliwal to discuss why the presence of 47,000 U.S. troops in Okinawa is causing controversy and why the new Japanese government may pull out its naval support of the war in Afghanistan.

An Afghani shopkeeper in Herat. Photo: Khushbu Shah

Khushbu Shah studied political science at Berkeley then did a Masters in conflict studies at the London School of Economics. She currently lives in Kabul and conducts research for a consulting firm.

I never say no to a meal in Afghanistan that consists of anything besides the usual combination of greasy meat and greasy rice. When my manager called me around noon last week to join her inside our gated compound for “special company and gourmet food,” I was already ringing her doorbell before she hung up the phone.

As I strolled in, four men in military uniform turned around. My boss flashed a mischievous albeit discreet grin my way.

As I realized that this was my first encounter with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and I had a million questions to shoot their way.

As the instant Starbucks coffee was poured into steaming cups, I cornered one of the guests, a lieutenant colonel from the German Armed Forces Technical Advisory Group (GAFTAG). I hounded the worn out and lieutenant-colonel with questions about his interaction with the Afghans who worked under his auspices in maintaining equipment for the burgeoning Afghan army.

Because he mentors Afghans willing to join the international forces for work, he worries constantly about how their equipment is not always up to international standards. There is also a lack of understanding between his team and the national staff in terms of the relative importance of their jobs.

Showing a remarkable amount of passion and sincerity that I did not expect from a man in his position, he constantly referred his frustration with getting his Afghan workers to take their jobs seriously. His mentee chose this job maintaining equipment because it was close to his home, he knew the Afghan in charge and he got to stay in Kabul.

When the colonel brought more than $2,000 USD worth of new equipment for his mentee, the first thing out of the man’s mouth was,” But where is my present?” According to the lieutenant colonel, this mentality has become prevalent over the last decade of international assistance because people prioritize their individual own survival and their immediate concerns: money and presents.

We mulled over the the need to strengthen the the Afghan National Army (ANA). We also lamented the fact that an ANA soldier makes $70 a month versus over $1,000 for a UN driver. Also, the lieutenant colonel adamantly stressed the need for a stronger police force as the basis for post-conflict reconstruction.

Finally, of course, I had to ask him about Obama’s impending decision and the possibility of an increase in American troops. Surprisingly, his answer was not the one I expected. He replied with a simple statement, “If the current number of troops have shown no promise of improvement or change, then there is no point in increasing the number now or later.”

I have days where I meet private security contractors and end up throwing out many harsh words. Generally, it is a battle between the humanitarians, journalists, and NGO workers versus the security contractors and ISAF, but this was a conversation to remember. Not once did I feel the urge to launch a verbal assault, and in actuality, I gained a new perspective on the ISAF’s daily struggles.

- Khushbu Shah

Commentators continue to debate whether the Karzai administration was complicit in the fraud and whether Hamid Karzai could ever be considered the legitimate Afghan leader. Some are even contemplating the prospect of a power-sharing arrangement between Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah.

Jamie Metzl, the executive vice president of the Asia Society and project director for its Afghanistan-Pakistan task force, speaks with Daljit Dhaliwal.

Remittances of 2.5 billion dollars make up Afghanistan’s entire national budget.

Richard O’Regan reports from Tehran.