President Barack Obama is taking the right approach in treating China as a key partner on global challenges by emphasizing the need for joint problem solving on his recent trip. But no one said it would be easy to cooperate with China’s leaders—or thrilling.

Case in point: the joint statement released by President Obama and his counterpart Hu Jintao. The document is remarkable in scope, but shows that the most we can expect on our shared agenda is incremental progress.

A presidential summit is what they call in government an “action-forcing event.” When heads of state meet and the cameras roll, the foreign policy bureaucracies of both nations are motivated to go for the gold. The results of the summit likely represent the most the United States and China could both sign off on at this moment. These gains are not earth shattering, but they unquestionably represent forward movement in some areas.

The most specific and ambitious plans came in climate and energy. In addition to throwing support behind a binding deal at Copenhagen, the two sides agreed to launch, among other programs:

* An electric car initiative
* A joint clean-energy research center
* A partnership on developing clean coal technologies
* A collaboration to help China develop an accurate greenhouse gas emissions inventory
* A U.S.-China Energy Cooperation Program to bring the private sectors of both nations into the clean-energy transformation so necessary for both nations to undertake

On the economy, less specific plans were announced but the two presidents reaffirmed the role of the Group of 20 developed and developing nations as the premier international leadership forum as well as the “cooperative process on mutual assessment” agreed to by the G-20 last month. This refers to an initiative announced at the recent G-20 summit in Pittsburgh whereby member countries will submit their macroeconomic plans to one another for review.

This G-20 review process could prompt uncomfortable exposure for the Chinese on their undervalued currency, so their recommitment to it is welcome. And though China did not make any new pledges on the value of the renminbi at the summit, the central bank earlier indicated a new flexibility about determining its value, and President Hu vowed, again, to continue to move toward a more domestic demand-led economic growth model. The other side of this needed bilateral rebalancing came in the form of a U.S. promise to rein in its budget deficits over the long term.

The two sides also agreed to push for the reform of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and to provide more resources to these multilateral institutions. That’s good news, and would signal a change if it comes to pass. As a recent report of mine describes, China is engaged in the international system but has not yet used its clout to strengthen international institutions and is decidedly avoiding a leadership role on most global challenges.

Also included in the joint statement were promises to increase cooperation in counterterrorism, agriculture, and pandemic disease. You get the idea: lots of issues, lots of pledges. As they are implemented, though, these could really matter. Each could mean greater safety for individual, ordinary Americans—from terror plots, tainted food, and swine flu.

Ultimately, that is why the relationship with China is so important. Beijing holds big cards on threats that can harm Americans. As a growing export market for U.S. goods and services, it also represents a partial answer on how to generate new U.S. jobs.

But let us be clear—they need us, too. Media stories have played on the theme of China’s rise and America’s decline. But American global leadership is real, it continues, it benefits the Chinese in many ways, and they know it. Interdependence works both ways. America being out in front is what allows China to take a back seat on many global issues.

The difficulty the United States faces in the future will be persuading China to help more in solving global problems– as the earlier mentioned report details– while at the same time being able to live with the reality that China’s leaders are not going to follow the U.S. playbook when it does not serve their interests. The lack of emphasis at the first Obama-Hu presidential summit on pressuring Iran on its nuclear program and the “agree-to-disagree” outcome on human rights and on Tibet illustrate this clearly.

But perhaps the new unilateral U.S. initiative announced at the summit– to send 100,000 American students to China over the next four years– will be the most important outcome from President Obama’s China visit. That program will pay future dividends in a greater understanding of this pivotal power among the American people and provide the Chinese who encounter these students a better sense of us, too.

Shanghai. Photo: flickr user Furryface

Last week, as he prepared to leave for Asia, President Obama called the U.S. relationship with China a “strategic partnership.” This new label is 100% certain to be met with accusations of appeasement and naivete by the not-always-so-loyal opposition. The neocons didn’t like the concept of “strategic reassurance” that Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg unveiled a few weeks ago, and spoke about at a recent Center for American Progress event, and they are going to like this even less. But using this term before his first visit to China is quite a smart move.

After also calling it a “competitor,” Obama referred to a strategic partnership with China in the context of major transnational threats. China is the world’s largest emitter of carbon, its most dynamic large economy (and owner of some $800 billion in US treasuries) and a nuclear power that neighbors North Korea and buys more oil from Iran than any other country. If China doesn’t become our partner, then we are in trouble.

Unfortunately, China has not been a reliable partner so far on these global challenges. As I detail in a new report, China is very engaged in all the international institutions and diplomacy, and this is a big step in the right direction. But you can count on a couple of fingers the number of times China has taken proactive leadership on a global threat: North Korea (but it took enormous and constant US pressure to get them to lead on the Six Party Talks); and the avian and swine flu pandemics, although its active leadership has consisted of convening international conferences of health experts– important, but not exactly mind-blowing.

In fact, Beijing is not using its leverage with Iran to end its nuclear program; it has so far resisted agreeing to specific targets for its carbon emissions that would make a global deal to address climate change possible; and the steps China is taking to move to a domestic-led growth model that will address global economic imbalances are welcome, but too few and too slow.

What the Chinese will tell you is that they achieve a productive relationship by, first, developing trust with their counterpart and only then embarking on problem-solving together. This is exactly reverse, they will say, of Americans, who want to get things done and develop trust in the process. President Obama is thus offering a modicum of pre-trust that the Chinese say they need. This is not weakness– it is clever diplomacy.

The Asia itinerary makes clear that China is only one element of U.S.- Asia policy. President Obama is strengthening our traditional alliances in Japan and South Korea, and finally getting the US in the game of multilateral diplomacy in APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) on which China has been running the tables over the last eight years.

Ultimately, though, for the new label to match reality, the Chinese need to pony up — on climate, currency, Iran and Afghanistan, among other issues — to help solve these problems, reassure the US that they are indeed willing to act like partners and confirm that the political risk President Obama took in nomenclature was worthwhile. Moreover, tackling each of these threats is in China’s own long-term interests.

If, over time, the Chinese do not cooperate more deeply, then “strategic partnership” could end up just a blip in the historical fluctuations of US-China terminology. But instead I hope that, in a few years, it turns out to be a positive, accurate and highly unremarkable description of our relationship with China.

- Nina Hachigian

Nina Hachigian with Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg. Photo: Flickr user CenterforAmericanProgress

I haven’t much posted recently because I just finished a report about China’s role in the international system.

China’s New Engagement in the International System looks at China’s engagement on four transnational threats that the Obama Administration has prioritized — global warming, the global economic crisis, nuclear proliferation and global pandemics like the swine flu.

The bottom line conclusions I reached were these: China’s transformation on the international stage has been profound, moving from a hostile, aggressive “rogue” state outside the international system to a full and active participant in global institutions.

China is deeply engaged in international institutions and initiatives. Chinese officials show up to all meetings, they are serious, and they often contribute to policy discussions in a constructive manner. This is no minor milestone.

Yet the quality of China’s engagement today on these four transnational issues leaves something to be desired from an American point of view. While China does play by the international rules to a large extent in these four areas, China does not reliably use its clout or leverage either to solve global problems or strengthen the system.

Rarely does it show proactive leadership on global problems, though the cases of North Korea’s nuclear program and pandemic flu are hopeful exceptions.

We launched the report this week at an event at the Center for American Progress with Deputy Secretary of State (and my former boss) Jim Steinberg. I asked him all questions about the framework for US-China relations and the upcoming trip. You can watch it here.

I’ll write more on this topic and the President’s upcoming trip to Asia in posts to come.

As he has said himself, his accomplishments aren’t comparable to past recipients (so far). But President Obama’s foreign policy vision is worthy of international accolade. He is implementing a strategy that recognizes that nation states have to hang together in this world or suffer apart.

Countries that want peace and prosperity — which is most of them — need to work together to have any hope against forces of chaos like global warming, worldwide economic crises, omni-present swine flu or terror attacks.

And they need to strengthen the international system that helps fight them, too. That is a far cry from thinking that rising powers as a threat to us as many in Washington tend to do.

Last year, in conjunction with the book I co-authored on this topic (see sidebar), an artist made this video:

It’s often described as “edgy” by my foreign policy friends–to try to illustrate this point and we had the following discussion about it.

I’d like to hear what you think.

- Nina Hachigian

Students sing in honor of the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China.

This article originally appeared in the Los Angeles Times.

What better way to celebrate a birthday than to take to the world stage? Last week, Hu Jintao became the first Chinese president to address the U.N. General Assembly, a privilege seemingly reserved for the president of the United States and colorful despots such as Moammar Kadafi. The People’s Republic, which turns 60 on Thursday, has evolved from tin-pot polity to powerhouse. And among the spectacular transformations China has undergone, its dramatic turnabout in how it relates to the world stands out.

China began as a pariah state, rejected by and immensely hostile toward the world community. Marxism shaped its view of international organizations as the “instruments of capitalist imperialism and hegemonism,” and for decades China had little to do with them.

Fast-forward to last week, when Hu proclaimed the “important role” of the United Nations and entreated the international community to “continue our joint endeavor to build a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.”

Today, China has joined every major international organization to which it is eligible and signed more than 300 international treaties. It has even had a hand in creating new regional groups. “They are acting like the new us,” a U.S. official told me. They prepare, send huge delegations to summits and carefully cultivate diplomatic capital.

This is not just lip service. In many cases, China’s engagement with global entities such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund has prompted Beijing to bring its conduct in line with international standards.

The next step, though, is a critical one. Now that China is fully engaged and has earned considerable clout, what will it do? Will it increasingly abide by and support international standards? Could it eventually become a genuine leader for the global common good, with the risk and sacrifice that often entails?

Beijing sends mixed signals. On the hopeful side, we see China’s leadership on the North Korean nuclear issue — hosting many rounds of the six-party talks, producing draft agreements and now, for the first time, enforcing U.N. sanctions against its nominal ally. And although it once objected to the whole idea, China now has 2,000 of its citizens in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

China has also done an about-face since the 2003 SARS debacle, when it covered up the outbreak and deceived international health officials. This time, it is sponsoring international conferences on swine flu and vaccinating millions of its people. In the economic realm, the stimulus package Beijing enacted in response to the global meltdown was huge — exactly the scale that the IMF and the U.S. recommended.

Of course, every nation acts in its own interests, but in all these cases, China also promotes the broader safety and prosperity of the world.

However, other areas show the zero-sum side of China’s international engagement. On climate change, China is one of the big bumps in the road on the way to a binding treaty at the Copenhagen summit in December. Thankfully — as it is now the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide — Beijing is going gangbusters on efficiency standards and renewables. But unless those domestic ambitions can be turned into specific and verifiable international commitments, there will be no deal, and the world will continue toward climate calamity.

There are other concerns. Chinese companies are signing billion-dollar energy contracts with Iran just as the international community is trying to ratchet up the pressure on the Tehran regime over its nuclear ambitions. And Beijing is still holding out against tougher sanctions as the U.S., France, Britain and even Russia push forward.

Also, China’s human rights conduct does not live up to international standards, and, often to ensure access to natural resources, it supports and shelters dictators who abuse their people. Its concerted efforts at industrial espionage undermine international law, and its no-strings-attached development assistance, while doing some good, is setting back anti-corruption efforts.

The U.S. does not have the power to make China a global do-gooder, but it has some cards to play. Administration officials have begun to frame the bilateral relationship in terms of global challenges, so that the health of the U.S.-China relationship, which Beijing cares deeply about, is tied to progress on major threats such as climate change and Iran. The U.S. is also reengaging with multilateral organizations, which increases Washington’s leverage when dealing with Beijing.

One of the most effective ways for Washington to shape China’s evolution is to remove Beijing’s excuses for inaction by leading ourselves — passing strong climate change legislation, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, making good on President Obama’s disarmament pledges and increasing efforts to alleviate extreme poverty around the globe.

U.S. exceptionalism has often provided political cover to China. In his own speech to the United Nations last week, Obama acknowledged that the United States hasn’t always been a fully responsible superpower, and he pledged to do better.

The Chinese say it is unfair to expect a still-developing China to shoulder so much international responsibility. But the forces of globalization that made China the major power it is today are the same ones breeding threats that only nations acting in concert can address.

China has come a very long way in two generations. Let’s hope that the next 60 years see China’s growth into a model citizen and stalwart supporter of the international system — for its own sake, and for ours.

- Nina Hachigian

Photo courtesy of Flickr user kevsunblush under a Creative Commons license.

G-20 leaders in Pittsburgh. Photo: Argentine Government

A surprising amount happened last week on the diplomatic scene, from the Iran confrontation to President Hu’s historic first speech ever by a Chinese president to the U.N. General Assembly where he announced some pretty dramatic steps on climate to President Obama using his leadership at the U.N. to pass the non-proliferation resolution to the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh.

Policies within the established architectures were changing, but finally the architectures were changing too. First, the G-20 resolved to replace the G-8 as the go-to group for global economic leadership. As I’ve written frequently, this is the right move. But a lot of questions remain including — who are the 20? Are they going to be the current 29 or so leaders, or will they find a way to shrink the group to a more manageable size? More importantly, will they find a mechanism to “refresh” the membership every so often? The top economies won’t always be comprised of this group. It would ensure the group’s future relevance if they brought in new blood and excused old blood every now and again, as I’ve suggested in the past.

The IMF is also — finally — going to better reflect the economic realities of today, because the G-20 agreed to shift 5 percent of voting shares from the developed to the developing countries. This might not sound like a lot, but in the world of IMF governance, it’s major. It shows Europe’s willingness to give up some of its over-representation.

Finally, the G-20 undertook two interesting experiments in accountability. First, it reviewed its progress to date. The result sounded like a puff piece, but the exercise, if taken seriously and done regularly, is one method to hold this group to account for its performance. Finally, it asked member countries to submit their macroeconomic policies to a “peer review” process. This is an interesting way to try to put teeth in a system with no built in enforcement mechanism. Peer pressure can be a powerful force, even among major powers.

- Nina Hachigian

Nina Hachigian is joined by Bruce Jones, the director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and senior fellow and director of the Managing Global Insecurity Initiative at the Brookings Institution.

The agenda for this week’s meeting of the Group of 20 developed and developing nations is full, but when the leaders of all these countries sit down in Pittsburgh to discuss banking regulation, energy and poverty alleviation, one question will not be on the table — the question of who should be at the table in the first place.

Deciding which nations will sit at the global decision-making table is more politically charged than whether to tie bankers’ bonuses to the risks they take or whether countries can and should stop subsidizing fossil fuel consumption. Resolving which nations will try to forge consensus on these and other critical questions, however, is key to determining whether any resolving actually gets done.

The current G-20 — which in fact consists of roughly 27 countries — came to life when the Bush administration was in a big hurry to address the global financial crisis back in 2008. The previous global leadership forum, the Group of 8 — the United States, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada and Russia — lacked the participation of newly emerging economic powers such as China and Brazil as well as several other major economies such as Saudi Arabia and South Korea. A global crisis requires global participation, and the G-8 was clearly the wrong tool for the job.

Since the G-20 already existed at the ministers’ level, President George W. Bush moved it up a notch to create a new forum. Pittsburgh marks the fourth time this group of leaders has met, but it still operates on an ad hoc basis and the confusion of who attends is undermining confidence in its ability to deliver. The challenge now is to forge a G- grouping that actually works.

The first problem with the current G-20 is that its membership is somewhat arbitrary. It is loosely based on economic weight, but Argentina, whose economy is not in the top 20, attends meetings and Poland, which is in the top 20, does not. If the G-20 were comprised of the actual top economies, then at least extremely time-consuming and distracting squabbles over who is in or out would be minimized. Using objective criteria for membership also has the aura of fairness in determining eligibility.

To increase legitimacy by increasing representation, the Center for American Progress proposed a variation of this idea earlier this year. The plan would take the top two economies from each of five regions of the world and then fill in with the next 10 largest economies. The group could also evolve over time, with membership recalculated every five years to reflect the actual economic and power realities of the moment. That “refresh” makeover would ensure that the group doesn’t quickly become a relic.

Another approach would be to base membership not just on economic weight but also population. One version proposed by the Brookings Institution’s Managing Global Insecurity project, would be to combine economic weight and population in determining the rankings of the top 16 countries.

Both the CAP and Brookings’ approaches allow for the inclusion of important populous countries such as Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Nigeria in addition to the big emerging economic powers that are now in the G-20. This has the potential to make the group’s decisions resonate with a far wider set of countries. That would help ensure greater global compliance with any decisions the leaders of these countries agreed to take.

The difficulty with all of these proposals, as President Barack Obama points out, is how do you explain to the 17th or 21st country that it is not welcome? That’s tough politics.

Hence a third answer is popular these days, which is to have a core of powerful countries act as the new G-grouping and then vary the membership depending on the issue. But if the politics of who’s at the G-20 table are thorny, why repeat them every single time a new meeting is convened? Surely better to take a tough decision once, rather than endlessly renegotiate it.

The choice of a global leaders-level summit grouping involves tradeoffs of important attributes. The new grouping should be broadly representative to maximize its legitimacy, but small enough to be effective. It should tie membership to responsibility, but also serve to shape the choices of less responsible, yet powerful, actors. Ideally it would be inclusive but small, representative but value-based, and legitimate, but effective.

That may simply be an unattainable goal in today’s world. Thus the Obama administration and other governments at the G-20 summit next week need to decide what attributes are most important and then brave the consequences. We believe that the most important balance to strike is between efficiency and buy-in — largely confining the club to those with actual power in the world economy and global security but bringing in a few countries that represent broader regions or groupings of states.

Right now, with the G-8 still active and the G-20 also meeting, the window is open for the Obama administration to develop a consensus around a new grouping of global leaders, or perhaps more than one, that could play a key role in global cooperation for decades to come. If they don’t seize this moment, however, important issues could drift, setting back progress.

If this issue isn’t tackled head on and some degree of stability brought into global decision making, both resentment and uncertainty will rise. That puts at risk the broader strategy that President Obama has outlined of forging broad cooperation on critical issues, such as non-proliferation or the upcoming talks in Copenhagen to forge a global carbon-emissions accord. These are problems that can’t wait for solutions.

- Nina Hachigian and Bruce Jones

See the original post.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user iwasaround under a Creative Commons license.

Missile defense during the Bush administration was so contingent as to be faith-based — if Iran builds long-range missiles, if they choose to commit a suicidal act by launching one, if the system can be made to work…if, if, if.  Of course, we need to plan for long-term and unknown threats, but not at the expense of protecting against more immediate and known threats. This shift also opens up more potential for cooperation with Russia on Iranian nuclear ambitions, by removing an irritant in the relationship but, more importantly, by showing just how serious we are about the threat from Tehran. Another victory for rational defense policies.  Go Gates.

- Nina Hachigian

Pollution in northern China. Photo courtesy of Flickr user AdamCohn under a Creative Commons license.

It’s good to be back. Some recent bits of news on China and climate caught my attention. First was Todd Stern’s admonition in Tuesday’s FT that China and India risk protectionist measures in the U.S. Congress if they do not agree to bind themselves in Copenhagen to curb carbon emissions.

Politically, this is certainly true. But it made me wonder whether tactically we should decouple China and India on climate in the run up to the negotiations in Copenhagen. Todd Stern has forgotten more about these issues than I will ever know, and, of course, in the long run we absolutely need all the major economies on board. Emissions from India and Russia could potentially catch up to China’s one day.

But, today, the real problem (other than us) is China. That fact is reinforced by a two-year study conducted by Chinese government thinktanks, released Wednesday, that said if China’s energy usage structure remains unchanged, its emissions of greenhouse gases would represent 60 percent of total global emissions and three times China’s current production. Of course, China’s usage IS changing, and that’s the encouraging news. China is massively investing in clean and efficient technologies.

That said, China is the largest emitter in the world and will be for some time to come. The U.S. and China account for about 20 percent each of global emissions and India is currently only at 5 percent. A 2006 study [PDF] from the Department of Energy has that disparity continuing until 2030. Even if India catches up, much faster, or China slows its emissions growth dramatically, China will still a much bigger part of the problem well into the future.

Moreover, the critical political point for today is that the largest emitter, China, has refused to commit to binding targets at Copenhagen for reducing its emissions. Without that commitment, the international community can’t forge a deal. Lumping India and China together offers China political cover in the negotiations. It reinforces China’s strategy of aligning itself with truly poor developing countries, like, say, Chad, that really cannot be asked to bear the costs of climate change. Further, while the Chinese government can likely deliver on an international commitment, its not clear that the Indian government currently has the capacity.

Right now, it may make sense to isolate China as a unique case. Particularly when by China’s own measure this week, it is no longer a low-income country, but a middle income one. I am not suggesting bilateral negotiations — the current set of mechanisms is fine. And we need the other emerging economies signed onto any treaty with as good a commitment as possible. But pressure where pressure is due — the real challenge of the coming months is the PRC.

- Nina Hachigian

When the kids of an uninsured family start showing symptoms, they will head to the emergency room — because they can’t call their primary care doctor for an initial read. ERs could easily get overwhelmed as the pandemic spreads. That will place a huge, expensive and ultimately deadly stress on the system.

I realize that insuring the uninsured is not what average Americans care about right now given the economy — it sounds expensive and the insurance lobbyists and neocons such as George Will are trying hard to play that up. So I think it’s right for the administration to be emphasizing the virtues — that a new health care plan means that preexisting conditions will be covered and that you can never lose your insurance for good.

The last thing they want is to create a panic around H1N1. But soon, it might be the virus that sells the Obama health care plan.

- Nina Hachigian

Clinton made a surprise trip to North Korea.

Update: North Korea has reportedly pardoned the two U.S. journalists.

Those who have complained that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has too many envoys are going to have a field day with this. But the decision to send former President Bill Clinton to Pyongyang to try to negotiate the release of the two Americans held there, Euna Lee and Laura Ling, is a smart move.

First, sending a well-respected former U.S. president shows the kind of respect Pyongyang is likely to respond well to.

Second, having such a seasoned political observer on the ground will give the U.S. some intelligence about what is going on in Pyongyang these days, with rumors about Kim Jong Il on dialysis and the plan to hand the reins to his youngest son, Kim Jong Un.

To the extent that the Obama administration wants to send a signal that they want to find a way to reengage after the second nuclear test, President Clinton can be trusted to handle that carefully.

Fourth, Bill Clinton is an excellent hands-on negotiator, and he won’t give up.

Finally, the fact that the U.S. is sending such a high-level figure means that back channels have indicated the possibility of success. I’m willing to live with the smirks for a decision that might return two Americans to safety and could help break the impasse with North Korea.

- Nina Hachigian

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Creativity+ Timothy K Hamilton under a Creative Commons license.

While nothing much happened in DC, perhaps it’s not a coincidence that the very first time China has publically enforced sanctions against North Korea was happening at the same time.

From a Korean newspaper account, pointed out by the Nelson report, comes this:

Chinese customs authorities confiscated 70 kg of vanadium that North Korea tried to smuggle through China. Vanadium has defense and nuclear uses — alloys containing vanadium are used in missile casings — but it was not clear what the stash was to be used for.

Dandong News, a newspaper from the Chinese-North Korean border city of Dandong in Liaoning Province, on Tuesday said the local customs office seized vanadium hidden in six fruit boxes from a truck heading to North Korea last Saturday. The confiscated material was contained in 68 bottles hidden among fruit and is worth 200,000 yuan, it said.

Vanadium is resistant to corrosion by sulfuric and hydrochloric acid and strengthens steel. It is alloyed with steel to make jet engines, missile casings and superconducting magnets.

This is a fairly big deal.  China has voted for sanctions before, but enforcing them — and doing so publically — is new.  Beijing is clearly trying to get Pyongyang’s attention.

- Nina Hachigian

Photo: Department of State

Believe it or not, in the upcoming “Strategic & Economic Dialogue” with China, the “&” signals a key process and policy shift for the United States.

China policy under the Bush administration was a rare showcase of foreign policy competence and moderation — after a rocky beginning during which Cold War hawks gained the upper hand — in part because it developed into a twice-yearly negotiating session with the Chinese called the Strategic Economic Dialogue, led by former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. Useful as that forum was, however, it always seemed misguided to have the Treasury Department coordinating the nation’s China policy given the weighty security issues on the bilateral plate, among them avian flu and North Korea’s nuclear program.

So when Hillary Clinton took the reins at the Department of State, her promise of a more comprehensive approach to China was welcome. The “&” soon followed. Today she will co-chair the first S&ED along with Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner and their Chinese counterparts State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Vice Premier Wang Qishan.

With that change and others, the Obama administration is getting off to a promising start on China policy. Even so, differences between Washington and Beijing in approaches to global challenges will be very difficult to overcome.

All Clinton and Geithner, Dai and Wang will attend the first half-day of meetings, which will address issues such as climate and clean energy that touch both security and economic concerns—an unusual effort to tackle a cross-cutting issue using a cross-cutting format. Then the two sets of wonks will go their separate ways and get more into the weeds on issues such as, for the Treasury side, economic stimulus and currency and, for State, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Myanmar and Iran. Other cabinet officials, among them Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, will join for their particular topics.

The Obama administration has slightly shifted the frame of the bilateral relationship toward one where two big powers, not equal, but both very consequential, will together tackle shared challenges. While the United States and China will continue to discuss and grapple with contentious bilateral issues—human rights, the trade imbalance, industrial espionage, a lack of military transparency, and Taiwan, among others—a collaborative approach to shared global problems is a new focus. Such a frame could encourage China to make more responsible choices because the most important bilateral relationship Beijing has will be shining a spotlight on global problem-solving.

Progress down this path will be very slow, and the ratio of negotiating to breakthroughs frustratingly high. The United States and China share top-level goals on the most dire transnational threats—preventing new nuclear states, halting climate change, fixing the economic crisis, and halting the spread of deadly viruses—but the differences in strategies, priorities, and perceptions that inform those aspirations are always very difficult to bridge.

Sino-American collaboration over North Korea’s nuclear program reeks of this duality. More than on any other national security threat the United States cares about, Beijing has stepped up to the plate, hosting the Six Party Talks, drafting documents, and even —in a real break from its typical opposition to such invasive measures—voting twice in favor of tough sanctions against Pyongyang at the United Nations. Yet when push comes to shove, China prefers a nuclear North Korea to a collapsed one, or so it seems, whereas America prefers the opposite.

The good news is there is a healthy debate in China right now about whether to turn the screws on its northern neighbor. Maybe that second nuclear test was really straw that broke the camel’s back for Beijing.

Climate is similarly fraught and has the makings of a full-on political maelstrom. China is a Blue-Dog Democrat when it comes to climate. Unlike many right-wing politicians, Beijing’s rulers — many of them engineers — believe the science of global warming. They understand the earth is heating up because of human activity and that the consequences of those trends could be devastating to China.

Nevertheless, because the West grew rich spewing carbon, because much of its own population remains very poor with low per-capita energy use, and because the regime must, for its own preservation, keep economic growth going, greenhouse gases or not, Beijing wants someone else—the United States and Europe—to pay the price. Beijing has thus called on the West to commit to targets that everyone knows are ridiculous and impossible.

In contrast, some Blue Dogs in the U.S. Congress are inclined to ensure that the United States isn’t shouldering an unfair burden by placing tariffs on Chinese goods if China doesn’t accept binding limits on its emissions during the global climate change negotiations in Copenhagen in December. This could add fuel to an already firey trade relationship.

Yet many “clean-energy” collaborations with China are in the works. And perhaps China’s current posturing is just that—knowing that the future of the planet is on the line, it will make key concessions in December.

While the “&” marks an improvement in process, we can’t expect any big announcements when this week’s S&ED concludes. Later this year Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao will meet twice, once in New York and once in Beijing. Hopefully they will have more to reveal.

- Nina Hachigian

This post originally appeared on the Center for American Progress.

This is a really interesting set of maps detailing where in the world some of the president’s speeches are most popular.

And if you weren’t one of the 8 million first people to watch that Ellen episode where he dances, that link is there too.

- Nina Hachigian

Secretary of Clinton rounded out the emerging power circuit with a trip to India this week.

The Obama administration has been in overdrive building America’s pivotal power relationships with China, Russia and now India. For reasons Mona Sutphen and I describe in our book, this is the right approach to big powers in the current era. A central rationale is that “strategic collaboration” will focus major power assets on transnational threats, which America cannot successfully battle alone.

A lot of legwork goes into building a working relationship, Obama officials have wasted no time. Presidents Hu and Obama have met twice, and every week seems to find another high level U.S. official in Beijing. Secretary of State Clinton was the first in history to go to China before Europe. Next week, the first Strategic & Economic Dialogue, an intense two-day conference co-chaired by Secretary Clinton and Secretary of Treasury Geitner and their Chinese counterparts, will be held in D.C.

President Obama and presidents Medvedev met and issued a comprehensive joint statement not even three months into his term, after Secretary of State Clinton had already hit the “reset” button with her counterpart.   Next came a full fledged summit in Moscow two weeks ago at which the U.S. and Russia agreed to resume arms control talks and to reinvigorate the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Secretary of Clinton rounded out the emerging power circuit with a trip to India this week. She inaugurated a “strategic dialogue,” with Delhi and blessed deepening civilian nuclear cooperation. But she came away empty handed on climate, as Delhi refused to commit to any binding targets under a new climate treaty.

It’s one thing to build these working relationships. And it is another for them to work. While we’ve realized some important gains from these rising power relationships already, many others are elusive. The coming years will be filled with frustration as our officials invest countless hours consulting and negotiating — yet we don’t get the kind of help we want from China on North Korea or climate, from Russia on Iran, and from India on Pakistan, to name a few. But at least we will increasingly understand their perspectives, and that will lead to either more policy success or more realistic expectations.

- Nina Hachigian

Photo courtesy of Flickr user u.s. department of state under a Creative Commons license.

Senate Votes to Strip $1.75 Billion for F-22s From Defense Bill

The Senate voted 58-40 to delete financing for seven more F-22 warplanes from a defense spending bill, handing President Obama a significant victory in his efforts to reshape the military’s priorities. Mr. Obama repeatedly threatened to veto the $679.8 billion spending bill if it included any money for the planes, which had become a flashpoint in a larger battle over the administration’s push to shift more of the Pentagon’s resources from conventional warfare to fighting insurgencies.

- Nina Hachigian

Is pandemic disease a national security threat?

Stephen Walt’s recent post describes one of the connections between healthcare and national security. He argues that our increasingly bleak fiscal situation, combined with the aging of the baby boomer generation, may put more pressure on dollars going to defense. He suggests that actors like the AARP might start to care just how many extra F-22s Congress will insist on purchasing above and beyond what the Pentagon says it wants and needs.

There are at least two other health and national security connections, and I’ve called healthcare a “formestic“ issue for this reason. First, pandemic disease, such as influenza, is one of only two outside threats (the other being a nuclear attack by terrorists) that could strike the U.S. at any time and that could potentially kill hundreds of thousands of Americans. It, plainly, is a national security threat. If a pandemic ever really blew up in this country, we would be much better off if everyone had health insurance. Global cooperation and the World Health Organization are critical to protecting us from this threat.

Another linkage has to do with America’s place in the world vis-a-vis rising powers. The fact is that one of the main reasons cited by businesses that decide to offshore jobs to places like China and India is the rising costs of healthcare in this country.

Moreover, an absolutely critical driver of U.S. success — particularly in a globalized economy — is our ability to innovate. I haven’t seen any real statistics, but there is plenty of anecdotal evidence out there to suggest that some would-be entrepreneurs opt to stay in corporate jobs because they cant give up their health insurance. We are crazy to hobble ourselves like this.

- Nina Hachigian

Photo courtesy of Flickr user hitthatswitch under a Creative Commons license.

The G-8 pledged $20 billion for food and farming aid. They came out with a strong statement on Iran which even Russia signed onto. And the G-8 agreed to cut their emissions by 80 percent by 2050 (although the developing economies did not go along with a set goal).

Another interesting development is that the G-8 tried to address its accountability problem. It issued its first report, prepared by experts, that tracked progress compared to pledges at the last summit. Food aid was quite behind schedule (except for you, Canada — kudos), as you can see comparing these two charts in the report:

I hope they do better on this year’s pledges.

Building in accountability mechanism is key for whatever G group emerges over the next year. This was a welcome start.

- Nina Hachigian

U.S. President Barack Obama joins other world leaders at the G-8 summit in Italy. Official photo: Maurizio Brambatti

By all accounts, planning for the upcoming Group of 8 Summit-polooza in Italy has been disastrous. Complex logistics are one problem. Ever since Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi decided to allow PR considerations to trump sanity and move the location of the summit to earthquake-stricken L’Aquila, tremor measurements and evacuation plans have dominated the news coverage.

Another cloud is Berlusconi the man, who has been plagued by multiple scandals, the most recent involving very young women with very few clothes. But the underlying trouble is the G-8 itself. The world simply needs a different set of countries at the high table of global governance to tackle today’s challenges.

Inertia is the mother of this G-8 summit. It is occurring because the member countries—the United States, Germany, Japan, France, Great Britain, Canada, Russia, and Italy—agreed a number of years ago that it would. Over the years, though, the G-8 has lost credibility because it does not reflect the realities of power, influence, and capacity in the world today. For that and other reasons, the G-8 has not been able to effectively address today’s global problems.

Yet the G-8 is the only leaders forum the world has had. So the staged meetings, the scripted communiqués, and the photo-ops have carried on, with only the occasional deliverable to interrupt the flow.

That changed in late 2008, when President George W. Bush brought the Group of 20 to life at the leaders’ level, recognizing that China, India, Brazil, and other major economies needed to be at the table to plan a coordinated response to the global economic crisis. In response, Italy this year decided that instead of giving up the G-8 host prerogative—the political equivalent of a cheetah giving up its prey—it announced it would also invite the G-20 countries to meet alongside the G-8. That idea was later pushed aside and the three-day summit now includes meetings of the G-8, the G-8 plus emerging economies, the Major Economies Forum (17 countries), and the G-8 plus emerging economies plus leaders from select African countries. That’s a lot of Gs.

The most valuable commodity in international politics—leaders’ time, especially President Barak Obama’s time—is being lavished on all these meetings. I truly hope breakthroughs result because the issues on the table could not be more serious—the economic crisis, development, and climate change, among others.

There is some cause for hope. A draft communiqué suggests that the one area where a group of rich countries such as the G-8 can add value—allocating funds to alleviate poverty—will be approached in a new and sensible way. Instead of offering food to developing countries, the G-8 may instead pledge billions for agricultural development. While that will anger U.S. farmers, it promises to be more effective at actually feeding hungry people over the long term.

There is also the possibility of an agreement to conclude the stalled Doha round of trade talks in 2010. Further, the Major Economies Forum is set to debate on an agreement to limit global warming to no more than 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 Fahrenheit) since pre-industrial times and solidify last year’s “vision” of halving global carbon emissions by 2050.

Outcomes like these would be terrific. But at some point fairly soon, these G groupings need to be rationalized. Aside from all the leaders time, the separate meetings of the G-8 before the emerging economies (traditionally called the G-8+5, or the “Outreach 5”) create divisions among the countries that are now playing out in the worldwide media about whether or not a new global currency is part of the summit agenda. And with the invitees constantly shifting, officials spend their time deciding who is in the room instead of solving the pressing matters of the day.

Building a better G-Pick Your Number will not be easy. Hell hath known no fury like a politician uninvited to a leaders forum. To add to the challenges, Europe is overrepresented in every of these groups and yet the most enthusiastic about them. Yet all this fluidity in the Gs does means the window for forging a new forum is open, but who knows for how long.

What should the new G look like? My colleagues and I have suggested that the new leaders forum be the G-20, but a G-20 whose membership is mandated to evolve over time as the major economies of the world change and that has only 20 seats at the table, not the 27 it has already grown to include.

Grumbling about Italy has reached a point where some European diplomats have suggested replacing Italy with Spain in the G-8. It would be better if they just replaced the entire G-8 with a leaders group for the 21st century.

- Nina Hachigian

This post originally appeared at the Center for American Progress.

Overall, I have given the Bush administration higher marks on emerging power relations than on most other aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Relations with China were broadened, the U.S.-Japan alliance deepened, the friendship with India solidified.

But on Russia, we saw a more classic Bush administration national security model, where divisions within the administration resulted in a roller-coaster ride of policy, from the highs of President Bush’s soul-gazing to official rhetoric that recalled the Cold War. (Secretary of Defense Bob Gates’ moments of sobriety on these issues were always welcome).

So it is good to see the Obama administration, in its rational, systematic way, putting the relationship to rights again. (I would expect no less of the excellent National Security Council types who are in charge — Mike McFaul and Gary Samore). Morality has nothing to do with this — a stable, working relationship with Russia will best further U.S. interests, period. What are those interests? My colleague Sam Charap from the Center for American Progress outlines them well in a new report. But in my mind, there is one that trumps the rest, and that is non-proliferation.

Russia is key to this issue in three ways. First, it has the largest stockpile of poorly-guarded fissile material in the world. If we want to prevent it from falling into terrorists’ hands, we need to work with Moscow on locking it down.

Second, Moscow has shown useful leadership on non-proliferation. George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin introduced the “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism” at the 2006 G-8 Summit in St. Petersburg. Among other things, the countries that have signed up to this pledged to “take a number of actions to fight nuclear terrorism by committing to improve accounting and security of radioactive and nuclear materials, enhance security at civilian nuclear facilities, and to improve detection of nuclear and radioactive materials to prevent illicit trafficking.”

More recently, in a joint statement they released on April 1, 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev said that their two countries “will seek to further promote the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which now unites 75 countries.” The partner countries have now met 5 times, most recently at the Hague in early June.

The Initiative appears to be high on the Obama administration’s agenda. In his speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said that he wished to turn non-proliferation initiatives like the Global Initiative to Combat Terrorism “into durable international institutions.”

Finally, Moscow is key to rolling back nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran, first because it has relationships with those countries, and second because Russia and the U.S., as the gorillas of the nuclear world, have to show leadership in order to have leverage in the non-proliferation framework. The bargain in the non-proliferation treaty — which, despite its flaws, has succeeded in limiting the number of nuclear countries in the world — is that nuclear countries will gradually reduce and eventually eliminate their weapons and that, in return, non-nuclear countries will stay that way. But the U.S. will not disarm unilaterally.

It’s not going to be an easy or smooth road with Moscow. We aren’t going to be chummy, let’s face it — and we disagree on some key questions, like the importance of a free press and the status of Georgia. But the agreement Presidents Obama and Medvedev reached yesterday to reduce their arsenals is a commitment we didn’t have the day before.

- Nina Hachigian