Click on map to enlarge. Courtesy of Ir Amim.

Worldfocus spoke with Hussein Ibish, a senior fellow at the American Task Force for Palestine, a non-profit dedicated to a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Originally from Beirut, Ibish is the former Washington D.C. correspondent for Lebanon’s Daily Star and current author of IbishBlog.

Worldfocus: How would you characterize the current situation in Jerusalem?

Hussein Ibish: Jerusalem is the most divided city in the world. Israelis in West Jerusalem and the Jewish quarter feel like normal citizens of the Israeli state living under Israeli law. For them, life is very normal.

But East Jerusalem is more than 80 percent Arab. The situation is similar to that in the rest of the occupied territory, but it’s starker in Jerusalem because they’re living in such proximity. Insofar as an analogy to “apartheid” applies, this is more stark in Jerusalem than anywhere else, where separate and unequal is almost universal.

Most Jerusalem Arabs are not in effect subjects of Israeli law but practically live under martial law. In many cases, they’re technically residents of Israel — but not citizens. They can’t vote in national elections. And they generally don’t vote in municipal elections. Jerusalem is the flash point for the conflict.

Worldfocus: Why can’t the leaders on both sides reach a rational agreement about sharing the city?

Hussein Ibish: The cultural, religious and political importance of the holy places means that Jerusalem is central to both populations. Both sides are becoming increasingly influenced by right-wing religious rhetoric. The conflict is transforming from an ethnic struggle over land and power in a small area — into a religious struggle between bearded fanatics on both sides about the will of God and holy places.

The Old City of Jerusalem requires a creative solution and the unique formula like the Vatican City. It can’t be the exclusive preserve of any of the religious or ethnic groups. A unique formula has to be found. But it’s not beyond the wit of man to come up with a solution for this, because the national interests of all parties require it.

Worldfocus: Are there certain deal-breakers on the issue of Jerusalem?

Hussein Ibish: For the Israeli side, the “right of return” (for Palestinian refugees) is a deal-breaker just like the claim that Jerusalem is the undivided and eternal Israeli capital is for the Palestinians. This kind of rhetoric acts as a political narcotic: it makes people feel good, but it’s extremely damaging.

But when you get into the final status agreement, these are all issues that can be negotiated successfully. Both parties have a stake in making it work. That could keep Jerusalem united and parts of the city jointly administered — although with separate sovereignty. All it takes is political will and some creativity. I’ve thought about it a lot, and I’m a skeptical person, but it seems possible to me. It’ll be an unusual arrangement reflecting the unique character of the place.

There are reciprocal bitter pills on the right of return and Jerusalem both sides must swallow in their own existential national interests.

The only serious player really resistant to this idea [to create two capitals in Jerusalem] is the Israeli government, which is trying to prevent Jerusalem from being a topic of discussion in any the final status talks. But Obama made it very clear that the terms of reference need to be clear and precise — and involve security for both parties, borders, refugees and Jerusalem. The U.S. position on Jerusalem is closer to the Palestinian view than to the Israeli one. There is implicit understanding in the U.S. that most of East Jerusalem needs to be the Palestinian capital.

There will also clearly have to be a land swaps. The Palestinian people accept that, and the leadership accepts it. Not every settlement in and around Jerusalem must be evacuate. I don’t mean that the Palestinians will be unwilling to have Israelis [in Palestinian-controlled East Jerusalem] or elsewhere in the Palestinian state. But the Israel government would probably not want to face the crisis of some incident involving Israeli citizens living in newly sovereign Palestinian state, and I think it will be they who push for
evacuation in the event of an agreement.

Both sides should be creative and flexible and Israel should be willing to evacuate settlements that make Palestinian statehood impossible. It’s politically problematic but not impossible. These are painful concessions for both but they are obviously necessary. It’s all about a series of complicated quid pro quos. This is not a menu where you can go through and choose what you want based on your tastes, its a delicate pattern of concessions. It’s also a kaleidoscope. Every time you move the image a little, the whole pattern shifts.

Worldfocus: Do you envision that Jewish Israelis will be able to stay on in the areas that become Palestine in East Jerusalem and the West Bank?

Hussein Ibish: Palestinian citizenship or dual citizenship for them is possible, but I don’t think the Israeli government will allow it in the West Bank, though they might find a way to make it work in East Jerusalem.

An agreement is in the core existential national interest of both parties. Settlements will be evacuated according to a variety of formulae. At least 75,000 [Jewish settlers] will need to be removed. That means perhaps up to 200,000- 300,000 will be staying where they are in the small parts of West Bank such as Ma’ale Adumim that will become part of Israel.

The bottom line is that the Palestinians cannot be denied 22% of Mandatory Palestine — the equivalent of East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank. I think they need and deserve that.

Worldfocus: What role will Palestinian Gaza play if it continues to be a separate entity from the Palestinian West Bank?

Hussein Ibish: Gaza has no independent future from the rest of Palestine. The idea of a political status that is separate is completely wrong. Very few people in the Gaza Strip want that. Israel is strategically trying to emphasize these divisions, but it’s not something that will take.

I don’t think we’re looking at a scenario yet where Hamas can really succeed in replacing the PLO. They’re quite far away from that. All they hope to do so is for negotiations to break down. Hamas are weak and isolated — only able to maintain control in Gaza through brute force and oppression. Hamas thrives on chaos, stalemate [in talks] and a rhetoric of confrontation and violence. Their core constituency — at most 13-15 percent of the Palestinian population — believes in the Muslim Brotherhood model. But that’s not really a major political force unless there is no hope for peace.

Worldfocus: How about fresh alternatives to the Fatah-Hamas split?

Hussein Ibish: Salam Fayyad a very serious actor on the scene, yet he’s not a politician. Fatah is a dysfunctional political party but commands major support. The PA could use Fatah’s political authority to facilitate Fayyad’s state-building agenda and technocratic prowess. This is crucial because Fayyad’s plan provides another avenue for progress, change and momentum towards ending both the occupation and the conflict. If 1/20 of Fayyad’s plan could be implemented, there would be a serious transformation of the strategic environment, greatly enhancing Palestinian interests and the prospects for peace.

I think his plan could serve as a crucial augmentation of diplomacy and a parallel track that is constructive, serious and transformational. The biggest threat to it at the moment is the idea of dissolving the PA and going back functioning strictly through the PLO as a diplomatic but not a governing entity. With international financial support and political protection, it would be very difficult for Israel to block this institution-building plan. In short order, this could really change the Palestinian political scene and the strategic environment for the better.

- Ben Piven

Listen to Worldfocus Radio: Martin Savidge hosts “Jerusalem United or Divided?” with Mustafa Barghouti of the Palestinian National Initiative and Gershon Baskin of the Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information.

A Yemeni government tank used against Houthi rebels in the north. Photo: Al Jazeera video

For the past 15 years, Dwight Bashir has worked on international conflict, human rights and religious freedom issues. He is a senior advisor for an independent U.S. commission focusing on international religious freedom. The views expressed here are his own personal views.

A war of words is heating up between Iran and Saudi Arabia over an ongoing armed conflict in northern Yemen between Shi’a Houthi rebels and Yemeni security forces. This week, Iran accused Saudi Arabia of state-sponsored “Wahhabi terrorism” in Yemen, while the most senior Saudi cleric accused Houthi rebels of being backed by Iran to spread Shi’a Islam in “Sunni Islam’s heartland.”

Both Yemen and Saudi Arabia accuse Iran of providing financial and/or military support to the rebels. Iran denies any kind of support for the rebels.

The conflict in Yemen is complex — with numerous interlocking factors, such as underdevelopment, limited resources, tribal tensions, political exclusion and security concerns. Some have posited that the conflict is exacerbated by the fact that Iran and Saudi Arabia are engaging in a proxy war on Yemeni soil.

The truth is that for 30 years both Iran and Saudi Arabia have spent billions of dollars exporting competing religio-political ideologies in the region and globally, while committing egregious human rights violations at home to defend and bolster their respective ideologies.

Ever since Saudi Arabia entered the conflict two weeks ago after Houthi rebels crossed into Saudi territory from northern Yemen and allegedly killed two Saudi border guards, tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia have risen almost daily.

UN officials have estimated that, since 2004, as many as 175,000 people have been displaced in northern Yemen. And at least 240 villages in Saudi Arabia have been evacuated in recent weeks.

To better understand the conflict, it is important to understand religious demographics in Yemen. Between 40-45% of the Yemeni population of 23 million are Shi’a Muslims, mostly from the Zaydi school of Shi’a Islam founded more than 1,000 years ago.

Although Yemen’s majority is Sunni, Zaydi Muslims make up a majority of the population in the north where the fighting is taking place. In general, there are few societal tensions between Yemen’s Shi’a and Sunni Muslims.

The Yemeni government claims that Houthi rebels — considered a Zaydi militant group — have sought to develop a political faction modeled on Hezbollah in Lebanon, in order to undermine the government and impose Shi’a Islamic law. This is similar to how the Iranian government’s interpretation of Twelver Shi’a Islam is the law of the land in Iran.

The rebels follow the late Zaydi cleric, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi (hence “Houthi rebels”). Al-Houthi is a former Yemeni parliamentarian who was killed during a 10-week rebellion in 2004 against the Yemeni government in the northern province of Saada, where the fighting started more than five years ago. The rebels claim they are fighting against government repression, although they have never articulated clear objectives, political or otherwise.

Despite both the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels insisting that the conflict is not sectarian in nature, the Iranian government is doing everything it can to portray the conflict as two predominantly Sunni Muslim states, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, cooperating to massacre Shi’a civilians in Yemen. Despite the complexities, these Iranian claims are exaggerated, at best, and downright contrived at worst.

Some Zaydi Muslims in Yemen have been subject to discrimination and harassment for perceived or actual sympathy toward Houthi rebels. According to human rights groups in the region, some Zaydi Muslims not connected to the rebels have been inadvertently targeted by the Yemeni government.

Because Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been promoting competing religio-political ideologies, it is not surprising that both countries would fan the flames of sectarian warfare. Yemen is a fragile state with an active al-Qaeda presence that threatens regional security, and its government is fighting for economic and political stability.

To date, the international community has not played an active role in the conflict. With the spillover into Saudi Arabia, the international community must engage and help broker an end to the current crisis. If not, the conflict could quickly escalate and the region may be facing a new security reality that would likely have wider implications.

- Dwight Bashir

An employee of Logistique Petroliere in Madagascar. Photo: Flickr user DavidDarricau

Ayo Johnson, a Worldfocus contributing blogger, writes about extraction of natural resources in Africa. The piece is excerpted from his blog, Africa Speak International.

The truth is that Africa is the next new frontier of mineral exploration. With major stakeholders battling, wilding and conniving their charm against a complex network of shady deals to outwit the cool, smart and calculative moves of the Chinese.

Africa’s strategic importance cannot be underplayed nor its value cheapened. Its geographical positioning and untapped mineral wealth make it a unique selling proposition to any investor. The trading ability of any multinational company is dependent on contracts signed and memorandum of understandings reached between hosts and investing governments.

African countries, dissatisfied by unequal trading relationships with the rest of the world, have hardened their political stance. China’s current interest in Africa is only a convenient opportunity for African governments to support another would-be investor.

China’s relationship building with Africa over the past 10 years has left the continent in relatively decent shape. African governments have realized that they need trade far more than aid. They need fair term without carrot and stick approach linked to investment. Africans clearly understand that they can choose between China from the East versus the rest of the world.

China has stolen the lead in Africa with over $60 billion worth of investment and untold influence.

Virtually in slow motion, overnight the Chinese had taken a grip of mineral extraction with Europe and the U.S. a distant fourth. Behind Russia and Brazil — both major players in their own right.

Industrialized nations’ appetite for oil goes unabated despite calls from pressure groups. Governments need to diversify into large scale production of new greener cleaner technologies of wind, solar and hydro. Wars in the Middle East, combined with strained relationships with many other oil-producing countries, have forced the West to look for new suppliers of oil.

China is also desperate; its rapid growth and technological advancement have increased its appetite for energy to fuel its enormous economy. This is the central driving force that justifies it presence in Africa. China’s dominance across the continent has come at a price. The Chinese have built bridges, road and general infrastructure all for free — in a bid to guarantee access to Africa’s precious minerals.

China has also provided soft loans to African governments, namely Angola, Sudan, Zambia, Congo and Rwanda as a means of raising much needed private capital outside of the framework of the IMF and the World Bank.

The Chinese have not imposed conditionality packages as part of their loan agreements, unlike the stringent and detrimental conditionality packages imposed by industrialized nations. Instead China has requested that African governments in receipt of Chinese money do business with Chinese companies and buy goods from Chinese firms.

Guaranteeing that the circulation of money is kept strictly with the China-Africa trade zone squeezes Western products and firms out of the picture. There are now little Chinatown enclaves popping up all over Africa with cheap Chinese goods replacing Western brand names.

It is therefore not surprising that President Obama visited Africa, flagged by an extended trip to various mineral hot spots by Hillary Clinton. The U.S. is eager to show support to Africa and to rekindle influence in a bid to up root and dislodge the Chinese iron grip on the continent.

African leaders and their advisers have finally awakened, realizing what the new type of global politics is all about. Who are the new major players, and what choices have to be made?

Africa finds itself in a very unique position to be able to choose among multiple investors all bidding for the same job. This increases the value of Africa’s currency, ensuring that the best deals are signed.

Africa’s choice will be at the expense of Western governments and their respective multinational companies. A liberalized continent is voting with its feet and changing suppliers, manufacturers and investors all at the same time. This is ground-breaking and truly unprecedented.

Young girls at the Gudwara Panja Sahib. Photo: Flickr user AlJazeeraEnglish

Worldfocus partner World Pulse is a media enterprise covering global issues through the eyes of women. This post is excerpted from their PulseWire project, an international online forum for women. In it, Nukhbat Malik writes about meeting children scarred by war in the town of Hasan Abdal in northern Punjab, Pakistan, at one of Sikhism’s holiest places.

He is a 13-year-old boy with big green eyes, following me everywhere while I wander around the Gurdwara Panja Sahib, taking pictures. The place is bustling with people of all ages, children running around, old men and women lying in the corridors. This boy appears in front of me when I move towards a quieter corner and looking straight into my eyes, he almost whispers and makes a sign which makes leaves me standing still.

Satish Singh is from Mingora, the largest city in the Swat district of Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province. He moved to Gurdwara on April 28th with his parents, three sisters and two brothers. He is the eldest among his siblings. I take his hand and lead him to the stairs. He looks around to make sure that no one is noticing him.

And then he says, ‘Maulana Fazlullah looks like a true hero of a movie. He comes there on a horse, and there are always three other people on horses with him, one at his back and two on each side. I wonder how he became such a dashing person. Though I have never seen his face but his personality is very impressive.’

I am stunned, and I ask him to explain the sign which he made earlier.

He looks around to see if anyone is watching and then with widened eyes says, ‘I saw there were three of them, wearing shalwar kameez. Their faces were wrapped in black cloth, excluding the eyes and they had guns. It was about 2:30 pm and I was coming back from school. It’s the Green Chowk where there are different shops and lots of people. They stopped in front of a shop, grabbed a man, knocked him down and beheaded him.’

‘He was an ordinary man, perhaps some government officer, I still think of him and wonder what his fault was?’

It’s hard for me to keep looking at Satish. Just when I try to move the conversation to a lighter tangent, he says, ‘That was the first time in my life when I ran as fast as I could. I entered my house, went straight to the washroom, threw up and fainted. For next three days I was not able to talk to any one. My mother still asks me what went wrong that day, but I am unable to explain, I am speechless when I think of that day, I am scared.’

‘So you never talked about this with any one?’ I finally asked.

He gives me a false smile and said, ‘What should I say? You know our Veer Ji (teacher) and our parents have strictly prohibited us to say a word about Taliban. If my father finds out about this conversation, he will lock me up or send me to India.’

It’s not just the story of Satish. I have met several children over the past week, all those who have a new identity now known as ‘Internally Displaced Persons’.

These children, regardless of their ages and religion have similar things to talk about: bombings, war, shelling, Taliban, blood, killings and the army.

Shehrbano is a 12-year-old girl. She can’t speak Urdu, but I know she wants to tell me something. I request a man standing beside me in the Jalala Camp of Mardan to ask her in Pashto what it is. Shehrbano looks at me for a second, puts her head down, and says, ‘There was a beheaded man, whose head was placed on his body with a note on it saying, whoever will do something wrong, will get the same punishment, I don’t know what wrongdoings they were talking about.’

Seven-year-old Atif has seen people killed in a suicide bombing, 11-year-old Daud Khan has no idea who is killing whom and 13-year-old Salman wonders when all of this will finish.

I have no answers to these questions. I am unable to imagine what sort of a generation this will be. Fear, terror and anger are written all over these children. They don’t laugh or smile anymore. I smile at them and get back an inquisitive look in return.

- Nukhbat Malik

President Obama at the Ft. Hood memorial service. Photo: Flickr user USarmy

Ambassador S. Azmat Hassan is a former Ambassador of Pakistan to Malaysia, Syria and Morocco and Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations. He is currently an adjunct professor at Seton Hall University and is a contributing Worldfocus blogger.

The implications of Major Nidal Malik Hasan’s rampage at Fort Hood continue to excite public scrutiny. The US is no stranger to deranged individuals of different religious persuasions indulging in mass murder in the past.

President Obama, in a moving eulogy to the dead, cautioned against a rush to judgment. The facts would have to be painstaking pieced together before a fair approximation of what motivated Hasan’s dastardly attack on fellow servicemen can be arrived at.

The fact that Hasan was an Army psychiatrist administering to the post traumatic stress syndrome issues faced by returning Army soldiers from Iraq and Afghanistan, added to the puzzling enigma of his act.

It seemed that a healer, trained to mend soldiers broken by the awful physical and psychological traumas inflicted on them by war, had himself cracked under the professional and personal strain he had apparently undergone.

There is little doubt that Hasan had increasingly become a misfit in the Army. Reportedly a loner, he found solace in increasing religiosity. As a Muslim-American, he appeared to be struggling to come to terms with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

He had publicly declared that he considered America’s involvement in these wars as a war against Islam. He agonized over whether Islam permitted Muslims to fight Muslims in war. It seems these warning signs were not noticed by his superiors who were about to deploy him to Afghanistan.

If the U.S. Army draws the conclusion that its Muslim soldiers are not to be trusted, this would be a big mistake. Most Muslims soldier and officers have fought bravely in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some have given the supreme sacrifice for their country.

Colin Powell personally knew and attested to the valor of one such Muslim officer who died in Afghanistan. He rests in peace in the Arlington cemetery, an acknowledged hero. The acts of one deranged man cannot and should not sway our military leadership. If we succumb to this attitude how can we trust our Iraqi, Afghani, Pakistani and other Muslim allies?

Instead, it would be better to reform Army procedures to catch its misfits in time. Such persons who cannot be nursed back to mental normality should be weeded out.

I cannot end without commenting on the ease with which weapons can be procured in America. In most first world countries this is not the case. There it is very difficult, if not virtually impossible to get a license for lethal weapons.

With stringent gun control imposed here, it might just be possible to avoid putting guns in the hands of alienated individuals who can wreak havoc on innocent citizens. Otherwise we are probably fated to see a repeat of such horrific incidents in the future. Civil society should take the lead in asking for reforms of the current gun laws.

When I served in Malaysia two decades ago, I noticed that it was a crime punishable by death to own an unlicensed revolver. Even owning bullets attracted heavy punishment. Crimes such as the recent rampage are unknown in Malaysia. They are also virtually unknown in Europe, although there are plenty of misfits in these countries.

Think about it.

- Amb. S. Azmat Hassan

Map of Ogaden, Ethiopia courtesy of Wiki user Lencer.

The violent, separatist conflict in southeastern Ethiopia known as the Somali region or Ogaden has been referred by some as the next Darfur. The conflict has claimed thousands of lives over the last 15 years.

Ethiopia sealed off the region to media so there is little accurate information about the conflict, including claims of human rights abuses.

The region is rich in natural gas and is home to about 5 million predominantly Muslim people, mainly ethnic Somali nomadic tribes. The U.S. has said little about the conflict, as Ethiopia is its main regional ally in the increasingly unstable Horn of Africa region.

Worldfocus interviewed David H. Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. Amb. Shinn is currently an adjunct professor of international affairs at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. His research interests include China-Africa relations, East Africa and the Horn, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, conflict situations, U.S. policy in Africa and the African brain drain.

Worldfocus: Ethiopia has labeled the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) as a terrorist organization. Is this an accurate description?

Amb. Shinn: While the ONLF has on occasion used tactics that qualify as terrorist — for example the kidnapping and/or killing of civilian Ethiopian government officials — it does not have any links of which I am aware with international terrorist organizations.

It receives external support from the government of Eritrea, which opposes the government of Ethiopia. It also receives financial assistance from Ogadenis in the Somali Diaspora. In 2007, 74 persons, including nine Chinese oil field personnel, were killed during an ONLF attack on a Chinese oil exploration work site in the Ogaden protected by Ethiopian troops.

The Chinese may have died in a crossfire between Ethiopian and ONLF forces. In the view of the U.S. government, ONLF activity so far does not meet the test of a terrorist organization. Should the ONLF escalate its tactics, however, this could change.

Worldfocus: The U.S. denied Ethiopia’s request to label the ONLF an international terrorist organization but also remained silent on claims that the Ogaden region is potentially the next Darfur. Ethiopia has shut down media access to the region, so accusations of human rights abuses are unconfirmed. Should the U.S. and other Western countries be speaking out?

Amb. Shinn: On those occasions when there are carefully documented human rights violations by the government of Ethiopia, the ONLF or any other organization, the U.S. and the rest of the world should speak out.

Virtually all of the information coming out of the Ogaden comes from either the Ethiopian government or the ONLF. Much of the information from both sides is unreliable. The problem, therefore, is making certain that accurate information exists before speaking out publicly. A good start would be a willingness by the Ethiopian government to allow independent, third party observers into the Ogaden to provide information about events there.

Worldfocus: Do the 4.5 million ethnic Somalis living in the region mostly support the ONLF? Do the majority of Ogadenis want to secede from Ethiopia?

Men chewing khat in Jigjiga, the capital of Ogaden. Photo: Flickr user CharlesFred

Amb. Shinn: It is impossible to know with any certainty what Somalis in southeastern Ethiopia really want. Because of the difficult security situation, there are no public opinion polls in the area. I think it is reasonable to conclude that the vast majority of Somalis feel marginalized in their own country and that most of them have legitimate grievances against government policies. But do most of them support the ONLF? There is no conclusive evidence.

Not all of the Somalis living in Ethiopia’s Region Five or Somali Region are ethnic Ogaden Somalis. There are significant numbers of non-Ogaden Darod, Isaaq and Dir. Ogadeni from the Darod clan constitute the most numerous group of Somalis and occupy the largest geographical part of the region.

While there may be widespread support for the ONLF by the majority Ogadeni, many Somalis from other clans are concerned about Ogadeni domination. It is even less clear whether the Ogadeni who support the ONLF agree on a political outcome for the region.

Worldfocus: Do Ogadenis have irredentist tendencies, and what is their relationship with Somalia?

Amb. Shinn: In March 2009, there was a leadership split in the organization. The leader of the main faction of the ONLF, Mohamed Omar Osman, is on the record as saying that he wants to hold a referendum so that the Somalis in the region can determine if they wish to remain part of Ethiopia, become an independent country or join with Somalia. It is my understanding that the leadership of both factions of the ONLF prefers an independent Ogaden.

Worldfocus: With national elections slotted for next May, what is at stake for the ONLF and their representation or lack thereof in the Ethiopian government?

Amb. Shinn: Ethiopian national elections in May 2010 will probably change nothing in the Ogaden. Because of the difficult security situation, it is doubtful that elections can even take place in much of Somali Region.

The ONLF, although it participated in the government as a political organization from 1991 to 1994, has shown no interest in rejoining the political process. Even if it believed that the Ethiopian government would allow it to compete freely and fairly as a political party, which it does not believe to be the case, it does not appear that the ONLF is prepared to lay down its arms.

The head of the original ONLF faction, Mohamed Omar Osman, did state in October 2009 that he is prepared to engage in negotiations with the Ethiopian government, but only in the presence of a neutral third party and in a neutral location.

- Lisa Biagiotti

A checkpoint in the West Bank.

Ambassador S. Azmat Hassan is a former career diplomat and a former Ambassador of Pakistan to Malaysia, Syria and Morocco and Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations in New York. He currently serves as an Adjunct Professor at Seton Hall University. He is a contributing blogger for Worldfocus.

In the past decades the United States has taken the lead in initiating a number of diplomatic moves to cut the Gordian knot of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There are two UN Security Council Resolutions agreed to by the protagonists: the Madrid Peace Process and the Road Map to a two-state solution. These initiatives have largely foundered on the twin shoals of Israeli intransigence and Palestinian disunity.

Enter President Obama with his vow to improve U.S. relations with the Muslim world. His speeches in Egypt and Turkey calling for new beginning were warmly welcomed by Muslims and indeed the wider international community. Obama called for a total freeze on Israeli settlements as a necessary first step to starting comprehensive negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians aimed at ending their conflict. No doubt his motives were sincere. However, his efforts have yielded no concrete results so far.

The Israeli government, led by Netanyahu and his hawkish Foreign Minister Lieberman, have spurned Obama’s entreaties to freeze all settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The U.S. then changed course and is now trying to get the two sides to talk while new settlement blocks continue to be built. No Palestinian leadership can be expected to negotiate in this scenario. The impasse has deepened. US credibility is at a low point in the Muslim world.

The opinion in the street is that Obama lacks the clout with Netanyahu to bring him around to halt all settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territories. Not doing so means that a two state solution will not happen. The ability of the U.S. to act as an honest broker is thus being questioned again. Palestine Authority President Mahmoud Abbas seems to have thrown up his hands in despair. He says he will not be standing for reelection next January.

The U.S. is the main supporter and aid-giver to Israel. U.S. interests in the Middle East apparently dictate that it continues to support Israel — come what may. I disagree with this post-1967 assessment because the Middle East has evolved. Clinging to old shibboleths in foreign policy never helps. But the real question is how long will the Arab countries continue to put up with the abominable status quo of Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands?

Meanwhile, the Palestinian political leadership is split with the extremist Hamas faction ruling in Gaza while an increasing weak and ineffectual Abbas has a tenuous hold in the West Bank, and Palestinians continue to suffer the daily humiliations of an onerous Israeli occupation.

I think the Obama administration needs to get tough with both the Israelis and Palestinians. Both should be told that they have to get their act together. The Israelis should be told in no uncertain terms that they cannot expect to hold on to the West Bank and East Jerusalem indefinitely. The US should not be squeamish. It must treat Israel as any other country in the Middle East and not as a special case. The Fatah and Hamas factions need to be told to bury their differences, form a unity government and engage with the Israelis. Sometimes tough love produces fruitful results compared to continuing meaningless talks to nowhere.

Whether Obama and his team can summon the political resolve, commitment and impartiality in moving the two parties toward a final settlement of this long standing conflict remains to be seen. One can only hope that Obama will succeed where his predecessors have failed. Otherwise we should brace ourselves for another eruption of bloody fighting with incalculable consequences for peace and stability in the Middle East.

The views of contributing bloggers do not reflect the views of Worldfocus or its partners.

Read more about his experience overseas in his blog, Embedded in Afghanistan.

The wait continues for the president’s decision on General McChrystal’s recommendation. The unfortunate aspect of all of this business is that the debate is taking place in the public eye. While having a public debate on the efficacy of sending more troops certainly satisfies the exigencies of American politics, it’s most certainly not beneficial to the war effort as a whole. I say this because if the decision is made to not send more troops, or even not send as many as asked for the by the general, we will be perceived by the Afghan government, people, and security forces as abandoning them and losing our will to fight the insurgents. I can confirm that the ANA leaders I habitually talked with were always worried about our ability to stick things out and did not want to see us go anywhere until the country had progressed significantly.

Perception is an incredibly important part of any counter-insurgency, as winning the support of the people should ultimately lead to victory. I can confirm that many of the people of Afghanistan don’t really care who wins this war, just so long as someone wins it, and they can live a semblance of a normal life…i.e. the people will support the side that appears to be on the path to victory.

For these reasons, any action leading to the perception of weakness or lack of commitment on our part needs to be scrupulously avoided. It would have been better to avoid all of this public debate on the issue…unless the request is granted of course, in which case we may take some small benefit from all of this publicizing of our intentions on the matter.

The views expressed by contributing bloggers do not reflect the views of Worldfocus or its partners.

North Korean Major Im Dong-chul. Photos: Ben Piven

Part 3 of 6 in our Inside the Hermit Kingdom series on the people and culture of North Korea. Worldfocus multimedia producer Ben Piven writes about his encounter with Major Im Dong-chul while on the north side of the Demilitarized Zone that separates the two Koreas.

Since 1953, it has been the world’s most militarized border. Bill Clinton has called it the scariest place on earth. Undoubtedly, my most compelling moment in North Korea was at the DMZ — Demilitarized Zone.

Many Americans visit the south side of the 2.5-mile wide buffer zone that runs across the 38th parallel, dividing the Communist north from the democratic south. But our group was given a rare glimpse of the north side, where more than one million soldiers lie in waiting.

Our tour guide, Im Dong-chul, was a 21-year veteran of the Korean People’s Army with a sharp jaw and oval eyes. He offered us our only opportunity to engage in real political conversation with a North Korean soldier. Although the dialogue began with tremendous tension, we moved toward a cordial rapport during our 90 minutes together.

Speaking in Korean, Major Im fielded questions about war and peace. The major and I squared off, with two dozen others crowded around, and I seized the challenge of bilateral hardball. I was simultaneously engaged as a journalist and a diplomat. And since Americans of neither profession are common in North Korea, the task at hand was immense.

Promoting the elusive two-party talks sought by North Korea, I asked what message I should relay to President Obama.

Major Im, with the line of control and U.S.-administered building on the South Korean side in the far background.

“The U.S. should end its hostile attitude towards the DPRK by withdrawing its forces from the Korean peninsula. This is the biggest issue blocking reunification,” he said.

“As a representative of the American people, I know that we voted for a new president because we wanted big changes in foreign policy,” I responded. “President Obama is sincere, but he’s busy with a dozen other problems.”

“If every American were like you, there would be peace,” he concluded. “And I hope Obama’s policy shift happens soon.”

I apologized for American bombers leveling Pyongyang during the Korean War, and the major responded to my empathy. I then reiterated the bottom line of denuclearization: the north needs to implement security guarantees for the south.

It was shocking that Major Im even tolerated our input. Apparently, American tourists had never engaged him before. We too felt the pressure, especially in the DMZ meeting room straddling the Korean border.

I wondered about the significance of the exchange. I had come to terms with our contribution to the tourist economy but hoped that we were not becoming apologists for the state’s Juche ideology.

Back at the hotel that night, we noticed signs of diplomatic progress on BBC World News. But the process is cyclical: the North relaxes its stance, opens to talks, and then postures militarily after making impossible demands. The leadership clams up, afraid to risk humiliation at the bargaining table.

Later in the trip, we heard endless misinformation at the Korean War museum and during our tour of the captured U.S.S. Pueblo spy ship.

In the conference room that straddles the line of control between the two Koreas.

We were told repeatedly that the Korean War was used to lift the Americans out of the depression and that the U.S. had initiated the war.

Yet, we heard not a peep about the American role in liberating Korea from Japan in World War Two, though we often heard more animosity toward the Japanese than toward the sworn American enemy.

During five days in the DPRK, North Korean people never reacted contemptuously to our group as Americans. While anti-American dogma figures into museums and monuments, strangers were deferential and usually avoided us. Tourism workers were often excessively nice, especially if we addressed them in Korean or Mandarin.

My conversation with Major Im was a small but promising victory for the prospects of diplomacy aimed at bringing the world’s most isolated, nuclear-armed regime in from the cold.

- Ben Piven

Hillary Clinton meets with Pakistan’s Prime Minister. Photo: Flickr user americagov

S. Azmat Hassan, a former Pakistani diplomat, is now a professor at Seton Hall University. He blogs about the U.S. Secretary of State’s recent trip to South Asia.

U.S.-Pakistan relations have witnessed many ups and downs in the past decades. This is not an infrequent phenomenon in bilateral relations. A perfect congruence of interests between any two states even neighbors — say, the US and Mexico — is well-nigh impossible. So the Pakistanis appreciated the fact that Hillary Clinton was spending three days in their midst. In the past weeks, they have been at the receiving end of horrific suicide attacks from the Pakistani Taliban, which have claimed the lives of more than 200 army and police personnel, as well as innocent men, women and children. These attacks even included a foray into the heavily guarded Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, which shook the Pakistani army. The Pakistani Taliban had hoped to forestall the Army’s long awaited assault on their bases in the tribal areas of South Waziristan, but their efforts failed. The Army launched the assault a few weeks ago.

Clinton’s diplomatic talents were on full display as she conducted herself among a cross section of the Pakistani nation reeling from terrorist outrages. She must have gauged that most Pakistanis support the Army’s actions to destroy the military power of the Pakistani Taliban in the forbidding wastes of South Waziristan. The U.S. leaders have pronounced themselves “impressed” by the Pakistani counter-terrorism operations in that area. The home town of Hakimullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, has been captured, and he is in hiding. He is a marked man. As I have stated before, there is much riding on this Army operation to militarily degrade the Mehsud militia.

Simultaneously, the Pakistani leadership must take effective action against violent extremists in Southern Punjab who appear to have linked up with the Pakistani Taliban and remnants of al-Qaeda in the remote regions bordering Afghanistan. What was refreshing was Clinton’s affirmation that U.S.-Pakistan relations were too important to be confined only to the counter-terrorism sphere. U.S. help and that of the Friends of Pakistan group which contains many wealthy countries, could be crucial in advancing Pakistan’s socioeconomic development.

Violent extremism will only abate through the accelerated provision of education and employment opportunities. Unemployed youth with no other means of subsistence have to be made stakeholders. They will then join civil society as productive members instead of being recruited as suicide bombers.

Clinton pointedly reminded Pakistanis in her various meetings that the economic inequality between a small rich minority and a large deprived majority is a recipe for violence and unrest. I hope that her frank advice will be heeded by the Pakistani establishment.

Clinton also reassured Pakistanis that the U.S. will not abandon Pakistan this time. Both countries have a huge stake in ridding the region of fanatical obscurantists who want to drag South Asia into the Dark Ages. Let’s hope she means what she says.

A Taiwanese gamer playing Happy Farm on Facebook. Photo: Flickr user copycatko

Hsin-Yin Lee, a former associate producer at Worldfocus, is a news editor at the “China Times” in Taipei.  She writes about the current Taiwanese obsession with a Facebook game.

“Happy Farm,” a six-month-old Facebook application, has spawned millions of cyber farmers across the island. According to the game developer, Taiwanese fans constitute up to 80 percent of the 3.7 million members of “Happy Farm.” Thanks to its popularity, Facebook’s reach rate in August was up 60 percent from July, which helped Taiwan post the highest growth in new Facebook members worldwide during September.

The rule of “Happy Farm” is quite simple: You come, you seed, you conquer. Each virtual farmer is allowed to set up farms, grow crops and raise livestock in a fiercely competitive environment. Points are won not only by one’s hard work but also his craft in stealing from friends when they are offline.

However, not everyone is happy with “Happy Farm.” Taiwanese premier Wu Den-yih recently had to step in to discourage people–especially civil servants–from playing it.

Wu’s comment came after several server shut-downs at local police stations because too many police were playing the game at work. The authority also worried that “crop-stealing” might hurt the image of the police.

The Happy Farm craze has set Taiwanese society in circus. In private companies, managers have issued statements to make clear that “harvesting in an air-conditioned room is immoral.” Some restaurants have even been renovated to resemble the “Happy Farm” interface to attract customers!

Students are complaining that too much work has made them unable to wake up in the middle of night to guard their crops; even drug dealers have been seen using the game to contact customers and establish new networks.

Experts say that overuse of Happy Farm didn’t come out of thin air, though. Taiwanese people are generally overworked, and it is the fatigue generated by heavy workload, experts argue, that leaves people no choice but to get connected through the Internet as much as possible.

According to the 2008 World Competitiveness Yearbook published by the Lausanne-based business school IMD, Taiwan’s working hours were ranked as the fifth-longest in the world - behind Mexico, Hong Kong, South Korea and India.

Since each Taiwanese employee has to work an average of 2,256 hours a year, experts said “Happy Farm” provides an ideal environment for self-indulgence at work. While taking care of your own farm brings contentment, getting a taste of humanity by stealing crops somehow eases the feeling of isolation.

Now, pardon me for ending my article here. I really need to get back to my farm to collect some pumpkins.

A Burka-clad woman in Afghanistan. Photo: Flickr user YanBoechat

S. Azmat Hassan, a former Pakistani diplomat, is now a professor at Seton Hall University.  He writes about the unending search for Osama bin Laden and why the U.S. should shift its strategy.

The month of October marks the eighth anniversary of the war in Afghanistan. It is now over eight years since the Bush administration successfully removed the Taliban regime from power in Kabul. But there was a crucial difference between the US eviction of Saddam from Kuwait and forcible regime change in Afghanistan.

In the former case the U.S. led coalition made sure that the Iraqi Army was destroyed. In the case of the Taliban many of their soldiers were allowed to escape to the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar. Inexplicably, they were not pursued and neutralized. The Taliban lived to fight another day, and today they have regrouped to become a formidable fighting force.

Similarly, Osama bin Laden, who was virtually trapped in the Tora Bora Mountains in eastern Afghanistan, eluded capture. His whereabouts have remained unknown despite the millions of dollars spent on the largest manhunt in history. A FBI reward promising $25 million for information leading to his arrest has also proved unavailing so far. More pertinent I believe is the question: how relevant is bin Laden to America’s security concerns?

Bin Laden’s views may still appeal to a scattered following in Yemen, Somalia, parts of North Africa and elsewhere, but his ability to energize a vast multitude of Muslims to fight America seems to have been seriously compromised.

So the time has probably come to lessen our morbid fascination with the man. The Taliban leadership in Afghanistan may have already written him off as a credible ally. Instead of continuing to expend resources and efforts to find Bin Laden, it may be better for the US to reach out to elements among the Afghan Taliban.The attempt should be to wean them away from the diehard elements around Mullah Omar.

This effort would require, in security expert Bruce Hoffman’s words, “intelligence on the ground.” Do the U.S. and NATO have enough Pashto-speaking operatives deployed in Afghanistan to accomplish this task? If the Taliban commanders can be assured of a power sharing arrangement in the Afghan government, the present fraught situation in Afghanistan could conceivably take a turn for the better.

The Pashtun tribesmen do not form a monolithic bloc. It is military confrontation by the US that unites them against what they perceive to be a foreign military occupying their land. If they see the prospect of an end to the Afghan war through co-optation in the Afghan government, they may be willing to lay down their weapons.

I believe it is desirable to explore this option to end a ruinous war which if pursued militarily alone, could last indefinitely. This prospect would not be in the interest of any of the principal actors. It would probably engender more turmoil, more bloodshed and more agony in that region, with ominous consequences for all.

An Afghani shopkeeper in Herat. Photo: Khushbu Shah

Khushbu Shah studied political science at Berkeley then did a Masters in conflict studies at the London School of Economics. She currently lives in Kabul and conducts research for a consulting firm.

I never say no to a meal in Afghanistan that consists of anything besides the usual combination of greasy meat and greasy rice. When my manager called me around noon last week to join her inside our gated compound for “special company and gourmet food,” I was already ringing her doorbell before she hung up the phone.

As I strolled in, four men in military uniform turned around. My boss flashed a mischievous albeit discreet grin my way.

As I realized that this was my first encounter with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and I had a million questions to shoot their way.

As the instant Starbucks coffee was poured into steaming cups, I cornered one of the guests, a lieutenant colonel from the German Armed Forces Technical Advisory Group (GAFTAG). I hounded the worn out and lieutenant-colonel with questions about his interaction with the Afghans who worked under his auspices in maintaining equipment for the burgeoning Afghan army.

Because he mentors Afghans willing to join the international forces for work, he worries constantly about how their equipment is not always up to international standards. There is also a lack of understanding between his team and the national staff in terms of the relative importance of their jobs.

Showing a remarkable amount of passion and sincerity that I did not expect from a man in his position, he constantly referred his frustration with getting his Afghan workers to take their jobs seriously. His mentee chose this job maintaining equipment because it was close to his home, he knew the Afghan in charge and he got to stay in Kabul.

When the colonel brought more than $2,000 USD worth of new equipment for his mentee, the first thing out of the man’s mouth was,” But where is my present?” According to the lieutenant colonel, this mentality has become prevalent over the last decade of international assistance because people prioritize their individual own survival and their immediate concerns: money and presents.

We mulled over the the need to strengthen the the Afghan National Army (ANA). We also lamented the fact that an ANA soldier makes $70 a month versus over $1,000 for a UN driver. Also, the lieutenant colonel adamantly stressed the need for a stronger police force as the basis for post-conflict reconstruction.

Finally, of course, I had to ask him about Obama’s impending decision and the possibility of an increase in American troops. Surprisingly, his answer was not the one I expected. He replied with a simple statement, “If the current number of troops have shown no promise of improvement or change, then there is no point in increasing the number now or later.”

I have days where I meet private security contractors and end up throwing out many harsh words. Generally, it is a battle between the humanitarians, journalists, and NGO workers versus the security contractors and ISAF, but this was a conversation to remember. Not once did I feel the urge to launch a verbal assault, and in actuality, I gained a new perspective on the ISAF’s daily struggles.

- Khushbu Shah

Pyongyang residents at the Arch of Triumph. Photo: Ben Piven

The South Korean government says that the number of North Korean refugees in South Korea has surpassed 16,000, and recent immigrants are generally uneducated and underemployed. Worldfocus contributing blogger Jamblichus writes about their plight.

South Korea’s Unification Ministry has requested 9.3 billion won (US$7.9 million) to beef up its resettlement facilities for defectors from the North as the number of refugees arriving from its destitute neighbor keeps climbing.

According to the ministry’s 2010 budget proposal, Seoul plans to spend just over four million dollars to build a second Hanawon, a resettlement center for defectors and around three million dollars to establish smaller “Hana” support centers across the nation.

Lets hope that those doling out the cash take the request seriously (the ministry has requested a 25% budget increase for next year) for North Korean refugees are becoming a growing underclass in the South whose needs current resettlement facilities are hugely under-equipped to accommodate.

Until the late 1990s, the number of North Koreans defecting to the South remained insignificant, totaling just 86 between 1990 and 1994 and remaining in double-digits each year until 1999. Numbers began to shoot up thereafter — following a devastating famine in the North — with 583 arriving in South Korea in 2001 and 1,139 the following year.

On February 16, 2007, the unification ministry pulled a cracker for Chairman Kim Jong-il on his birthday by announcing that the total number of Northern refugees arriving in the South had reached 10,000; just 32 months later there are now more than 16,000. You do the math.

The first wave — in fact more a gentle ripple — of defectors were largely drawn from the North Korean elite. But recent defectors have often been young and unskilled, hailing from the communist state’s North Hamgyong province. The sheer numbers have meant they are treated no longer as romantic escapees deserving of full approbation by the southern public — but a burden on the taxpayer, somewhat unsophisticated and potentially threatening to the social order.

The South’s rigid and hyper-competitive education system looks almost designed to alienate young defectors further from an already difficult-to-crack South Korean society. And while there are success stories — from world champion female boxer Choi Hyun-mi to journalist Kang Chol-hwan — the vast majority wind up unemployed.

A survey of 654 defectors that was conducted in December 2006, showed that 45.1% were unemployed, 30% had part-time employment, 13.1% had temporary employment, and only 11.8% were either self-employed or had full-time employment. Another survey conducted by Professor Park Sang-an of Seoul National University in the same year came up with an unemployment rate of over 67%.

Things may have improved since then, but I’m guessing not dramatically, particularly given the sheer increase in numbers arriving. Another survey reported by the Chosun Ilbo in 2007 found more than half of North Korean teens in South Korea drop out of school, a staggering figure compared to the 1-2 per cent drop out rate for South Korean students.

Given the numbers, seven million bucks doesn’t sound like all that much. There’s only so long South Korea can afford such a failure of integration — as defector numbers burgeon — before the problem becomes significantly more visible. Let’s hope the Unification Ministry gets its money.

Mayan-inspired artifacts in Yucatan, Mexico. Photo: Flickr user ncreedplayer

Many conspiracy theorists, contradicting the claims of most scientists, point to 2012 as the year of the apocalypse. They often cite the Mayan calendar as evidence that doomsday will occur just over two years down the road.

Blogger Sean Goforth writes how the Mayans do not actually see 2012 as the end of the world — but merely as the end of a time cycle — and how most have more pragmatic concerns.

According to History Channel lore the Mayan calendar ends on December 21, 2012. Indeed the Long Count calendar, one of several used by the Maya, reaches the end of a 394-year cycle, known as a Baktun, at about that time. The Long Count calendar begins in 3114 BCE; hence, 2012 AD will mark the end of the 13th Baktun.

Popular consciousness has conflated “Mayan calendar” and “end of cycle, 2012,” interpreted ‘cycle’ to mean ‘existence’, and spawned a rumor mill that the world is on the brink of destruction. Turns out, global demise is at hand, rife with meteors, tidal waves, “pole shifts”, nuclear annihilation, etc. I, for one, was unaware until last semester. While returning mid-term exams, a student quipped that his grade didn’t matter because everyone is going to die in three years anyway. Normally a quiet bunch, I found myself among a chorus of doomsdayers. The speculation seems unlikely to abate—next month the apocalyptic thriller “2012” will debut in theatres.

Unlike other doomsday prophecies, this one contains a germ of archeological and astronomical truth. Along a rural path in southern Mexico, a tablet known as Monument Six was discovered in the 1960s. Inscriptions on the ruin note the year 2012 and speak of something happening with Bolon Yokte, a Mayan god associated with war and creation. One section of Monument Six roughly translates as, “He will descend from the sky.” A little eerie perhaps, but nothing too damning when put in context. David Stuart, an expert on Mayan epigraphy at the University of Texas, states, “The Maya never said the world was going to end, never said anything bad was going to happen necessarily, they are just recording this future anniversary on Monument Six.” The Maya also plausibly cited 2012 because they were astronomical prodigies. Upon the 2012 winter solstice the sun will line up with the center of our Milky Way, an occasion that only comes around every 25,800 years.

But the idea of the clock “running out” in 2012 is a Western invention. The Maya in fact celebrated the end of cycles, so the transition from the 13th Baktun to the 14th should be greeted, if anything, with revelry. And the Maya noted dates beyond 2012. Guillermo Bernal of Mexico’s National Autonomous University points out inscriptions at various Mayan sites reference future dates as far away as 4772. Part of the misinterpretation emerges from the Mayan practice of pre-recording important dates.

Still, experts are getting rather frustrated with the hubbub surrounding the Mayan calendar. Apolinario Chile Pixtin, a Mayan elder, is annoyed: “I came back from England last year, and man, they had me fed up with this stuff.” Sandra Noble, executive director of the Foundation for the Advancement of Mesoamerican Studies, calls the doomsday scenario “a complete fabrication and a chance for a lot of people to cash in.” Academics and Maya elders instead believe Earth in 2012 will be hit by a “meteor shower of new age philosophy” and pop astronomy, no doubt teased by TV specials.

Ruminating on doomsday in three years may be engrossing, but it’s a luxury many Maya don’t have. A drought-stricken 2009 is proving quite harsh. According to one Yucatan archeologist, if you went to Maya Yucatan communities and said the world might end in 2012, “They wouldn’t believe you. We have real concerns these days, like rain.”

- Sean Goforth

A Waziri man in Bela, Pakistan. Photo: Flickr user sahrizvi

S. Azmat Hassan is a former Pakistani diplomat.  He is now a professor at Seton Hall University.  He writes about the current Pakistani military campaign in South Waziristan and what the U.S. should do in the troubled region.

After months of planning, the Pakistani army has finally dispatched 38,000 troops into the Pakistani Taliban stronghold of South Waziristan. President Zardari and Army Chief Kiyani doubtlessly hope for a knockout blow to the newly anointed leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsud. How much support Hakimullah enjoys among his fierce and warlike fellow tribesmen, the Mehsuds, is not known.

Military analysts estimate that Hakimullah commands around 10,000 fighters including 1500 battle-hardened Uzbeks from Uzbekistan. The Pakistani Taliban may be numerically outnumbered but have the advantage of terrain, tribal solidarity and extremist ideology.

It is crucial for the Pakistani army to blunt the power of the Mehsud group. A stalemate this time will be interpreted as a serious setback which could have ominous repercussions for the Zardari-led civilian government. If Hakimullah stands his ground, his stature among violent extremists in the region will grow. The ability of the Afghan Taliban to continue to use Pakistan’s lawless and ungovernable tribal areas bordering eastern Afghanistan as sanctuaries will continue unimpeded. Therefore there is much riding on the Pakistani operation. Its reverberations will be felt not only in Islamabad and Kabul but also in Washington, London and other Western capitals.

The modern history of Afghanistan is a sorry saga of continual blundering by the Afghans, the Soviets, the Americans and the Pakistanis. The Afghan leadership fell into the lap of the Soviets in the 1970’s, and the Soviets committed the original sin in 1979 of invading, occupying and brutalizing a poor neighbor which had done it no harm. The famous Soviet physicist and Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov, said it best when he stated, “The war in Afghanistan itself was criminal, a criminal adventure taken on, undertaken by who knows who, and who knows [who] bears the responsibility for this enormous crime of our motherland.” The US turned their backs on a broken Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew in defeat in 1989. This was a sure recipe for radicalizing the region.

The Pakistani security establishment trained and groomed the Taliban after the latter captured power in Kabul in 1996. Today the Pakistani Taliban has turned on their former mentors. For the Pakistani leadership and common people, they have become Frankensteinian monsters.

The Obama administration made a big error in coining its so-called ‘Afpak’ strategy. What was required were two different approaches for two different, albeit neighboring, countries, with not much in common between them. Conflating the two and putting them in the same basket showed both ignorance and unfamiliarity with the political dynamics of both.  I am glad Obama is reviewing Afpak. He should treat both countries as separate entities, and the U.S. should craft different approaches to them. Hopefully Richard Holbrooke after his numerous visits to both nations has been able to advise Hilary Clinton and Obama suitably.

To succeed in its campaign, the Pakistani army will have to take a crash course in counterinsurgency warfare. Conventional land wars and confronting Taliban insurgents in their mountainous bases are as different as chalk and cheese.  The Pakistanis desperately need counterinsurgency materiel such as attack helicopters, electronic surveillance devices, night vision goggles, etc. The U.S. should cut out the bureaucratic red tape and provide such assistance quickly. It is in their interest that the Pakistani army succeed in their assault on their mutual enemies.

Finally, I would advise the Pakistani planners and their American allies to locate and cut off the financial support available to the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. This is an achievable task. The UN and Interpol can provide help, as can the European Union, the Iranians, Russians and other interested parties. Without sizable financial support, such insurgencies wither away sooner rather than later. That is how al-Qaeda has been reduced to a shadow of its former strength. This is the most effective way to defang the two Talibans.

After months of planning, the Pakistani army has finally dispatched 38,000 troops into the Pakistani Taliban stronghold of South Waziristan. S. Azmat Hassan, a former Pakistani diplomat, writes about the current Pakistani military campaign in South Waziristan and what the U.S. should do in the troubled region. http://worldfocus.org/files/2009/10/th_pakistan_waziri.jpg ]]> http://worldfocus.org/blog/2009/10/19/moving-beyond-afpak-in-us-foreign-policy/7860/feed/ http://worldfocus.org/blog/2009/10/12/us-mulls-military-options-in-afghanistan/7727/ http://worldfocus.org/blog/2009/10/12/us-mulls-military-options-in-afghanistan/7727/#comments Mon, 12 Oct 2009 19:20:39 +0000 Worldfocus http://worldfocus.org/?p=7727

An Afghan villager in late 2008. Photo: Flickr user RugNug

S. Azmat Hassan is a career diplomat and former ambassador of Pakistan, where his postings have included Ambassador of Pakistan to Malaysia, Syria and Morocco, and Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations in New York. He currently serves as an adjunct professor at Seton Hall University.

On how to proceed in Afghanistan: Obama should make haste slowly. He is being pulled in different directions, which is not unusual in American politics. Kennedy was pressured by his senior military commanders to preemptively attack Russian missile sites in Cuba, which he rejected. Instead, he wisely chose diplomacy. He averted a possible nuclear holocaust in the aftermath of which the living if any would have envied the dead. Truman dismissed MacArthur, a general with a big ego, who advised him to nuke China to stop their advance in the Korean War.

Obama should strictly order the US commander in Afghanistan General McChrystal, to observe military protocol by not courting the media to publicize his recommendation for 40,000 additional troops. He should go through the military chain of command instead of trying to become a military prima donna. The buck stops with Obama- the Commander-in-Chief.

Since time immemorial, no foreign army has won in Afghanistan. Alexander, arguably the greatest military commander of all time, and more recently the mighty British and the Soviet armies, all experienced humiliating reverses in Afghanistan. The US Army supported by some NATO forces, has been trying for 8 years to defeat a ragtag militia calling itself the Taliban. They have failed. One does not have to be a military genius to figure out that when the combination of the forces opposing you is in the ascendant; it is time to give up the military option. The Taliban have the advantages of geography, history and resolve to attenuate and outlast the US forces-whom they consider foreign invaders.

Throwing in more troops is not likely to alter the current military equation. In today’s world where asymmetric warfare has demonstrated that a $20 improvised explosive device can destroy humvees and armored personnel carriers costing millions, the military calculus is weighted in favor of the local resistance. It is a resistance, moreover, which is hugely reinforced by an apparently inexhaustible supply of suicide bombers who can wreak havoc among both the military and civilians.

Those who recommend military escalation are still hoping for a military victory. Their rationale for pursuing the military option is the wrongheaded conflation of the Taliban with al-Qaeda. No such partnership is discernible today in Afghanistan. The Taliban regime was overthrown by the US in 2001 for being in cahoots with Osama bin Laden. They are unlikely to make the same mistake twice. American analysts themselves admit that al-Qaeda is down to around 100 adherents in Afghanistan.

Al-Qaeda is thus highly unlikely to be in a position to launch another 9/11 or any operation approaching it. Mullah Omar has publicly proclaimed that his fight is not against the West. It is against foreign military forces and the ineffectual and corrupt Karzai regime which stands further delegitimized in the eyes of many Afghans as well as many in the international community, for blatantly rigging the recent general election. Afghanistan is called the graveyard of empires. It would be prudent for Obama who is considered an astute politician, not to fall further in this bottomless pit like the others before him.

So what can be done? The US must initiate a dialogue with the Taliban beginning with their leader Mullah Omar. A senior British diplomat whom I had invited recently to lecture to my class told them that at the height of the British conflict with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the British kept up contacts with them. When the IRA was ready to talk with the British authorities, they utilized an already established channel of communication.

Today the centuries old Anglo-Irish problem is largely resolved. Regrettably, the US has not evolved politically to set up such mechanisms with its antagonists such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Hizbullah and Hamas. They have forgotten British Foreign Secretary’s Lord Palmerston’s sage advice tendered 150 years ago: in international relations there are no permanent friends or enemies- only interests. Today it is patently in America’s interest to explore the diplomatic option in Afghanistan as the military option has failed. It is the road to a dead end.

- S. Azmat Hassan

ACCRA, Ghana.
Several thousand children live and work on the streets here, and their numbers are growing. Increasing urbanization in the capital city and increasing poverty in the surrounding countryside are making more children vulnerable to all forms of exploitation and abuse, including a higher risk of exposure to HIV.

Amina is 11, an orphan who works as a porter in the suburb of Nima. Porters like Amina, known in Accra as kayayei, carry heavy loads in a basin balanced on their heads. She said in an interview that she came to Accra two years ago, when she was 9, after her parents were killed. They were returning home from their farm field on a bicycle when they were hit by a car and killed, she said.

Although she has aunts and uncles, they not only declined to take in the orphan but also accused her of causing her parents’ deaths, she claimed. Since she had no other family to run to, her only option was to head to Accra to find work and take care of herself. So now she carries loads for shoppers in the Nima market.

She charges 70 pesewes ($ .50 U.S.) for a small load and 1 cedi ($ .68 U.S.) for a bigger load. After the day’s work, she waits for a shop to close so she can sleep in front of that shop, she said, adding that she has been robbed a few times of the money she made that day.  She asked that her full name not be published because she feared for her safety if her relatives should learn of her whereabouts.

The minimum age when children can work legally in Ghana is 16. However, more than 26 percent of children between 5 and 14 work illegally, according to the Ghana Statistical Service. The service’s report indicates that children in rural areas work in fishing, herding and farming, and as domestic servants, porters, hawkers, mine and quarry laborers, and bus conductors. In urban centers like Accra, street children work mainly as truck pushers, head porters, and sales workers.

Jalal Mohammed, a program officer at Moslem Family Counseling Services in Accra, said in an interview that child laborers are not only denied access to education but also some are held in indentured servitude, forced to work off their families’ debts. According to his agency, more than 1 million underage children work in Ghana. Of those, more than 242,000 are engaged in the most dangerous and exploitive work and over 800,000 are not in school.

Mohammed said many child traffickers in Ghana have been publicly exposed but authorities have failed to prosecute them.  He added that the government would not act and traffickers would not be deterred unless aid workers, human rights activists, and journalists continued to apply pressure.

Ambassador Azmat Hassan

Azmat Hassan is a career diplomat and former ambassador of Pakistan, where his postings have included Ambassador of Pakistan to Malaysia, Syria and Morocco, and Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations in New York. He currently serves as an adjunct professor at Seton Hall University.

The outcome of the recent Geneva talks between the P5+1 and Iran is good news. The international community is rightly concerned at the ambiguity surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s agreement to turn over the enriched uranium fuel from its reactors to Russia represents a significant concession. But more significantly, it is a victory for diplomacy. It staves off, at least temporarily, the hawkish option of preemptive attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities by either Israel or the United States.

The latter course would be disastrous as it almost certainly would unleash more bloodshed and uncertainty in the Middle East — and probably tilt Iran toward joining the nuclear club. Iran feels hemmed in by the only nuclear power in the Middle East, Israel; by the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan; and by nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The Geneva talks open up the possibility of diplomatic engagement between the U.S. and Iran.

The U.S. and Iran have not spoken to each other for 30 years. They have to reengage to serve their mutual interests. Normalization would enable American diplomats on the ground in Tehran to better gauge the dynamics of Iranian politics. Ditto for Iranian diplomats in Washington. If matters proceed well, it might enable Obama to have a direct channel to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Pakistan helped the U.S. and China to reconcile forty years ago, and it would be a possible mediator between Washington and Tehran.

I vividly remember accompanying President Leghari of Pakistan in a meeting with Khamenei, when the former was on a state visit to Tehran in 1994. Khamenei sat on the floor, and so did the Pakistani delegation, on exquisite Persian carpets interspersed with cushions. Far from the West’s caricature of Iranian clergy as a bunch of scowling mullahs in black robes, Khamenei appeared both genial and worldly.

I did not detect any fire and brimstone in his remarks. Engagement almost always softens the rough edges of animosity and misperception among adversaries. Rabbi Jonathan Sacks of the U.K. said that a real hero is one who turns an enemy into a friend.

Diplomatic engagement between the U.S and Iran is imperative if we desire a more peaceful Middle East. This will be good for all actors. Iran is just too important and powerful to be intimidated or isolated. Nixon’s opening to China showed the enormous benefits of bringing China into the world’s mainstream. The same can happen with Iran. Diplomacy means putting oneself in the shoes of one’s antagonist. It means viewing intractable issues from a different prism. Ultimately, it means searching for accommodation. If the U.S. were to open up and normalize with Iran, it could open the way for a broad-based rapprochement between Israel, the Palestinians, the Arab countries and Iran. It could unlock the gridlock in Iraq and Afghanistan. It could thus be win-win all around — instead of the zero-sum game that the hawks want us to play.

- Azmat Hassan

For another perspective on the responsibilities of the P5+1, read contributor Dwight Bashir’s thoughts: Amid Iran nuclear talks, don’t forget human rights.

Should the P5+1 stand in solidarity with Iran’s reformers?

For the past 15 years, Dwight Bashir has worked on international conflict, human rights and religious freedom issues. He is a senior advisor for an independent U.S. commission focusing on international religious freedom. The views expressed here are his own personal views.

Now that the P5+1 (the United States, Britain, France, Russian, China + Germany) have embarked on multilateral negotiations with the Iranian government, it is time to look forward, not backward. The one-day talks in Geneva held last week will resume after an October 25 visit to Iran by representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to assess Iran’s newly-declared nuclear facility.

As expected, international attention has focused on Iran’s apparent willingness to send most of its enriched uranium out of the country and to allow the IAEA to inspect its latest facility. What has not received adequate attention is what happened on the fringes of the formal talks –- separate discussions between American and Iranian diplomats on human rights.

Here’s how the U.S. State Department spokesman characterized these conversations: “In addition to the focus on the nuclear program, they also had a frank exchange on a number of other issues, including issues of human rights. And we also raised the issue of American citizens who are being held in Iran…”

Understandably, the United States government asked about American detainees in Iran, but what other human rights issues were discussed? Unfortunately, there has been no further explanation.

Did anyone inquire about the hundreds of Iranian citizens injured or killed while peacefully protesting the contested outcome of the June 12 elections? Or the scores of dissidents and reformers who have been beaten by Iranian security and militia forces and unlawfully detained for weeks? What about before the elections, and the thousands of brave women’s rights activists, journalists, bloggers, ethnic and religious minorities, human rights defenders and others who have been unjustly imprisoned?

For that matter, did anyone raise specific cases such as the seven Baha’i leaders, in jail since early last year, who could be sentenced to death on October 18 on baseless espionage charges? What about the status of two Christian women, Maryam and Marzieh, who reportedly have serious health concerns yet continue to languish in prison — now for more than six months — without charge and facing the death penalty for apostasy?

Let’s also not forget that just two weeks ago, President Ahmadinejad arrived in New York on very shaky international standing with internal turmoil alive and well in Iran. Nevertheless, he still felt confident enough to spew anti-Semitic rants and anti-Western vitriol during his address to the United Nations General Assembly.

All is not lost. There is a way forward.

In addition to holding the Iranian government to account for its nuclear ambitions, the P5+1 should use its new platform to raise substantive human rights issues, and not just behind closed doors. The Iranian government has already agreed to “embark on comprehensive, all-encompassing and constructive negotiations,” so human rights are fair game. In particular, the P5+1 should publicly express its genuine concern about the plight of Iranian citizens, as well as raising specific cases (a similar method was used successfully by the United States during the 1970s when it raised human rights effectively during arms talks with the Soviet Union). This message must emerge in future deliberations, otherwise the morale of Iran’s reformers and — of advocates of freedom and democracy globally — will have suffered a major blow.

The P5+1 can cite Iran’s obligations under international human rights law; in particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which Iran is a party. Not only would this present a unified front among P5+1 partners, but would also demonstrate solidarity with the Iranian people. If Russia and China balk, the four Western partners can still take a powerful stand. The Iranian people need to know that the international community cares about their fate and will not trade away 30 years of transgressions for potential nuclear concessions.

The U.S. Congress can also play its part. Both the Senate and House are moving forward on providing the Obama administration with a new set of targeted economic sanctions should Iran fail to produce tangible results in a timely fashion. Current legislation under debate identifies nuclear proliferation and support for international terrorism as justification for imposing new sanctions. Final legislation should add international human rights violations to the list. This inclusion would demonstrate that the Iranian government’s poor human rights record is on equal footing with other security concerns.

Even if symbolic, Congress should also consider triggering a targeted sanction under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA). Iran has been on the U.S. blacklist of religious freedom violators for 10 years, yet no new sanction has been imposed. In addition, the State Department has a statutory requirement under IRFA to identify foreign agencies and officials responsible for violations of religious freedom and can bar individuals from entry into the United States.

This requirement remains unfulfilled.

Ideally, the ultimate goal would be to get international agreement among the P5+1 on any new sanctions. Although this isn’t a must. Again, if Russian and/or China hold out, the four Western allies can still work together. Since late 2006, the U.N. Security Council has passed three rounds of sanctions penalizing Iran’s nuclear program and imposing travel bans on those individuals involved. Why not do the same for Iranian officials involved in human rights abuses? It’s high time to identify Iran’s human rights violations as a justification for tougher sanctions. This act alone would bolster Iran’s reformers to play their part inside Iran.

- Dwight Bashir

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Plug 1 under a Creative Commons license.